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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents three studies that seek to understand how the interaction between
economic and natural systems affects the efficiency of policy instruments to regulate envi-
ronmental externalities. In the first study, I use a population data set of irrigation wells
in Nebraska’s Republican River Basin to analyze whether adopting spatially differentiated
groundwater markets leads to significant savings in abatement cost while protecting nearby
streams. Although the marginal damage of groundwater use on stream flows depends cru-
cially on the location of pumping relative to streams, I find that regulators can generate
most of the potential cost savings and maintain current levels of stream flow without spa-
tial differentiation. In the second study, I examine the key features of an efficient tradable
permits system to regulate environmental externalities that are lagged and stochastic. I find
that optimal tradable permit systems will require trading ratios that may be greater than
or less than one, and that the magnitudes of these trading ratios depend on (a) the discount
rate, (b) conditional expectations of future states of the affected resource, (c) persistence of
the state of the affected resource, and (d) initial conditions. In the third study, I analyze
how analytical hydrologic models can inform the effective design and choice of policy in-
struments to manage groundwater quality. I develop an economic optimization model that
explains the role of geophysical parameters in determining optimal groundwater contaminant
levels and apply the model to solve a management problem of aquifer contamination from
highway deicers. I compare my theoretical results to those from previous economic studies
of groundwater pollution and describe how my model can provide a framework to evalu-
ate the potential effectiveness of different policy instruments to manage different classes of
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groundwater contamination problems. Overall, the dissertation provides a mixed review of
the success of traditional market-based schemes in internalizing cost effectively the damages
of complex environmental externalities.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation presents three studies that seek to understand how the interaction between
economic and natural systems affects the efficiency of policy instruments to regulate environ-
mental externalities. Economists often favor market-based solutions to externalities because
theory predicts that these schemes can achieve environmental targets cost-effectively. How-
ever, many existing studies do not account for the fact that the physical systems underlying
these markets can be stochastic, spatially and temporally variable, and subject to time
lags [10, 71]. This mismatch between modeled and realistic physical processes may lead to
suboptimal management policies and exacerbate conflict over natural resources. The over-
arching hypothesis of this dissertation is that explicit integration of environmental processes
into an economic framework will yield optimal market-based policies that are qualitatively
different from those currently offered in the literature, and that management practices that
reflect these differences will lead to better economic and environmental outcomes. The
following chapters test this hypothesis by addressing three different but related research
questions.
In chapter two, I analyze the cost effectiveness of policy instruments to regulate an ex-
ternality known as steam depletion. Stream depletion occurs when groundwater pumping
from aquifers reduces the flow of surface water in nearby streams. Recent awareness of this
externality in the United States has led to interstate conflict and litigation between local
stakeholders and federal agencies. The analysis consists of an optimization model of each
well owner’s crop choice, land use, and irrigation decisions that determines the distribution
of regulatory costs and a hydrologic model that quantifies the externality of pumping on
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streams. I use this coupled economic-hydrologic model to estimate farmer abatement costs
and stream flow benefits under a constrained optimal market that features spatially differ-
entiated, tradable groundwater permits as well as under alternative, second-best policies.
Although the marginal damage of groundwater use on stream flows depends crucially on the
location of pumping relative to streams, the analysis shows that regulators can generate most
of the potential cost savings and maintain current levels of stream flow without spatial dif-
ferentiation. This surprising result is quantitative evidence that cost-effective market design
may not lead to significantly better economic outcomes compared to simpler second-best
policies. However, the model also predicts that if regulators need to increase the protec-
tion of streams from current levels, spatially differentiated policies will generate sizable cost
savings compared to policies that ignore spatial heterogeneity.
In chapter three, I examine the key features of an efficient tradable permits system to
regulate environmental externalities that are lagged and stochastic. Many important ex-
ternalities exhibit both time lags and uncertainty, such as the impact of greenhouse gas
emissions on global mean temperatures and the effects of fertilizer application in agriculture
on the eutrophication of coastal waters. For this analysis, I develop a dynamic optimization
model in which production by firms affects a natural resource stock with heterogeneous time
lags and the state of the stock follows a stochastic process. The model is parameterized
using exponential functional forms and the stochastic process is given structure in order to
obtain analytical results regarding the relationship between optimal firm abatement levels
and key parameters. Results show that optimal tradable permit systems to regulate lagged
and stochastic externalities will require trading ratios that may be greater than or less than
one, and that the magnitudes of these trading ratios depend on (a) the discount rate, (b)
conditional expectations of future states of the affected resource, (c) persistence of the state
of the affected resource, and (d) initial conditions. The theoretical model is then imple-
mented in a numerical application for a groundwater market in the Republican River Basin
in order to illustrate the difference between market designs that do and do not account for
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the simultaneous presence of time lags and uncertainty in an externality.
Both chapters two and three use data from the Republican River Basin to analyze ground-
water regulations that seek to protect streams. Together, these chapters seek to address the
most important sources of physical complexity in externalities of groundwater use on streams,
namely, spatial heterogeneity, time lags, and uncertainty. A fully cost effective, comprehen-
sive policy would require an analysis that accounts for all of these properties simultaneously.
However, the approach taken in this dissertation is to study the impact of these complexities
in isolation. The coupled economic-hydrologic model in chapter two analyzes the role of
spatial heterogeneity and time lags in the externality on streams while abstracting from the
presence of uncertainty; the dynamic optimization model in chapter three studies the role
of time lags and uncertainty while abstracting from the presence of spatial heterogeneity.
The motivation behind this approach is to disentangle the effects of spatial, dynamic, and
stochastic complexity in order to understand the qualitative and quantitative implications
of each factor on the design environmental policy instruments.
Finally, in chapter four, I discuss how analytical hydrologic models can inform the ef-
fective design and choice of policy instruments to manage groundwater quality. Analytical
hydrologic models are an alternative to numerical hydrologic models, which are difficult to
implement in an economic analysis because they are often computationally intensive and
calibrated to specific aquifers or watersheds. I develop a social planner’s problem of optimal
groundwater quality management that is coupled with analytical hydrologic equations and
provide a theoretical analysis to characterize the properties of an optimal emissions policy.
I compare these theoretical results to those from previous economic studies of groundwater
pollution and describe how the model can provide a framework to evaluate the potential
effectiveness of policy instruments to manage different classes of groundwater contamination
problems. The model is then applied in a numerical analysis to demonstrate the relevance of
the theoretical results to practical management settings using the example of groundwater
contamination by chloride from highway deicers (i.e. road salt).
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All three of these research questions are motivated by issues related to water resources and
ecosystems. Although water is an important natural resource and environmental medium
in and of itself, the methods and conclusions contained in the chapters of this dissertation
can be generalized to cover other problems in environmental and resource economics. In
particular, I try to characterize the type of environmental problems for which spatial hetero-
geneity, time lags, and uncertainty can play a large role in influencing the cost effectiveness
of different policy instruments. For those settings where accounting for the complexity of
the natural system matters, I describe the advantages and disadvantages of different poli-
cies such as zoning, emissions or harvest restrictions, and permit markets. Methodologically
speaking, I advocate the use of analytical equations from the physical and natural sciences
to capture complex dynamic and spatial properties of different environmental externalities.
This approach can be applied in economic analysis of natural resources other than water for
which costly and computationally intensive numerical models are not currently available.
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CHAPTER 2
THE REGULATION OF A SPATIALLY
HETEROGENEOUS EXTERNALITY: TRADABLE
GROUNDWATER PERMITS TO MAINTAIN
INSTREAM FLOWS
2.1 Introduction
Groundwater pumping from aquifers can reduce the flow of surface water in nearby streams,
in a process known as stream depletion. In the United States, recent awareness of this
externality has led to interstate conflict over the role of groundwater use in the fulfillment
of compacts governing the distribution of water in trans-boundary rivers. Groundwater
regulations have been implemented in response to claims filed in the U.S. Supreme Court
by Texas against New Mexico over flows in the Pecos River, by Kansas against Colorado
over the Arkansas River, and by Kansas against Nebraska and Colorado over the Republican
River [26, 45]. Interstate commissions that manage other trans-boundary rivers, such as the
Delaware River, which flows through New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware,
have expressed concern over the role of groundwater withdrawals on stream flow [11]. In
addition, large-scale groundwater use in several parts of the country has degraded species
habitats that depend on surface water. The ecological impacts of stream depletion have
resulted in litigation between local stakeholders and federal agencies over species protected
under the Endangered Species Act in Idaho [69] and Texas [42], as well as species that are
economically and culturally important, like Pacific Northwest salmon [2].
In this chapter, I analyze whether adopting a spatially differentiated groundwater permit
system can lead to significant savings in compliance costs while meeting targets on stream
protection. Groundwater use is typically unmonitored and unregulated in the United States,
but concerns over stream depletion have led to rapidly-changing groundwater allocation
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policies and management institutions. One factor that complicates the design of management
policies is the spatial heterogeneity of the stream depletion externality; the marginal damage
of groundwater use on stream flows depends crucially on the location of pumping within
a hydrologic context. Under these circumstances, economic theory predicts that spatially
differentiated policies can achieve an aggregate reduction in stream depletion cost effectively.
However, whether spatially differentiated policies offer significant abatement cost savings and
environmental improvements over simpler, alternative policies is an empirical question.
Using a population data set of active groundwater wells in the Nebraska portion of the
Republican River Basin, I implement an optimization model of each well owner’s crop choice,
land use, and irrigation decisions to determine the distribution of regulatory costs. I model
the externality of pumping on streams by employing an analytical solution from the hydrol-
ogy literature that determines reductions in stream flow caused by groundwater pumping
over space and time. The economic and hydrologic model components are then combined
into one optimization framework, which allows us to measure farmer abatement costs and
stream flow benefits under a constrained optimal market that features spatially differenti-
ated, tradable groundwater permits. I compare this outcome to the efficiency of alternative
second-best policies, including spatially uniform permit markets and pumping restrictions
based on geographic zones.
I find that if current levels of stream flow in the Republican River Basin are held fixed,
regulators can generate most of the potential abatement cost savings by establishing a one-
to-one tradable permit system that does not account for spatial heterogeneity. I obtain
this surprising result because the agronomic and climatic parameters in the data set that
determine farmer abatement costs are spatially correlated with hydrologic parameters that
determine the marginal damage of groundwater use on streams. However, I also find that
if future legal or ecological circumstances require regulators to increase significantly the
protection of streams from current levels, spatially differentiated policies will generate sizable
cost savings compared to policies that ignore spatial heterogeneity.
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My analysis makes two main contributions to the environmental economics literature.
First, I evaluate the management of a spatial and dynamic externality using an analytical
approach that is flexible enough to yield a variety of concrete policy implications. In ad-
dition to stream depletion, there are many important environmental externalities that vary
over space and time. Most economic studies on the regulation of these externalities rely on
computationally intensive, cell-based numerical air quality or groundwater flow models, or
on regression-based equations that may not capture nonlinear and dynamic effects in exter-
nalities. My analytical approach allows me to solve a large number of economic optimization
problems for different policy scenarios and environmental targets, while also modeling im-
portant properties of the natural system. I add to the small economic literature that applies
analytical solutions from the natural and physical sciences to quantify environmental exter-
nalities (e.g. [6, 41, 64]), but to my knowledge, this is the first study to implement these
solutions to compare the cost effectiveness of spatially differentiated permits to that of alter-
native policies. While the application in this chapter is specific to stream depletion, similar
analytical solutions exist to explain the diffusion of air [65] and water pollutants [17], as well
as the dispersal of species populations [70]. Therefore, there is potential for broader use of
my approach to study a wide variety of economic issues in environmental regulation.
My second contribution to the literature is to provide new evidence regarding the fac-
tors that determine the relative cost effectiveness of spatially differentiated and spatially
uniform permit systems. While most existing empirical studies find that spatial differ-
entiation in a wide range of regulatory settings leads to large reductions in compliance
costs [3, 14, 41, 52, 66], only two studies predict small cost savings. In a study of nitrogen
dioxide (NO2) standards in Baltimore, Krupnick [39] concludes that the outcome of spa-
tially differentiated control policy can be closely approximated by an eﬄuent fee varying
only by source type. O’Ryan [58] finds that for low levels of required abatement of urban air
pollution in Santiago, Chile, a uniform concentration standard for all sources is a suitable
alternative to a spatially differentiated ambient permit system. My analysis predicts simi-
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larly modest gains from spatial differentiation in a numerical application with a much larger
number of spatial units (over 10,000 compared to several hundred) and with finer-scale data
that captures variability and heterogeneity in marginal environmental damages at the level
of the individual decision-maker. In addition, while the two previous studies attribute the
relative cost effectiveness of spatially uniform permits to the placement of different types of
users or the weakness of the environmental standard, I show how cost effectiveness can be
driven by the spatial distribution of underlying physical characteristics that affect both eco-
nomic and environmental outcomes, such as climatic, agronomic, and hydrologic parameters.
By providing empirical evidence that spatial correlation in physical parameters can be an
important determinant of cost effectiveness, I also help explain how spatially differentiated
permits may or may not be cost effective in other contexts.
2.2 Background: Stream Depletion and Spatial Heterogeneity
Economic theory predicts that when production by heterogeneous firms generates an envi-
ronmental externality, an aggregate abatement goal can be achieved cost effectively if each
firm undertakes abatement until marginal abatement costs are equalized across all firms.
If the marginal damage of the externality is equivalent for all firms, this outcome can be
induced with marketable permits that are traded on a one-to-one basis. A key feature of
groundwater flow that complicates the design of permit markets to curtail stream depletion
is a time-dependent process known as diffusion. In the presence of diffusion, pumping by
users located far away from the stream will affect flows in the stream with a longer time
lag than pumping by users located nearby [19]. As a result, over any given period of time,
pumping by wells close to the stream will remove more water from the stream than pumping
by wells that are farther away – that is, the marginal damage of groundwater pumping will
vary over space. The theory for these cases was first developed by Montgomery [49], who
showed that a cost-effective marketable permits system must be spatially differentiated, with
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trading of permits occurring under fixed ratios that account for the relative magnitudes of
the externalities generated by firms exchanging permits. The stream depletion externality is
also difficult quantify because the marginal damage of groundwater pumping on streams is
nonlinear in the distance between the well and stream as well as in aquifer parameters such
as transmissivity and the storage coefficient.1
Despite their theoretical cost effectiveness, spatially differentiated permit systems can be
difficult to implement in practice. The transaction costs and informational requirements
associated with establishing multiple trading ratios may be large compared to regulations
that impose uniform prices on the externality [38, 72]. Furthermore, regulators may face po-
litical opposition when proposing policies that treat firms differently based on their location.
Given these concerns, an important empirical question is whether spatially differentiated
policies will generate quantitatively significant reductions in abatement cost while satisfying
environmental targets. Existing groundwater policies generally do not follow spatial criteria;
they are usually in the form of denials of new or expanded allocations, or uniform upper
bounds on annual pumping for large groups of wells.
Previous empirical analyses on the cost effectiveness of spatially differentiated policies
have focused on strategies to control air pollution [3, 39, 52, 58, 66]. With respect to wa-
ter resources, previous research has demonstrated the desirability of spatially differentiated
policies to manage water quality (see, for example, Goetz and Zilberman [21] and Khanna
et al. [34]), but only two studies have empirically measured the cost effectiveness of permit
markets that account for spatially heterogeneous damages. Farrow et al. [14] show that
significant cost savings can be generated by switching from current uniform reduction re-
quirements to trading ratios for combined sewer overflow management in the Ohio River
Basin. Lankoski et al. [41] examine point/nonpoint trading in the Kymi River Valley in
Finland and find that spatial heterogeneity in marginal damages has profound effects on
1Transmissivity is a measure of the rate at which water can be transmitted horizontally in an aquifer,
while the storage coefficient characterizes the capacity of an aquifer to release groundwater from storage in
response to gradients in the aquifer.
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the distribution of gains and losses from adopting water quality trading. My study provides
evidence that spatial differentiation may not necessarily yield large reductions in compliance
costs, and I do so by analyzing markets with a much greater number of potential traders
and fine-scale heterogeneity in both abatement cost structures and marginal environmental
damages. There also exists a literature on the use of trading ratios in point/non-point source
water quality trading [28, 67], but the need for these ratios arises from differences in stochas-
tic variability of pollutant loadings rather than from spatial heterogeneity in environmental
damages.
2.3 A Model of Agricultural Groundwater Use with Stream
Depletion
Consider a river basin with j = 1, . . . , J wells that pump groundwater for agricultural
purposes. Because groundwater rights are tied to individual wells instead of to owners or to
parcels of land, each well is a fundamental decision-making unit. Let upij > 0 represent the
annual profit-maximizing pumping volume of the jth well that would prevail in the absence
of regulation. Also, let aj equal the annual pumping abatement level of well j, so that
upij − aj is its actual annual pumping volume. If well j irrigates a seasonal crop, then upij
and upij − aj represent the unconstrained and actual volumes of water pumped within the
irrigation season each year. We can define well j’s annual abatement cost as the difference
in the well’s profits under unconstrained and actual pumping:
Cj(aj) = pij(u
pi
j )− pij(upij − aj), (2.1)
where pij(·) is well j’s profit function. Consequently, Cj(·) is an abatement cost function
that quantifies the forgone profits to well j from reducing groundwater use. I assume that
C ′j(·) ≥ 0, C ′′j (·) > 0, and C ′j(0) = 0 for all j.
Groundwater pumping by wells generates an externality in the form of stream depletion.
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Stream depletion is a lagged and dynamic process in which the instantaneous rate of water
removed from streams varies continuously over time in response to pumping. In my model,
I define the stream depletion externality as the total volume of water removed from streams
over a given period of time. Specifically, over a time horizon of T years, we associate an annual
pumping volume of upij − aj acre-feet by well j with an average annual stream depletion of
xj acre-feet. This cumulative definition of the externality allows me to capture the dynamic
properties of stream depletion without the use of difference equations. Following standard
assumptions in the hydrology literature [36], average annual stream depletion caused by well
j is equivalent to a proportion of its annual pumping:
xj = (u
pi
j − aj)Ψ(dj,Γj, T ), (2.2)
where Ψ(·) is a transfer function that takes on a value between 0 and 1. The value of the
transfer function depends crucially on the distance between the well and the stream, dj, and
basic hydrologic principles require that ∂Ψ/∂dj < 0. In other words, pumping by wells that
are farther away from the stream causes less stream depletion, all else equal. The magnitude
of Ψ(·) also depends on the time horizon T because of time lags in the stream depletion
externality. If a longer time horizon is chosen, more of the lagged stream depletion impacts
are accounted for, thus increasing the impact of pumping on average annual stream depletion.
Finally, the argument Γj in the transfer function is a vector of parameters other than distance
and time that may determine well j’s pumping externality. If wells irrigate seasonal crops
so that pumping occurs only in certain months of the year, the transfer function Ψ(·) needs
to be adjusted to account for recovery of stream flow during the off-season when pumps are
turned off [5].
I assume that the regulator only cares about the total amount of stream depletion caused
by all of the wells in the river basin. This assumption is consistent with a regulatory frame-
work that seeks to meet a legal requirement on stream flow at one point in the river, such as
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at a jurisdictional boundary.2 I set aggregate annual stream depletion X equal to the linear
sum of stream depletion caused by pumping by the individual wells:
X =
J∑
j=1
(upij − aj)Ψ(dj,Γj, T ). (2.3)
Equation (2.3) states that aggregate stream depletion is additively separable such that the
externality generated by one well’s pumping is independent of the externality caused by
pumping at other wells.3 The additivity of weighted pumping volumes in equation (2.3)
greatly simplifies the derivation of optimality conditions in the policies I analyze below. It is
also important to note that the linear relationship between pumping and stream depletion
together with additive separability imply that the value of the transfer function Ψ(dj,Γj, T )
can be interpreted as the marginal environmental damage, in physical terms, of groundwater
pumping by well j.
2.3.1 The Constrained Optimal Allocation of Groundwater
Suppose that the regulator wishes to choose annual abatement levels for all the wells in the
river basin in order to minimize the total abatement cost to well owners while not exceeding
an annual average level of aggregate stream depletion X¯. For a time horizon of T years, the
constrained optimal allocation of groundwater is given by the solution to the following social
planner’s problem:
min
a1,...,aJ
J∑
j=1
Cj(aj) s.t.
J∑
j=1
(upij − aj)Ψ(dj,Γj, T )) ≤ X¯. (2.4)
2While the motivation to protect streams in the Republican River Basin is largely a legal one, regulations
in other settings may be prompted by ecological concerns. For these scenarios, it is likely that stream flow
requirements would need to be met at multiple points along streams. Analysis of such a problem would
require a more complex model with multiple constraints which are spatially defined with respect to the
location of users in the river basin.
3The assumption that the externalities of pumping are linearly additive is consistent with the principle
of superposition, which is an accepted result in the hydrology literature for stream depletion and other
groundwater flow processes [17].
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The constraint requires aggregate stream depletion, as defined in equation (2.3), to be less
than the upper bound X¯. Because the regulator chooses the same abatement levels for each
of the T years and the constraint is defined in terms of average annual stream depletion,
the optimization problem is static despite the fact that stream depletion is modeled as a
dynamic externality. The Lagrangian expression for the constrained minimization problem
is:
L = −
J∑
j=1
Cj(aj) + λ
[
X¯ −
J∑
j=1
(upij − aj)Ψ(dj,Γj, T )
]
. (2.5)
The associated first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂L
∂aj
= −C ′j(aj) + λΨ(dj,Γj, T ) ≤ 0 for j = 1, . . . , J, (2.6)
∂L
∂λ
= X¯ −
J∑
j=1
(upij − aj)Ψ(dj,Γj, T ) ≥ 0, (2.7)
aj
∂L
∂aj
= aj
[−C ′j(aj) + λΨ(dj,Γj, T )] = 0 for j = 1, . . . , J, (2.8)
λ
∂L
∂λ
= λ
[
X¯ −
J∑
j=1
(upij − aj)Ψ(dj,Γj, T )
]
= 0. (2.9)
These necessary conditions are also sufficient for the existence of a minimum due to the joint
concavity of the Lagrangian in a1, . . . , aJ .
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Due to my focus on the regulation of groundwater use to protect stream flows, I focus on the
optimality conditions that apply when the stream depletion constraint binds, i.e. when the
unconstrained pumping allocation {upi1 , . . . , upiJ} leads to a violation of the constraint in (2.4).
Given the assumption that a well’s marginal abatement cost is zero at zero abatement, the
optimality conditions indicate that all wells will undertake a nonnegative level of abatement
in a constrained optimal allocation.5 As a result, optimality conditions (2.6) and (2.8) imply
4Because C ′′j (·) > 0 for all j, the Hessian matrix of (2.5) has a negative and dominant diagonal. It follows
that the Hessian matrix is negative definite, which in turn implies the joint concavity of the Lagrangian in
a1, . . . , aJ .
5To see why aj > 0 for all j in a constrained optimal allocation with binding stream depletion constraint,
consider the opposite case and suppose that ak = 0 for some well k. By assumption, this implies that
C ′k(0) = 0, and condition (2.6) requires that λ = 0 because Ψ(dj ,Γj, T ) > 0. As a result, condition (2.6)
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that C ′j(aj)/Ψ(dj,Γj, T ) = λ for all j. In other words, the ratios of marginal abatement cost
to marginal damage for every well must equal the marginal social shadow cost of violating
the stream depletion constraint. The marginal damage in the denominator of the ratio plays
a crucial role in the optimality condition by adjusting the allocation to the well based on
the magnitude of the environmental externality associated with a unit of pumping by the
well. For example, if two wells have the same abatement cost function but different marginal
damages of pumping, then the curvature assumptions on the cost function imply that the well
with greater marginal damage should undertake more abatement in a constrained optimum.
Note that these optimality conditions also illustrate how it may be optimal for a well to
shut down, i.e. set aj = u
pi
j . For such a well, C
′
j(u
pi
j )/Ψ(dj,Γj, T ) ≤ λ; that is, the marginal
private cost of shutting down the well, weighted by its associated marginal damage, is less
than or equal to the marginal social cost of violating the stream depletion constraint.
Because conditions (2.6) and (2.8) apply to all wells, a constrained optimal allocation
{a1, . . . , aJ} is one in which the marginal abatement costs of all the wells, weighted by their
marginal damages on stream flows, are equalized:
C ′1(a1)
Ψ(d1,Γ1, T )
=
C ′2(a2)
Ψ(d2,Γ2, T )
= · · · = C
′
J(aJ)
Ψ(dJ ,ΓJ, T )
. (2.10)
In any allocation that does not satisfy condition (2.10), total abatement costs can be reduced
by reallocating groundwater rights to wells with higher marginal abatement cost and/or lower
marginal damage to streams. An important factor that drives this result is my assumption
that the regulator seeks to satisfy a single constraint on aggregate stream depletion.
In theory, the constrained optimal allocation of groundwater pumping can be replicated
using a tradable permit market. In such a market, profit-maximizing well owners will choose
the desired levels of abatement if the pricing mechanism reflects the above optimality con-
ditions. Specifically, if pj is the permit price charged to well j for the right to pump a unit
requires that C ′l(0) = 0 for all other wells l 6= k, which in turn implies that al = 0 for all l 6= k. Therefore,
aj = 0 for all wells j = 1, . . . , J , which is a contradiction to the assumption that unconstrained pumping
leads to a binding stream depletion constraint.
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of water, condition (2.10) implies that pj = λΨ(dj,Γj, T ) in a constrained optimal market.
That is, the price of a permit to a well (i.e. the well’s marginal cost of groundwater use) must
equal the marginal shadow cost of stream depletion, adjusted for the well’s marginal damage.
A key implication of this pricing scheme is that, all else equal, wells that are farther away
from streams (i.e. wells with larger dj) will be charged a lower price for permits compared to
wells that are closer to streams. Accordingly, if users are allowed to trade permits, buyers
and sellers will be subject to trading ratios; if the owner of well i wishes to purchase a permit
from the owner of well j, the trade must occur at a ratio of Ψ(dj,Γj, T )/Ψ(di,Γi, T ), which
is the ratio of marginal damages associated with pumping by the wells involved in the trade.
Such a trading rule will encourage fewer pumping permits to be purchased by well owners
located close to streams, where the marginal damage of pumping is high, and more permits
to be purchased by well owners located far away from steams, where the marginal damage
of pumping is low, all else equal.
2.3.2 Other Allocations of Groundwater
By implementing the spatially differentiated trading ratios described above, a regulator can
obtain a desired reduction in stream depletion at least cost to groundwater users. However,
because aggregate pumping is not generally equal to stream depletion, an alternative setup
is for the regulator to issue pumping permits for units of groundwater less than what would
be pumped in the absence of regulation, and then allow well owners to trade these permits
on a one-to-one basis. This more conventional form of a water market may be a desirable
policy option because it is spatially uniform, and thus administratively simpler than ratio
trading, which requires the regulator to establish a different ratio for every potential trade
in the river basin. Under one-to-one trading, the cost-minimizing allocation will satisfy the
equimarginal principle without differential weighting of individual wells:
C ′1(a1) = C
′
2(a2) = · · · = C ′J(aJ), (2.11)
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which is equivalent to condition (2.10) with the denominators removed. One-to-one trading,
by definition, allocates any given total quantity of pumping at minimum total abatement
cost. However, unlike ratio trading, one-to-one trading is not the cheapest policy to meet
any given stream depletion constraint because it ignores the spatial heterogeneity in the
externality.
Transaction costs of establishing and running this simpler type of market may still be too
high for implementation in a river basin. Equity concerns in the region may also engender
political opposition to such markets for water. An even simpler but less cost-effective option
is to divide the river basin into N zones and establish uniform per-acre upper bounds on
pumping for each zone.6 Let u¯Z1, u¯Z2, . . . , u¯ZN represent the upper bounds on pumping
in zones Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN , respectively. When the stream depletion constraint binds, the
optimality conditions for this problem state that the cost-minimizing upper bounds satisfy
the following expression:
∑
j∈Z1C
′
j(u
pi
j − u¯Z1)∑
j∈Z1 Ψ(dj,Γj, T )
=
∑
j∈Z2C
′
j(u
pi
j − u¯Z2)∑
j∈Z2 Ψ(dj,Γj, T )
= · · · =
∑
j∈ZN C
′
j(u
pi
j − u¯ZN)∑
j∈ZN Ψ(dj,Γj, T )
. (2.12)
This condition requires upper bounds on pumping for each zone to be chosen to equalize
the sum of marginal abatement costs of wells in each zone, weighted by the sum of the
externalities caused by the wells in each zone.
2.4 Numerical Application: The Republican River Basin
The application is based on the Republican River Basin (hereafter referred to as “the Basin”),
which stretches across thirteen counties in Nebraska and encompasses 1.25 million acres of
cropland. The Basin has experienced ongoing conflict over stream flows in the Republican
River, which flows from eastern Colorado, across southern Nebraska, and over the state bor-
der into Kansas. In 1998, Kansas sued Nebraska on the grounds that large-scale development
6My analysis in this chapter is limited to the case in which zone boundaries are determined exogenously.
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of groundwater wells for irrigation in Nebraska was adversely affecting the quantity of sur-
face water flowing into Kansas, thus violating the Republican River Compact of 1942 which
dictated each state’s share of the Basin’s water resources. As a result of this litigation, a
series of regulations were put in place in the Nebraska portion of the Basin to help preserve
stream flows. By 2004, the following policies were implemented: (1) a moratorium on well
drilling, (2) mandatory metering of wells used for irrigation, (3) certification of irrigated
acreage, and (4) volumetric restrictions on groundwater pumping.
The pumping restrictions were imposed by setting an annual per-acre allocation of ground-
water for wells in the Basin [55]. The size of the allocation depends on the Natural Resource
District (NRD) that a well is located in; wells in the Upper Republican NRD are given the
largest annual allocation of 13 inches per acre, while wells in the Middle and Lower Repub-
lican NRDs are allocated 12 and 9 inches per acre per year, respectively. The Tri-Basin
NRD sets annual irrigation allocations by county: 11 inches for Gosper County, 10 inches for
Phelps County, and 9 inches for Kearny County. Differences in the upper bounds on pump-
ing are intended to reflect the climatic gradient in the Basin, which provides significantly
more rainfall to farms in the eastern portion of the Basin than those in the western portion.
While farms in the Basin typically comprise more than one well, groundwater allocations and
certified irrigated acreage are well-specific under the current regulation. This is consistent
with my theoretical modeling framework, which treats each well and its associated acreage
as the fundamental decision-making unit.
I have access to field-level, georeferenced data on economic, agronomic, hydrologic, and
climatic variables that influence abatement costs and stream depletion. The 2008 Nebraska
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) Well Database provides a record of the 10,908
active registered wells with certified irrigated acreage in the Nebraska portion of the Basin.
The Well Database includes the geographic coordinates of each well and data on well yield
and depth to groundwater when pumping. Distances between wells and nearby streams were
calculated using stream shapefiles provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. Well-specific soil
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types originate from maps in the State Soils Geographic (STATSGO) database. Soil-specific
county-level data on dryland crop yield, maximum irrigated yield, and crop evapotranspira-
tion requirements were obtained from the University of Nebraska Cooperative Extension’s
Water Optimizer irrigation decision support tool,7 which were then spatially interpolated
from county centroids to individual well locations and soil types. Finally, we used 2005-2009
average crop prices from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and 2005-2009
average energy prices from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).
In order to determine the hydrological connection between surface water in the Basin
and water pumped from wells, the Republican River Compact Administration (RRCA) has
developed a numerical groundwater model of the Basin.8 This groundwater model, which
is based on the U.S. Geological Survey’s MODFLOW model [43], is updated yearly by the
RRCA to determine whether surface water allocations to Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas
need to be adjusted. For my analysis, I use the well-specific data on certified irrigated acreage
and aquifer parameter values contained in the input files of the RRCA model.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for some of my variables that are likely to influence
well abatement costs and stream depletion impacts from pumping. These statistics show
that key parameters are highly variable and heterogeneous across the Basin. Soil quality
in the Basin is also variable, with 69% of wells located on fine soil, 18% on intermediate
soil, and 13% on coarse soil. Despite this spatial heterogeneity of well characteristics, the
NRD-level upper bounds on groundwater pumping imposed by the current regulation are
relatively uniform over space. Currently, each NRD regulates between 1,529 and 3,320 wells,
so that large groups of wells are being regulated with the same upper bound on pumping. A
more spatially differentiated policy may yield significant cost savings to groundwater users
while allowing Nebraska to satisfy its stream flow requirements. Quantifying these welfare
effects can inform current debates surrounding the increased regulation of agricultural water
7The tool and documentation are available at http://www.agecon.unl.edu/water optimizer.html.
8Documentation for the RRCA model is available at http://www.republican rivercompact.org/.
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use and help resolve some of the ongoing intra- and inter-state conflicts over stream flows.9
Two steps are required in the numerical application before we can analyze the efficiency
of different policies to protect stream flows. In the first step, I use my data set to derive
abatement cost functions for every well in the Basin in order to quantify the cost to farmers of
complying with different restrictions on groundwater use. In the second step, I parameterize
the stream depletion transfer functions in order to quantify the stream flow impact of seasonal
pumping choices made by farmers for each well.
2.4.1 Quantifying Abatement Costs
Given my definition of the abatement cost function in equation (2.1), we need to specify
the profit maximization problem for farmers in the Basin. I assume that the farmer has
no access to surface water; the water rights I consider are comprised solely of groundwater
rights.10 Assume that there are k = 1, . . . , K crops with output prices r1, . . . , rK and Θj,k is
a vector of local characteristics for well j that affect yield for crop k, such as climate and soil
type. Let F irrj,k (Θj,k) and F
dry
j,k (Θj,k) represent well j’s crop-specific per-acre fixed costs of
production for irrigated and dryland crops, respectively, and let Vj,k(Θj,k) represent well j’s
cost of pumping a unit of water. Well j’s yields for irrigated and dryland crops are denoted
by Y irrj,k (uj,k,Θj,k) and Y
dry
j,k (Θj,k), where uj,k is the per-acre volume of water applied by well j
on crop k. Each year, the farmer operating well j must choose irrigated and dryland acreage
for each crop (lirrj,k and l
dry
j,k ) and the per-acre quantity of water applied to the irrigated crop
(uj,k) so as to maximize the sum of total profit from irrigated crop production and dryland
9Previous economic studies have analyzed a different pumping externality which can occur between wells
instead of between wells and streams (see, for example, Gisser and Sanchez [18] and Brozovic´ et. al. [6]). I
do not model this externality in my analysis since typical well spacings in the Republican River Basin are
large enough to render this externality between wells negligible.
10Surface water rights in the Basin are allocated and administered separately, and conjunctive use of
surface water and groundwater on the same land is rare. The extent of surface-water irrigation in Nebraska
is very limited compared to groundwater irrigation [74].
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crop production:
max
{ldryj,k ,lirrj,k ,uj,k}Kk=1
K∑
k=1
lirrj,k
[
rj,kY
irr
j,k (uj,k)− Vj,kuj,k − F irrj,k
]
+ ldryj,k
(
rj,kY
dry
j,k − F dryj,k
)
, (2.13)
where we have suppressed the Θj,k term for notational convenience. The farmer’s profit
maximization problem is subject to the following constraints:
K∑
k=1
ldryj,k + l
irr
j,k ≤ l¯j, (2.14)
K∑
k=1
lirrj,kuj,k ≤ l¯ju¯j. (2.15)
The first constraint requires irrigated and dryland acreage in production for well j to be
less than the total land certified to well, l¯j. The second constraint requires that total water
applied on all crops be less than the water allocation for that well, l¯ju¯j, where u¯j is the
per-acre allocation of water.11
Palazzo and Brozovic´ [59] use this profit-maximization problem to obtain abatement cost
curves for every well in the Basin, applying relevant values from the data set described above.
The cost functions F dryj,k (·), F irrj,k (·) and Vj,k(·) and the crop yield functions Y dryj,k (·) and Y irrj,k (·)
are parameterized following Water Optimizer. Solving the profit maximization problem while
varying the constraint on water availability, u¯j, yields a schedule of profits for the well as a
function of abatement in groundwater use. Unconstrained levels of water use and profit can
be obtained by increasing u¯j until the constraint no longer binds. Comparing the constrained
profits to the unconstrained profits yields abatement cost functions for groundwater use, and
repeating this procedure for every well in the Basin generates a set of abatement cost curves
that can quantify the regulatory cost of any allocation of water in the Basin. These cost
curves take the place of Cj(aj), for j = 1, . . . , 10, 908, in the model described in Section 2.3.
11Note that if the farmer is constrained below her optimal irrigation depth, the optimal deficit irrigation
strategy may be to increase per-acre irrigation above u¯j on a reduced number of irrigated acres. As a result,
profit-maximizing per-acre water use may be greater than u¯j if less than l¯j is irrigated.
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2.4.2 Quantifying the Externality
A second set of functions quantifies the externality on stream flows from seasonal pumping
choices made by farmers operating their wells. This allows us to verify whether a given
allocation of groundwater use satisfies or violates a constraint on stream flow reduction.
Equations known as stream response functions in the hydrology literature can model the
relationship between pumping and stream flows, accounting for the fact that significant time
lags exist between pumping decisions and the consequent stream depletion, and that the
magnitudes of these time lags depend primarily on the distance between wells and nearby
streams. Hydrologists have derived stream response functions for use in different hydrologic
settings, but for our purposes, the following analytical solution by Glover and Balmer [19] is
sufficient:
Ψ(dj,Γj = (τj, S), T ) =
2√
pi
∫ ∞s
d2
j
S
4τjT
e−z
2
dz, (2.16)
where τj is aquifer transmissivity for well j and S is the aquifer storage coefficient. While the
Glover-Balmer solution embodies some key simplifying assumptions regarding the hydrology
of the stream-aquifer system, it is considered a valid first approximation of the flow drawn
from a river by groundwater pumping. There is precedent for the use of this solution in
setting regulations, such as determining the availability of groundwater for appropriation in
other river basins in Nebraska [55] as well as in Kansas [33]. I use this solution to parameterize
the transfer function Ψ(dj,Γj, T ), allowing me to quantify the aggregate impact on stream
flows of pumping in the Basin, as defined in equation (2.3). Because the Nebraska DNR’s
primary concern is to fulfill the legal requirement of stream flows at the state border, it
seeks to limit the total quantity of stream flow lost in the Basin. This is consistent with
the modeling framework in Section 2.3; the regulator’s allocation of groundwater needs to
satisfy only one aggregate stream flow constraint.
I assume that wells pump groundwater at a constant rate over 160 days in each year,
which is the approximate length of the irrigation season in the Basin. I set the baseline time
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horizon T at fifty years, which is the standard employed by the Nebraska DNR in assess-
ments of issues relating to hydrologically connected surface- and groundwater resources [55].
As specified, this transfer function ignores the presence of return flows from groundwater
irrigation, which might also influence stream flows. I discuss the potential role of return
flows later in Section 2.6 as part of the sensitivity analysis.
Because the transfer function Ψ(·) can be interpreted as the marginal environmental dam-
age of groundwater pumping by a well, the empirical distribution of Ψ(·) across wells can
represent the heterogeneity of marginal damages in the Basin. Figure 2.1 is a histogram of
the values of Ψ(·) that result from applying the Glover-Balmer solution to hydrologic data
associated with the wells in the Basin. The figure shows that, for some wells in the Basin,
seasonal pumping over fifty years leads to almost no stream depletion (i.e. marginal damage
of pumping by the well is close to zero), while for wells on the other extreme, almost all
pumped groundwater originates from the stream (i.e. marginal damage is close to one). This
spatial heterogeneity in marginal damages leads to constrained optimal trading ratios that
range from 0.009 to 112, differing significantly from the ratio of 1 that would be uniformly
applied in conventional, one-to-one trading.
2.4.3 Policy Analysis
Having derived the abatement cost and transfer functions for each well in the Basin, I analyze
an array of management policies which vary not only in the degree of cost minimization
and environmental impact, but also in the level of complexity, feasibility, and associated
transaction costs. The policies I consider fall into four categories:
1. The current policy: This is the current policy in the Basin, consisting of NRD-level
upper bounds on groundwater pumping per acre.
2. Cost-minimizing upper bounds: This policy adjusts the NRD-level upper bounds
currently imposed in the Basin so that total abatement costs are minimized. Adopting
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this policy would not require a change in the current regulatory framework in the
Basin. We also consider upper bounds at Basin-wide and county levels.
3. One-to-one trading: In this policy, the regulator issues groundwater pumping per-
mits, and farmers may buy or sell these permits at a single equilibrium price. I consider
markets that allow Basin-wide trading of permits as well as markets that only allow
trading within NRD or county boundaries.
4. Ratio trading: This is the constrained optimal policy in which the regulator issues
groundwater pumping permits, and farmers may buy or sell these permits based on
trading ratios that are adjusted to reflect the relative magnitudes of the externalities
generated by the users involved in the transaction. As with one-to-one trading, I
consider markets that allow trading Basin-wide, within NRDs, and within counties.
For the market-based policies described above, a permit is equivalent to an annual lease
of a right to pump groundwater. I analyze policies that restrict the geographic extent of
markets to within NRD or county boundaries because regulators may wish to prevent large
reallocations of water between management institutions, as well as avoid negative local effects
on land values and associated tax receipts.
In all the markets I consider, farmers trade into a central exchange with market clearing,
and reallocation of water between wells within the same farm must be authorized as a trade.
I assume that transaction costs are sufficiently low to allow frictionless trading. While this
may be a strong assumption, there are several reasons why the institutional context in the
region of study is well suited for implementation of tradable permits. First, the good to be
traded (i.e. the right to pump a unit of groundwater) is uniform, well defined, and does not
require diversion or a delivery system. Second, groundwater users in this study area have
clear property rights that are tied closely to the right to irrigate. Third, because recent
regulations have forced farmers in the Basin to reduce their pumping from historical levels,
most wells have excess pumping capacity, allowing farmers to purchase permits without
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additional capital investment. Finally, because all wells are already metered and annual
reporting of pumped volume is mandatory, monitoring costs are likely to be low. In fact,
informal trades have already taken place in Nebraska despite the lack of formal markets
or water brokerages.12 This is in contrast to previous real-world experiences with tradable
permit systems to regulate water quality, which have been associated with “thin” markets
and limited improvements in environmental outcomes [75].
In order to analyze the economic and environmental outcomes under the four policy cat-
egories, I first coded the abatement cost and stream depletion transfer functions in the
MATLAB numerical computing environment. To model the current policy in the Basin, I
imposed the volumetric restrictions on groundwater use by the wells in the data set and
calculated the resulting abatement cost and stream deletion. For the remaining policy sce-
narios, I constructed algorithms that applied the optimality conditions associated with each
regulation: equation (2.12) for cost-minimizing upper bounds, equation (2.11) for one-to-one
trading, and equation (2.10) for ratio trading.
2.5 Results
This section begins by describing the economic and environmental outcomes predicted by
my model when well owners are subject to the current policy in the Basin. I then compare
the status quo results to those under the three alternative policies when aggregate measures
such as stream depletion are held fixed. Holding one of the environmental outcomes constant
makes the polices more comparable in terms of cost effectiveness. The last set of results
describes abatement costs under the different policies when regulators need to attain levels
of stream protection greater than what is obtained under the current policy. I conclude the
section by discussing the sensitivity of my results to the choice of modeling parameters and
the presence of return flows from groundwater irrigation.
12A. Palazzo and N. Brozovic´. Spatial water management policies for the protection of instream flows.
Unpublished manuscript, 2010.
24
2.5.1 Current Policy Outcome
Excluding those wells with a profit-maximizing strategy of dryland farming at any water
allocation leaves 10,705 wells in my analysis. While the model implementation considers
four crops (corn, wheat, soybeans, and sorghum), crop choices under profit maximization are
almost always irrigated corn and dryland wheat. The first row in Table 2.2 presents predicted
aggregate water use and stream depletion under the current policy in the Basin. In order to
understand the impact of this policy, I compare the aggregate pumping figure to the total
certified volume of water that is available for pumping and the predicted aggregate pumping
if farmers were unrestricted in their water use. These results confirm that the current policy
restricts aggregate water use, leading to an 8.1% decrease in aggregate pumping and a 7.7%
reduction in stream depletion. This restricted water use is associated with an annual total
abatement cost of $7.98 million, or about $6.42 per acre.
However, these results also reveal that some of the currently allocated water rights go
unused, as predicted aggregate water use is less than the total quantity that is certified for
pumping. This is due to well operators pumping groundwater only up to the point where
the marginal value product of water equals zero, which in some cases may be less than the
volume of water allocated to the well. While this “slack” only accounts for 2.2% of the
total water allocation, 32% of the wells in the Basin are unconstrained under the current
policy. Most of these wells are located in the eastern portion of the Basin, which suggests
that current marginal abatement costs are higher for well owners in the western portion of
the Basin.
2.5.2 Alternative Policies With Stream Depletion Held Fixed
Because the relationship between total pumping volume and stream depletion depends on the
spatial distribution of pumping, it may be possible to reallocate groundwater use across wells
in a way that reduces abatement cost without causing additional harm to streams. Table 2.3
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provides a comparison of outcomes under the current policy and the three alternative policies
when the stream depletion externality is held fixed at current levels. As expected, a Basin-
wide market with spatially differentiated trading ratios leads to an allocation that meets
the stream depletion constraint at least cost, with an average abatement cost of $1.21 per
acre. This abatement cost is significantly lower than the $6.42 incurred by farmers under
the current policy. Because the average farm in the Basin irrigates 655 acres of cropland,
switching from the current policy to a Basin-wide market with trading ratios will lead to an
average annual savings of $3,413 per farm.
A key result that arises from this comparison of policies is that Basin-wide trading of
permits on a one-to-one basis will yield abatement cost savings that are similar to those
when trading permits with spatially differentiated ratios ($5.21 per acre versus $5.07 per
acre). This is a surprising result because, as discussed in Section 2.4.2, there is a large
degree of variability in marginal damages associated with pumping by different wells, yet a
market with one-to-one permit trading does not account for this heterogeneity.
The relative efficiency of one-to-one trading is not expected to be a general result for
the management of spatially heterogeneous externalities, so I examine the factors that drive
this result in the Republican River context. Looking at the data, I find three explanations,
all of which are related to the spatial distribution in the Basin of physical properties that
determine abatement costs and marginal damages of wells. First, there are several areas in
the Basin where there are low yield – and hence low profitability – wells close to streams.13
Because the cost of pumping a unit of groundwater is high for these wells, when trading is
allowed, these wells tend to sell their water rights and possibly shut down pumping entirely,
thus reducing pumping in areas of high marginal damage to streams. Second, I find that
wells in the western portion of the Basin, which suffer from relatively unfavorable climatic
conditions, are located farther away from streams than wells in the eastern portion because
13Well yield is the maximum pumping rate that can be supplied by a well. All else equal, pumps on wells
with low yield must operate for longer periods of time than pumps on wells with high yield in order to
extract the same quantity of water. While wells in the Republican River Basin exhibit a correlation between
low yield and closeness to streams, this is not a feature of river basins in general.
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they operate in a wider section of the alluvial valley that forms the Basin. The average
distance between wells and streams in the westernmost NRD, the Upper Republican NRD,
is 3.49 miles, while the average distance in the easternmost NRD, the Lower Republican
NRD, is 1.06 miles. Finally, my data set reveals that most of the wells in the western
portion of the Basin are irrigating land with coarse and intermediate quality soil, while
almost all wells in the eastern portion irrigate on fine soil. The distributions of climate and
soil quality in the Basin imply that farmers in the western portion are more constrained and
endure higher marginal abatement costs under the current policy. As a result, well owners
in the west are currently the most willing to purchase permits, and if trading is allowed,
applied water will move away from streams even in the absence of spatially differentiated
trading rules.
Table 2.3 also provides estimates for outcomes under alternative policies that are enacted at
the NRD and county levels. For upper bounds on pumping, allowing for different restrictions
at the NRD and county level leads to significantly lower total abatement costs than with
a Basin-wide upper bound. This is because NRD- and county-level upper bounds can be
chosen to reflect differences in abatement costs and marginal damages at a finer spatial
scale. However, the results also suggest that moving from the current regulatory framework
of NRD-level upper bounds to one of county-level upper bounds will yield relatively small
cost savings. For tradable permit systems, markets with smaller geographic extents lead to
fewer cost savings since market boundaries limit opportunities to equate marginal abatement
costs across users in the Basin.
The georeferenced data allow me to examine the geographic distribution of groundwater
use under the different policies. Figure 2.2 is a map of the Basin that illustrates how
groundwater is reallocated across space when the current policy is switched to the constrained
optimal ratio trading policy. Each dot on the map represents a well in the data set, and
the shading of the dot indicates how water use by that well changes with the policy switch.
Wells with darker shaded dots experience an increase in water use, while wells with lighter
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shading experience a decrease in water use. The map depicts large regional changes in water
use following such a policy change, and confirms that groundwater use will generally shift
from the eastern areas of the Basin to the western areas. Because wells in the west have a
higher marginal abatement cost than wells in the east under the current policy, a trading
policy that encourages the equating of marginal costs leads to less abatement in the west
and greater abatement in the east.
2.5.3 Alternative Policies With Aggregate Allocation Held Fixed
The next analysis corresponds to outcomes under the alternative policies when the current
total certified allocation of groundwater is maintained. These results specify the potential
gains from switching policies if technical or political complications prevent regulators from
reducing the number of water rights that have already been issued. In groundwater markets,
these outcomes can be accomplished by distributing permits so that each well receives per-
mits equivalent to their currently certified allocation, and then allowing trading of permits
between wells. The results in Table 2.4 show that if trades can occur Basin-wide, aggregate
pumping will increase as unused water rights under the current policy are sold to restricted
groundwater users. As a result, stream depletion increases under every alternative policy
(except for county-level trading with ratios) because trading reduces the existing “slack”
in water use in the Basin as well owners with previously unused permits sell them to con-
strained owners. However, these previously unused water rights also play an important role
in providing additional liquidity to the market, leading to significant abatement cost savings
to farmers, especially when trading is allowed across the entire Basin.
One way to reduce the adverse environmental effects of previously unused water rights
entering a groundwater market is to issue only as many permits as there are currently
exercised water rights. Table 2.5 presents the results for this scenario, and shows that
keeping the slack from entering the market will prevent stream depletion from increasing
relative to the current level, and will decrease it by 1.4% if Basin-wide ratio trading is
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adopted. However, because the unused water rights do not enter the market, abatement
costs are over three times higher than when unused permits are allowed to enter the market.
One potential barrier to implementing this regulation is political opposition to a policy
change in which currently unused permits are revoked from farmers. Another issue is that
currently unconstrained farmers may anticipate the policy change and over-apply water on
their crops in order to receive a larger allocation of permits.
Given the distribution of constrained and unconstrained farmers under the current policy,
yet another regulatory option is a “hybrid” policy that uses a combination of markets and
upper bounds. One obvious arrangement is to allow trading in the Upper Republican NRD,
in which almost all the wells are constrained, while maintaining the current upper bounds
on pumping in the remaining NRDs. Under this policy, farmers in the Upper Republican
can take advantage of the gains from trade in the form of reduced abatement costs, while
unconstrained farmers in the other NRDs will continue their status quo levels of water use
as they are not allowed to sell their unused water rights. My model predicts that this hybrid
policy would reduce annual abatement cost in the Upper Republican NRD from $12.63 to
$10.07 per acre while also reducing total stream depletion from 724,000 acre-feet per year
to 717,000 acre-feet per year. This policy also has the administrative benefit of preventing
large cross-Basin reallocations of groundwater.
2.5.4 Policies to Further Reduce Stream Depletion
Thus far, we have analyzed the economic and environmental impacts of alternative policies
when certain status quo outcomes are held fixed. In this section, I estimate consequences
on abatement costs and stream flows for a larger range of water use and stream depletion
constraints. While the current policy in the Basin leads to a 7.7% reduction in the stream
depletion externality, future legal or environmental circumstances may force regulators to
reduce stream depletion in the Basin significantly from current levels. I am able to conduct
this analysis because (a) I have derived the entire abatement cost curve for every well, and
29
(b) I have derived stream response functions that can predict the stream depletion caused
by any spatial arrangement of groundwater pumping in the Basin.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the per-acre abatement costs incurred under the three policies for
reductions in stream depletion from the unconstrained level of zero up to fifteen percent.
The star indicates the abatement cost and stream depletion that result from the current
policy, and the dots indicate outcomes under the three alternative policies when the total
allocation is kept at current levels. As expected, abatement costs rise under all three policies
for greater desired reductions in stream depletion, and ratio trading is the least costly policy
over the entire range of reductions, followed by one-to-one trading and upper bounds by
NRD. The graph also shows how one-to-one trading can approximate the cost savings of
ratio trading for desired reductions of the externality within this range.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the same set of curves as Figure 2.3 for an expanded range of re-
ductions in stream depletion. The figure shows how one-to-one trading loses its effectiveness
relative to ratio trading for stricter constraints on stream depletion. For example, if reg-
ulators decide to reduce stream depletion from current levels by an additional twenty-five
percent, per-acre abatement cost under ratio trading will be $7.61 cheaper than under one-
to-one trading. In fact, for reductions in stream depletion greater than fifty percent below
the unconstrained level, one-to-one trading is only slightly more cost effective than setting
upper bounds by NRD.
2.5.5 Sensitivity of Results to Parameter Choices and Return Flows
I tested the sensitivity of my abatement cost and externality estimates to the choice of
parameter values in my model, particularly those that enter the farmer profit functions as
these can change over time. Baseline results were calculated using mean input and output
prices for the period 2005-2009, but I also performed the analysis using high prices from
2007 (the highest prices in the last five years) and low prices from 2004 (the lowest prices in
the last five years). I also apply the model using 90% and 110% of the baseline crop yield
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value and consider values of the time horizon T of 10 years and 100 years. Table 2.6 lists
the percentage changes in water use and total abatement cost resulting from adoption of a
trading policy while holding stream depletion constant. These results indicate that relative
gains from adopting groundwater markets are fairly insensitive to parameter choices. This
table also demonstrates that one-to-one trading retains its relative efficiency compared to
ratio trading under different parameter values.
The hydrologic component of my model does not account for irrigation recharge and
its associated return flows. The process of accounting for recharge is highly uncertain, as
its magnitude and timing depends on precipitation, evaporation, groundwater and surface-
water irrigation, and irrigation management practices, all of which can vary from year to
year. Despite these complications, we can gain some insights on this issue by considering
the fundamental behavior of return flows. Some sources of recharge, such as precipitation
and evaporation, will not change in response to policy modifications. However, one concern
is recharge from groundwater irrigation, which can change as polices lead to different spatial
distributions of groundwater pumping. In the hydrology literature, recharge from groundwa-
ter irrigation is often modeled as having an equal and opposite effect on nearby streams as
pumping [5]. Therefore, I only need to deal with consumptive use as the net stress causing
stream depletion in my analysis, which in turn requires us to examine irrigation efficiency.
I use a baseline efficiency parameter value of 0.75 in the crop yield function Y irrj,k (·), but I
also run the model with a stochastic distribution for the efficiency parameter. If technical
efficiency is uniformly and randomly distributed in the range [0.65,0.85], relative gains from
adopting groundwater markets are similar to the baseline outcomes. However, if return flows
are included, we can expect lower absolute volumes of stream depletion rates for any given
allocation of pumping due to contributions of the return flows to shallow subsurface flow
and stream baseflow.
The state-of-the-art numerical groundwater currently used by the RRCA calculates
recharge from groundwater irrigation as the product of estimated pumping multiplied by
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an appropriate efficiency factor. For year 2000 simulations, Nebraska applied a groundwater
irrigation efficiency of 80% in the RRCA model [62]. Because the RRCA assumes that the
relationship between pumping and stream depletion is linear and the efficiency factor is spa-
tially uniform, achieving a given percentage reduction in stream depletion entails the same
abatement cost regardless of the how much of applied water for irrigation ends up as return
flow. Therefore, to the extent that return flows can be modeled, omitting return flows in my
analysis will not affect my estimates of the relative efficiency of tradable permits. Finally,
because irrigation efficiency is already high in the study region, I expect any changes in the
spatial distribution of groundwater irrigation recharge to have a minimal impact. In sum-
mary, based on my sensitivity analysis and discussion regarding return flows, I am confident
that changes in these assumptions will not affect the cost effectiveness ranking of the policies
I examine in this chapter.
2.6 Conclusion
Current debates and conflicts surrounding the regulation of spatially heterogeneous external-
ities motivate the question of whether the gains from spatially differentiated policy predicted
by economic theory are quantitatively significant in practice. In this chapter, I analyzed the
abatement costs and environmental benefits of adopting spatially differentiated groundwater
permits and other alternative policies to protect streams in the Republican River Basin of
Nebraska, where recent interstate litigation has led to restrictions on groundwater use. After
developing a model of agricultural groundwater use and its impacts on nearby streams, I as-
sessed the performance of a constrained optimal permit market and compared it to outcomes
of alternative second-best policies.
I find that a Basin-wide market for groundwater would save the average farm more than
$3,000 annually in abatement costs while maintaining current levels of stream protection.
In addition, my results show that regulators could capture most of the potential cost sav-
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ings by establishing a one-to-one tradable permit system that does not account for spatial
heterogeneity in the stream depletion externality. One-to-one trading is relatively efficient
in the Basin because of spatial correlation between parameters that determine the marginal
abatement cost to farmers and parameters that determine marginal damages of groundwater
pumping. However, if regulators need to reduce stream depletion significantly from current
levels, spatially differentiated polices will generate sizable cost savings.
While the results presented in this chapter are context-specific, they contribute to the
economic literature on environmental regulation more generally by showing that the general
analytical framework can help to explain the factors that determine the relative efficiency of
different policies to manage spatially heterogeneous externalities. By identifying spatial cor-
relation in agronomic, climatic, and hydrologic parameters as an important determinant of
cost effectiveness, I also explain how spatial differentiation may or may not be cost effective
in other contexts. For example, for the control of localized air pollutants, marginal abate-
ment costs are usually determined by the availability of abatement technology and input
substitutes to polluters, while marginal damages are primarily influenced by the proximity
of polluters to major population centers [52]. If these determinants are spatially uncorrelated,
then spatially differentiated emissions permits may yield significant additional reductions in
compliance cost. Furthermore, my results provide a caveat to regulators who are considering
policy changes in the presence of unused pollution or harvesting rights given their potential
to generate unexpected increases in environmental damages.
Future work can exploit the framework offered in this chapter to analyze other aspects of
spatially targeted regulation. For example, there may be zone-based market arrangements
that are more sophisticated than NRD-level upper bounds but administratively simpler than
a contained optimal market with ratio trading. In this policy, zone boundaries would be
chosen to reflect the differences in marginal damages of groundwater pumping across space.
Trading of groundwater permits would be allowed on a one-to-one basis within the zones,
while trades across zone boundaries would be subject to a trading ratio that accounts for the
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difference in marginal damage between the two zones. This setup would be a lot simpler than
the contained optimal market with ratio trading because the regulator needs to determine
a trading ratio for each pair of zones as opposed to for each pair of wells in the Basin;
implementations of ratio trading for environmental management in the real world are likely
to follow this format.
Another extension would test the validity of my analytical approach to quantifying the
stream depletion externality. While cell-based finite-difference models of the Republican
River Basin such as the RRCA groundwater model do exist, embedding them into a well-
level economic optimization problem would generate a model that would be difficult to solve
with current computing capabilities. An alternative route is to feed the allocations solved
by my model into these numerical models and verify whether the predicted stream depletion
externality is similar to that anticipated by my analytical model. Such a validation procedure
would require my population data set to be matched to the cells used in the numerical models,
which we leave for future work.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Key determinants of abatement cost and stream depletiona
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Abatement cost
Dryland corn yield (bu/ac) 70.57 17.57 31.92 105.28
Pumping water level (ft) 147 86 4 1,990
Well yield (gal/min) 1,045 618 10 3,600
Stream depletion
Distance to nearest stream (mi) 2.23 2.22 0.01 13.85
Aquifer transmissivity (ft2/day) 9,081 7,100 189 47,262
a Number of wells by NRD: Upper Republican = 3,183; Middle Republican =
2,876; Lower Republican = 3,320; Tri-Basin = 1,529.
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Table 2.2: Current policy outcomes
Water use Stream depletion TAC TAC per acre
(’000 ac ft/yr) (’000 ac ft/yr) ($’000/yr) ($/yr)
Predicted 1,145 724 7,977 6.42
Unconstrained 1,247 784 0 0
Certified 1,177 745 7,977 6.42
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Table 2.6: Sensitivity analysis: Stream depletion held fixed at current level
Percent change in water use Percent change in TAC
1-to-1 trading Ratio trading 1-to-1 trading Ratio trading
Baseline 0.63 1.22 -78.98 -81.20
Pricesa
High 0.66 1.28 -75.14 -77.81
Low 0.62 1.14 -83.81 -85.47
Crop yield
90% of baseline 0.62 1.17 -78.74 -80.95
110% of baseline 0.65 1.25 -78.26 -80.59
Efficiencyb
B ∼ U [0.65, 0.85] 0.64 1.37 -74.11 -77.11
Time horizon
T = 10 yrs 1.24 2.94 -83.58 -88.37
T = 100 yrs 0.45 0.78 -77.43 -78.81
a High prices are the highest in the last five years (2007), and low prices are the lowest in the
last five years (2004).
b Baseline efficiency is B = 0.75.
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Figure 2.1: Histogram illustrating the distribution of marginal damages from groundwater
pumping by wells in the Republican River Basin. In the histogram, the wells are
distributed into 50 bins.
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Figure 2.2: Map of wells in the Republican River Basin illustrating the reallocation of
groundwater due to the adoption of a market with trading ratios. Wells with darker
shading are associated with increases in groundwater allocation, while wells with lighter
shading are associated with decreases in allocation.
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Figure 2.3: Annual per-acre abatement costs for desired reductions in stream depletion
under three management policies (detail).
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Figure 2.4: Annual per-acre abatement costs for desired reductions in stream depletion
under three management policies.
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CHAPTER 3
TRADABLE PERMITS TO MANAGE
ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES WITH TIME
LAGS AND UNCERTAINTY
3.1 Introduction
A large class of economic activities generates environmental externalities that are realized
with significant time lags. For example, reduced leaching of nitrogenous fertilizer in agricul-
ture does not instantaneously translate into reduced pollution and eutrophication of coastal
waters [25]. Similarly, a recent study [46] predicts that even if greenhouse gas concentrations
in the atmosphere had been stabilized in the year 2000, further global warming and sea
level rise are likely to occur throughout the 21st century. In addition, many environmental
processes that can mitigate environmental externalities, such as carbon sequestration and
wetland restoration, occur with delays [24, 61]. Many of these lagged externalities are also
subject to uncertainty due to imperfect monitoring and society’s limited ability to predict
future states of natural resource stocks.
In this chapter, I examine the key features of an efficient tradable permit system to regulate
environmental externalities that are lagged and stochastic. I develop a dynamic optimization
model in which production by firms affects a natural resource stock with heterogeneous time
lags and the state of the stock follows a stochastic process. I parameterize the model using
exponential functional forms and add structure to the stochastic process in order to obtain
analytical results regarding the relationship between optimal firm abatement levels and key
parameters. Within this analysis, I focus on the design of a tradable permit system that
induces firms to undertake optimal abatement. I then implement a numerical application
for the Republican River Basin of Nebraska in which I simulate a market for agricultural
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groundwater use that seeks to protect nearby streams. This application demonstrates the
relevance of the issues raised by the theoretical analysis to real-world management problems.
From my theoretical analysis, I find that optimal tradable permit systems to regulate
lagged and stochastic externalities require trading ratios that may be greater than or less
than one. The exact magnitudes of the optimal trading ratios depend on (a) the discount
rate, (b) conditional expectations of future states of the affected resource, (c) persistence
of the state of the affected resource, and (d) initial conditions. I also find that the optimal
trading ratios may be non-monotonic in the degree of uncertainty regarding the future state
of the affected resource. My numerical analysis suggests that these complexities in permit
market design may be relevant to the range of economic and physical parameters encountered
in real-world environmental problems.
Previous studies on the impact of time lags on optimal economic decision-making have
focused largely on problems outside the realm of environmental and natural resource eco-
nomics, primarily on cases in which current decisions by a firm impact the demand for their
products with a lag. These studies include models of dynamic advertising policy [32, 56],
population accumulation in the macroeconomy [1, 78], and the production and taxation of
durable goods [50, 51, 20, 63]. In these studies, lags are shown to be significant in determin-
ing the profit-maximizing behavior of individual firms. However, the conclusions provided
by these models are not directly applicable to markets for the protection of the environment,
since lags in these applications only impact private costs and thus do not affect the rest of
society through externalities.
In the environmental economics literature, a series of papers has incorporated time lags in
models of optimal control of groundwater pollution. In modeling the response of groundwa-
ter systems to emissions, these studies adopt a stock-and-flow approach similar to the state
equations that describe capital accumulation in the macroeconomics literature. In most
cases, emissions are treated as a flow that, with some temporal delay, get added to a stock of
ambient pollution that decays over time. Kim et al. [35] and Fleming et al. [15] develop dy-
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namic models that examine the effect of time lags between nitrogenous fertilizer application
and nitrate contamination of aquifers on optimal regulatory policy. Conrad and Olson [8],
Yadav [80], Nkonya and Featherstone [57], and Ibendahl and Fleming [30] conduct empirical
studies of agricultural practices in the United States and use the estimated models to test
the effect of regulations such as nitrogen standards and user fees. Recent work has also
examined the role of lags in optimal carbon sequestration paths [61, 7]. While these studies
provide compelling theoretical and empirical evidence that lags are significant in determining
optimal economic activity in the presence of externalities, they stop short of considering the
implications on a tradable permits system to manage the underlying environmental prob-
lem. This is due to the fact that all of the models employed in these studies have only one
decision-maker, so an optimal policy does not have to adjust for the tradeoffs involved in a
regulatory context with multiple, heterogeneous agents. Furthermore, the proposed models
are all deterministic and thus do not account for the possible interaction between lags and
uncertainty.
This chapter contributes to the environmental economics literature in two ways. First,
this is the first theoretical analysis of a tradable permit market to regulate multiple agents
that generate stochastic externalities with heterogenous time lags. The model presented in
this chapter has two control variables so that the regulator must assess the tradeoff between
two economic activities with different time lags. The closed-form solution that results from
parameterized model provides a qualitative understanding of this tradeoff and its implications
on the design of permit markets to regulate the economic activity. Second, the analysis in this
chapter yields findings that are new to the economic literature on environmental regulation.
I find that accounting for uncertainty in a theoretical model can reverse the relationship
between optimal emissions and time lags found in previous studies [15, 35]. Furthermore,
I find that accounting for time lags can reverse the relationship between optimal trading
ratios and uncertainty, which was previously found to be monotonic [67, 68]. While the
analytical and numerical models presented here do not fully reflect the true complexity of
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lagged dynamics in natural resources, the results provide insights into how these complexities
can be accommodated by market-based environmental policies. Furthermore, this study can
provide some intuition behind the results of future studies that implement numerical models
of lagged and stochastic externalities that are more realistic but too complex to explore
analytically.
3.2 The General Model
3.2.1 Abatement Costs and Environmental Damages
I develop a general dynamic model in discrete time that illustrates the need for trading
ratios in a market of permits or quotas when externalities are realized with time lags. This
model highlights the role of time lags in physical processes of environmental systems, as
opposed to other regulatory or behavioral lags that may also affect the optimal design of a
tradable permits scheme. Correspondingly, I assume that the structure of the lags in the
model are determined exogenously and thus cannot be modified by the regulator or by the
firms. Consider a market consisting of j = 1, . . . , J firms that generate pollution. Each firm
makes a one-time decision regarding its emissions level, and let u¯j represent the emissions of
the jth firm that would prevail in the absence of regulation. In the presence of regulation,
firms may choose to reduce their emissions below their uncontrolled quantity at a cost, which
is given by the following abatement cost functions:
Cj = Cj(aj), C
′
j(·) > 0, C ′′j (·) > 0, (3.1)
where aj is the abatement level of the jth firm. Emissions by firm j after abatement is thus
given by u¯j − aj.
While the firm’s decision on emissions is static, I model the impact of these emissions on
the environment as a dynamic process. In other words, firms generate emissions in the first
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time period only, but environmental damages from those emissions can be experienced by
society in later time periods. In the model, emissions by the J firms pollutes a single natural
resource stock, the state of which I represent with the variable xt. As such, the state variable
xt can represent the concentration of air pollutants measured at a monitoring station or the
accumulation of carcinogens in a stream or aquifer in time period t. The evolution of the
state variable in response to firm emissions is given by the following equation of motion:
xt = ρxt−1 +
J∑
j=1
(u¯j − aj)Ψ(Γj, t) + θt. (3.2)
In equation (3.2), Ψ(Γj, t) is a transfer function that describes the impact in period t of a unit
of emissions by firm j, where Γj is a vector of firm-specific characteristics. As a result, the
Ψ(·) function introduces time lags into the externalities of firm emissions, and the nature of
these time lags can vary across firms. Furthermore, I assume that the evolution of the state
variable exhibits serial correlation, which is captured by the persistence parameter /rho, and
that the stock is subject to a stochastic shock θt ∈ Θt in every period. The realized shock
in the current period is observable, but shocks in future periods are not. Finally, I represent
the monetized social costs of damage to the environment at time t with a damage function
D(xt), where D
′(·) > 0 and D′′(·) > 0, so that marginal damages are increasing in the level
of pollution.
3.2.2 The Social Planner’s Problem
The finite-horizon social planner’s problem is to find a set of abatement levels {a∗1, . . . , a∗J}
that minimizes the sum of abatement costs to firms and costs from expected future environ-
mental damage in time periods t = 1, . . . , T :
min
a1,...,aJ
J∑
j=1
Cj(aj) + E
[
T∑
t=1
βtD(xt)
]
, (3.3)
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subject to the equation of motion (3.2), where β is a discount factor and E is the expectation
operator. If the initial state of the environment is given by x0, using recursive substitution,
I can describe the state variable xt explicitly as a function of the control variables a1, . . . , aJ :
xt = ρ
tx0 +
t−1∑
i=0
ρi
J∑
j=1
(u¯j − aj)Ψ(Γj, t− i) +
t−1∑
i=0
ρiθt−i. (3.4)
Substitution of equation (3.4) into the objective function (3.3) allows derivation of the first-
order conditions for an interior solution:
C ′j(a
∗
j)− E
[
T∑
t=1
βtD′(·)Ψ(Γj, t− i)
]
= 0, (3.5)
where I suppress the argument to the marginal damage function for notational convenience.
As a result, a necessary condition for optimality in this social planner’s problem is for the
marginal cost of abatement for each firm to equal the discounted marginal damages that
those emissions are expected to cause in the future. The term Ψ(Γj, t− i) in condition (3.5)
plays a crucial role by conferring a weight on firm j’s emissions within the total marginal
damages caused by all firms. A sufficient condition for optimality in this cost-minimization
problem is the joint concavity of (3.3) in the choice variables a∗1, . . . , a
∗
J .
3.2.3 Implementing the Optimal Solution in a System of Tradable Permits
In a system of tradable emissions permits in which firms must purchase a permit to release
a unit of emissions, firm j will solve the following cost-minimization problem:
min
aj
Cj(aj) + pj(u¯j − aj − qj), (3.6)
where pj is the price of permits to firm j and qj is the initial endowment of permits for
firm j. It follows that firms in the market will choose an optimal level of abatement amktj
such that C ′j(a
mkt
j ) = pj, i.e. where the marginal cost of abatement is equal to the cost
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of purchasing an additional emissions permit. From the first-order conditions of the social
planner’s problem (3.5), we know that the socially optimal emissions level for firm j can be
induced (that is, amktj = a
∗
j) if the permit price equals:
pj = E
[
T∑
t=1
βtD′(·)Ψ(Γj, t− i)
]
. (3.7)
The permit price should be set so that, in choosing a level of emissions, each firm faces
the cost of expected discounted marginal social damages caused by their decision. Because
the firms have heterogeneous impacts on the environment over time (i.e. different transfer
functions Ψ(Γj, t − i)), in general, the permit prices will not be equal across firms. As a
result, if firms are able to trade permits between themselves, it would be suboptimal to
allow the trades to occur on a one-to-one basis. That is, trading ratios must be put in place
in order to adjust for the fact that firms cause different marginal damages to the environment.
Specifically, for two arbitrary firms k and l, their trading ratio is given by:
τk,l =
E
[∑T
t=1 β
tD′(·)Ψ(Γk, t− i)
]
E
[∑T
t=1 β
tD′(·)Ψ(Γl, t− i)
] . (3.8)
Again, the transfer functions Ψ(Γk, t − i) and Ψ(Γl, t − i) play a crucial role in that they
determine how the terms in the summations in the numerator and denominator of the trading
ratio are weighted. More specifically, the Ψ(·)’s will determine how the compounded discount
factor βt and time-varying marginal damage to the stock D′(·) are distributed over the time
periods since emissions were released. Both of these effects will change the size of the
trading ratio, although the direction of the effect is ambiguous in the general formulation of
the model.
Another important component of the trading ratio (3.8) is the stochastic shock θt, which
is an argument in the marginal damage function. If D′′′(·) > 0, that is if marginal damage
is convex in pollution, and if θt has mean zero so that E[θt] = 0 for all t, then by Jensen’s
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inequality:
E
[
D′
(
ρxt−1 +
J∑
j=1
(u¯j − a∗j)Ψ(Γj, t) + θt
)]
> D′
(
ρxt−1 +
J∑
j=1
(u¯j − a∗j)Ψ(Γj, t)
)
. (3.9)
Therefore, the presence of uncertainty in the stock will have an impact on the trading ratio
by increasing the size of both the numerator and the denominator through the curvature of
the damage function. The direction of change of the trading ratio due to uncertainty depends
on how the difference between expected stochastic and deterministic marginal damages are
distributed in the summations in (3.8). A similar ambiguity results in the case when D′′′(·) <
0, in which the presence of uncertainty will decrease the size of both the numerator and
denominator of the trading ratio.
In summary, this model shows that trading ratios would be required in an optimal tradable
permit system to manage lagged and stochastic environmental externalities, and that the
magnitude of these ratios will depend on how the lags affect the discounting of future envi-
ronmental damages, the time distribution of marginal damages, and the role of uncertainty
in defining the expected marginal damages. However, under the current formulation, it is
difficult to characterize further the impact of lags and uncertainty on the optimal trading
ratio. Therefore, the next section parameterizes the general model and adds structure to the
nature of the uncertainty that affects the natural resource stock.
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3.3 A Model With Two Firms, Exponential Forms, and Single
Lags
3.3.1 Parameterizing Abatement Costs and Environmental Damage
First, I reduce the number of agents in the model from J firms to 2 firms which have identical
uncontrolled extraction rate u¯ and identical abatement cost functions of the exponential form:
C(aj) = exp(φ1aj + φ2) for j = 1, 2, (3.10)
where φ1 and φ2 are scaling parameters. Note that under this formulation, the cost function
is strictly increasing and convex in the level of abatement. Second, I assign an exponential
form to the environmental damage function:
D(xt) = exp(γ1xt + γ2) for t = 1, . . . , T, (3.11)
where γ1 and γ2 are scaling parameters. Under this formulation, the damage function is
strictly increasing, strictly convex, and has a positive third derivative. Finally, I add structure
to the dynamics of pollution by specifying that the lagged impacts of emissions by each firm
occur entirely within one period in the future. That is, I specify that emissions by Firm 1
affect the natural resource stock with a time lag of k1 < T periods and emissions by Firm
2 affect the stock with a lag of k2 < T periods. This is equivalent to a transfer function
Ψ(Γj, t) that equals 1 in period t = kj and 0 in all other periods.
3.3.2 Adding Structure to the Stochastic Process
Because resources may be subject to different stochastic processes, I consider two alternative
forms of uncertainty. While both of these stochastic processes are simple, they demonstrate
how small differences in the nature of the uncertainty can lead to different implications
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regarding the design of tradable permit systems in the presence of time lags.
Case A: Serial Correlation in the Shocks to the Resource
For the first type of uncertainty, I allow no serial correlation in pollution (i.e. ρ = 0) but
allow for serial correlation in the shocks to the environment θt. Because the lagged damages
of pollution occur only in periods k1 and k2 in our parameterized model, under this stochastic
process equation (3.4) describing the evolution of state variable xt can be simplified to:
xt =

(u¯− a1) + θt if t = k1,
(u¯− a2) + θt if t = k2,
θt otherwise.
where θt = µθt−1+t, t ∼ N(0, σ2 ) and θ0 is given. The parameter µ describes the persistence
of the shocks to the resource. This form of uncertainty is consistent with shocks to natural
resources that are correlated over time, so that positive shocks are more likely to be followed
by positive shocks than negative shocks, and vice-versa. However, the state of the resource
itself in any time period is independent of the state of the resource in other time periods.
Case B: Serial Correlation in the State of the Resource
In the second form of uncertainty, we allow serial correlation in the state of the natural
resource stock (i.e. ρ > 0) and no serial correlation in the shocks θt. Under this form of
uncertainty, the state equation can be written as an AR(1) process as follows:
xt =

ρxt−1 + (u¯− a1) + θt if t = k1,
ρxt−1 + (u¯− a2) + θt if t = k2,
ρxt−1 + θt otherwise.
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where θt ∼ N(0, σ2θ) and x0 is given. This form of uncertainty is consistent with the behavior
of natural resources with states that exhibit persistence over time. In this case, the current
state of the natural resource depends in part on previous states of the resource, although
the shocks to the resource are independent over time.
3.3.3 Properties of the Optimal Trading Ratio Under Case A
Thanks to the fact that exponential functions follow the exponential identity, a closed-form
solution for the social planner’s optimal abatement levels is possible when shocks to the
resource are serially correlated (see Appendix A.1 for details on derivation):
a∗j =
1
φ1 + γ1
γ2 − φ2 + ln(γ1βkj
φ1
)
+ γ1
(
u¯+ µkjθ0
)
+
1
2
γ21σ
2

kj−1∑
i=0
µ2i
 , (3.12)
for j = 1, 2. It is clear from this solution that the optimal abatement level for firm j depends
crucially on its associated externality lag length kj. Furthermore, equation (3.12) indicates
that the optimal abatement level for both firms is positively related to the discount factor
β, the size of the initial shock θ0, and the variance of the stochastic process σ
2
 . In other
words, lower discount rates, unfavorable initial shocks to the resource, and high variance in
the shocks to the resource entail higher optimal abatement levels for both Firms 1 and 2.
More interestingly, under Case A, we can also determine whether changes in any of these
key parameters entail larger shifts in optimal abatement for one firm than for the other. Such
differences in marginal outcomes are important in the design of a market for permits since
different permit prices would need to be charged to the two firms. Furthermore, if trading
of these permits is to occur between the two firms, we require a trading ratio that accounts
for the difference in the change in optimal abatement. By substituting equation (3.12) into
equation (3.7), we can obtain the optimal permit price for each firm, which in turn will allow
us to obtain the optimal trading ratio. Assuming, without loss of generality, that k1 < k2 so
that the lag associated with emissions by Firm 2 is longer than that associated with Firm 1,
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the optimal trading ratio is given by:
ln
(
p1
p2
)
=
φ
φ+ γ
[
(k1 − k2) ln β + γ(µk1 − µk2)θ0 − 1
2
γ2σ2
k2−1∑
i=k1
µ2i
]
. (3.13)
The three terms contained within the square brackets in equation (3.13) allow us to analyze
separately the effect of the discount factor, the initial shock to the resource, and the variance
of the shocks to the resource on the magnitude of the trading ratio.
Proposition 3.1. [The Discounting Effect] When the discount factor β decreases (in-
creases), the trading ratio must adjust to make permits relatively cheaper for the firm with
longer (shorter) lags.
Proof. The relationship between the discount factor β and the trading ratio p1/p2 can be
determined directly from equation 3.13.
Because the environmental damages of emissions by the firm with longer lags occur farther
into the future, their social costs are discounted further. Thus, for lower discount factors
(i.e. higher discount rates), it is optimal to allow relatively more extraction by the firm
with longer lags. This is reflected in the market by a increase in the trading ratio (as defined
in (3.13)), which raises the price of permits to Firm 1 relative to Firm 2, thereby encouraging
more permits to be held by Firm 2. It is important to note that the discounting effect exists
even in the absence of uncertainty or persistence in the value of the stock variable, so that
a trading ratio is required even in a deterministic setting.
Proposition 3.2. [The Initial Shock Effect] When the initial observed shock to the
resource is positive (negative), the trading ratio must adjust to make permits relatively cheaper
for the firm with longer (shorter) lags.
Proof. The relationship between the initial shock θ and the trading ratio p1/p2 can be de-
termined directly from equation 3.13.
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Because the shocks are correlated over time as defined in Section 3.3.2, the conditional
mean of the shocks in any given period s is equal to E[θs|θ0] = µsθ0. Thus, if a positive
shock is observed in the initial period (i.e. θ0 > 0), the conditional mean of the shocks will
be positive though eventually converging to zero for future time periods.1 In other words,
the correlation of shocks over time implies that the positive initial shock is more likely to be
followed by more positive shocks than negative shocks. In this case, because the expected
damages to the stock from the stochastic process are higher in earlier periods than in later
periods, it is optimal to move the impacts of extraction on the resource farther into the
future, that is, encourage emissions by the firm with longer lags. This is accomplished by
increasing the trading ratio, which encourages more permits to be held by the firm with
longer lags.
Conversely, if the initial shock to the stock is negative, then (3.13) indicates that the
trading ratio should be lower, which makes emissions permits relatively cheaper for Firm
1. The reason behind this is that the conditional mean of the state of the resource will
be more negative (i.e. better for the resource) in earlier periods, so it is optimal to move
pollution impacts closer to the present, when it is expected that the resource will be in better
condition. In this case, emissions by the firm with shorter lags should be encouraged over
emissions by the firm with longer lags.
In essence, because shocks to the resource are correlated over time, the regulator’s “best
guess” regarding the condition of the stock at various points of time in the future depends
on the shock she observes in the initial period. Since good initial shocks are likely to be
followed by more good shocks in the near future, the regulator will adjust the trading ratio
so as to move impacts on the stock closer to the present, that is, favor emissions by the
firm with shorter lags. On the other hand, if the initial shock is bad, then the regulator can
expect to see more bad shocks in the near future, so she has an incentive to move impacts
on the stock farther into the future by favoring emissions by the firm with longer lags.
1Note that in the current model, a positive realization of the shock θt is bad in that it causes additional
damage to the resource.
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Proposition 3.3. [The Uncertainty Effect] When the variance of the stochastic process
σ2 increases (decreases), the trading ratio must adjust to make permits relatively cheaper for
the firm with longer (shorter) lags.
Proof. The relationship between the variance of the stochastic process σ2 and the trading
ratio p1/p2 can be determined directly from equation 3.13.
In addition to the conditional mean of the stochastic process, the conditional variance
affects the size of the optimal trading ratio. When the shocks to the resource are correlated
over time, the conditional variance of the process in any given period s is:
Var[θs|θ0] = σ2
s−1∑
i=0
µ2i, (3.14)
which increses monotonically in time as it converges to the unconditional mean of the process,
σ2/(1− µ2). In other words, the variance of the stock is higher farther into the future. The
regulator’s confidence intervals expand as a function of time, which reflects the fact that the
regulator’s ability to forecast the condition of the stock degrades the farther she looks into
the future.
The fact that the regulator faces higher variability farther into the future will have impli-
cations on the optimal choice of extraction level if the third derivative of the damage function
is nonzero. If D′′′(·) > 0 as it is in the current model, then the uncertainty will raise the
trading ratio so that permits are relatively cheaper for Firm 1. The regulator will prefer to
move pollution impacts closer to the present, to periods when things are more predictable.2
Table 3.1 summarizes the results for Case A. One finding is that if the lags for the two firms
are the same, i.e. k1 = k2, then the trading ratio equals one as it does in a standard tradable
permits system. Furthermore, the greater the difference between the lag lengths associated
with the two firms, the greater the impact of each of the three effects described above in
2This relationship between the third derivative of the damage function and the optimal extraction policy
is analogous to models in the macroeconomic literature, in which the effect of “prudence” leads agents to
sacrifice current consumption in favor of future consumption if the third derivative of their utility function
is positive.
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determining the trading ratio. These results suggest that taking lags into account in a permits
market will yield the greatest welfare improvements in settings where heterogeneity in lags
across firms is large. While the relationship between the trading ratio and the individual
parameters are predictable in this case, the magnitude of the trading ratio ultimately depends
on the combination of the three effects described above. As a result, optimal trading ratios
may be greater than or less than those that apply in the absence of time lags and uncertainty,
and the relationship between the optimal trading ratios and key parameters may be non-
monotonic.
3.3.4 Properties of the Optimal Trading Ratio Under Case B
In contrast to Case A, when there is serial correlation in the state of the natural resource,
there is no closed-form solution for the social planner’s optimal abatement level. The first-
order conditions for Case B (see Appendix A.2) illustrate the added complexity that persis-
tence in the state of the resource brings to the derivation of optimal abatement. However, it
can be shown using comparative statics that the direction of change in optimal abatement
in response to key parameters is predictable.3 Specifically, we can show that optimal abate-
ment by both firms is increasing in the discount factor β, initial state of the resource x0, and
variance of the stochastic process σ2.
It can also be shown using comparative statics that if the initial state of the resource is
unfavorable (i.e. higher x0), relatively more abatement should be undertaken by the firm
with shorter lags (i.e.
da∗1
dx0
>
da∗2
dx0
). This result implies that the trading ratio should make
emissions permits cheaper for the firm with longer lags. However, the relationship between
the trading ratio and the discount factor β and the relationship between the trading ratio
and the variance of the stochastic process σ2 are ambiguous. Table 3.2 summarizes these
results for Case B.
3Derivations of these comparative static results are notationally tedious and thus not provided; they are
available upon request.
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Persistence in the state of the natural resource is the key factor that introduces the am-
biguity into the results for Case B. The presence of persistence implies that emissions by
Firm 1 affects the natural resource during periods t = k1, . . . , T while emissions by Firm 2
affects the resource during periods t = k2, . . . , T . Therefore, if k1 < k2, emissions by Firm
1 affect the natural resource during more periods within the time horizon t = 1, . . . , T than
emissions by Firm 2. This difference in the time frame of pollution impacts makes the effect
of discounting and variance in shocks ambiguous.
3.4 Numerical Application: Trading Groundwater to Protect
Streams
3.4.1 Institutional and Environmental Setting
To demonstrate how my theoretical results can apply to real-world environmental man-
agement scenarios, I present a numerical application for an externality known as stream
depletion. Stream depletion can occur when groundwater is pumped from an aquifer that is
adjacent to a stream; the decline in water levels in the aquifer can be large enough to induce
water to flow out of the stream and into the aquifer. This externality creates a problem of
tenure uncertainty for holders of rights to water from the stream, as well as a disruption
of ecosystem services provided by the stream. Because groundwater flow is diffusional, sig-
nificant time lags can exist between pumping decisions and the resulting stream depletion
impacts. Furthermore, the length of these time lags depends crucially on the location of the
pumping well relative to the stream; holding other factors constant, groundwater users close
to streams will cause stream depletion with a shorter lag than groundwater users far away
from streams. The theoretical results from Section 3.3 suggest that a market for groundwater
that seeks to prevent excessive stream depletion will require trading ratios that are adjusted
for different users in the watershed.
The numerical application will be based on hydrologic and economic data from the Repub-
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lican River Basin of Nebraska. Recently, Nebraska has passed legislation which recognizes
that surface water and groundwater may be hydrologically connected. This legislation is a
result of litigation by the State of Kansas, which contended that large-scale development of
groundwater wells in Nebraska was adversely affecting the quantity of surface water flowing
out of Nebraska and into Kansas, thus violating allocations established in 1942 via the Re-
publican River Compact. In recent years, the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) has installed meters on all certified wells in the Basin and imposed restrictions on
groundwater pumping throughout the Nebraska portion of the Republican River Basin [55].
The Nebraska DNR maintains a registry of all wells in the state, each of which has an
associated certified irrigated acreage. Data on input and output prices, climate (evapotran-
spiration and crop yield), and hydrology (including soil types, pumping water level, and
well yield) were collected by Palazzo and Brozovic´ [59] for 2006 and processed using Water
Optimizer, which is a single-field irrigation decision support tool created by University of
Nebraska-Lincoln Extension.4 This procedure yields abatement cost curves for each of the
10,908 wells in the Republican River Basin, which can be used to determine the cost to
farmers for complying with restrictions on pumping.
3.4.2 Abatement Cost and Environmental Damages
Although I have described the theoretical model in the context of a pollution problem, we
can adapt the terminology to accommodate a numerical application to the stream depletion
externality. In our application, groundwater pumping by wells is equivalent to firm emissions,
and stream depletion is equivalent to pollution concentration. In addition, instead of two
firms, we will consider two “pumping zones” in the Republican River Basin. We determine
these zones by ranking the 10,908 wells by distance from the nearest stream and dividing
them into two groups; the group of wells that is closer to streams is designated as Zone 1,
and the group of wells that is farther from streams designated as Zone 2. Borrowing the
4The tool and documentation are available at http://www.agecon.unl.edu/wateroptimizer.html.
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definitions from the theoretical model, I denote groundwater pumping in Zone 1 by u¯ − a1
and pumping in Zone 2 by u¯− a2. Similarly, pumping in Zone 1 generates stream depletion
with a lag of k1 years and pumping in Zone 2 generates stream depletion with a lag of k2
years, where k1 < k2. I assume that the two zones have identical total annual abatement
cost functions of the exponential form (3.10) and damages from stream depletion in year t
are also given by an exponential function (3.11).
I fit the exponential abatement cost function to the aggregate total abatement cost curves
from the Republican River Basin data set, which leads to scaling parameter values of φ1 =
5.8309 × 10−5 and φ2 = 14.2745. Because there is no widely recognized damage function
for stream depletion, I resort to the two-parameter damage function with flexible curvature
employed by Kolstad [37]:
D(xt) = bc
(xt
c
)n
, (3.15)
We set the parameter c equal to the annual volume of stream depletion that is implied
by current restrictions on pumping in the Republican River Basin, that is, c = 135,598
acre-inches. The parameter b has been set equal to 10, which is the value of irrigation
in dollars in the Republican River Basin as estimated by Palazzo and Brozovic´ [59]. The
parameter n measures the curvature of the damage function; it yields a convex function for
n > 1 and a function with positive third derivative if n > 2. I choose a value of n = 3
and fit the exponential damage function (3.11) to this damage function, yielding scaling
parameter values of γ1 = 4.3104 × 10−5 and γ2 = 8.2508. Table 3.3 summarizes these
and other parameter values used for this numerical analysis. Finally, in order to introduce
uncertainty into the numerical application, I adopt the stochastic process of Case B described
in Section 3.3.2. This implies that stream depletion over time is serially correlated.
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3.4.3 Numerical Results
In order to solve for the optimal abatement policy in the Republican River Basin, I first
plug in the parameter values in Table 3.3 into the first-order conditions for the Case B
optimization problem (see Appendix A.2). These first-order conditions comprise a system of
two equations and two unknowns that define the optimal abatement quantities and associated
optimal trading ratios. This procedure can be repeated several times in order to analyze
how the optimal outcomes vary with changes in key parameters. Figure 3.1 illustrates how
optimal abatement levels for the two zones and the trading ratio change in response to the
discount rate. The trading ratio is expressed from Zone 2’s point of view.
The left panel confirms that abatement in both zones decreases with the discount rate
(i.e. increases with the discount factor), but it also reveals how the ranking of abatement
quantities can switch depending on the discount rate. The higher optimal abatement level for
Zone 2 at low discount rates is likely due to the uncertainty effect dominating the discounting
effect, while the higher optimal abatement level for Zone 2 at higher discount rates is likely
due to the discounting effect dominating the uncertainty effect. This switch is reflected in
the trading ratio illustrated in the right panel of the figure, which shows that the trading
ratio between Zones 1 and 2 can be greater than or less than one within this range of the
discount rate.
Figure 3.2 illustrates how optimal abatement levels for the two zones and the trading ratio
change in response to variance in the shocks to stream depletion. The left panel confirms the
theoretical result that optimal abatement in both zones increases with greater uncertainty.
Within the range of the variance parameter shown in the figure, optimal abatement in Zone 1
is always greater than in Zone 2. However, the right panel indicates that the optimal trading
ratio is non-monotonic in the variance of the stochastic process; the ratio first increases and
then decreases with greater uncertainty. This non-monotonicity is a result of the complex
interaction between discounting, uncertainty, and persistence effects that cannot be resolved
definitively by our theoretical analysis.
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3.5 Conclusion
There are many processes in nature that exhibit time lags and uncertainty, but the joint
impact of these two features on the efficiency of market-based solutions to environmental
externalities has thus far not been explored in the economic literature. In this paper, I
developed a theoretical model that demonstrates the potential for lags and uncertainty to
alter the optimal design of tradable permits systems. I showed that such markets will require
trading ratios between buyers and sellers, and that these ratios can be greater than or less
one. Analyzing a simpler, parameterized model with two polluters and exponential functional
forms revealed the determinants of the magnitude of these trading ratios, namely the discount
rate, conditional expectations of future states of the affected resource, persistence of the
state of the affected resource, and initial conditions. A numerical application involving a
groundwater market to protect streams in the Republican River Basin of Nebraska illustrated
how the theoretical results are relevant to real-world problems in environmental management.
The main policy implication that arises from this analysis is that, in designing permit
markets, regulators must consider the relative importance of discounting and uncertainty
associated with the future impacts in environmental process that are lagged and stochastic.
This consideration is more significant when participants in the market impact the natural
resource differently. In addition, it has been shown that the initial state of the environment
matters in choosing the optimal trading scheme. In the context of water resource allocation,
for example, the that optimal water use policies across multiple users will differ depending
on whether the allocation decision is made in a wet year or a dry year. Regulators are
often criticized for exercising a “reactive” policy, that is, waiting until the state of a natural
resource is critical before enacting any regulations. Nonetheless, the fact that the initial
state matters in determining an optimal policy may be an argument in favor of delaying
the imposition of regulation until the state of the resource in question degrades to a given
critical point.
While I do not explicitly assess the implications of lags and uncertainty on the relative
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informational burden of regulating an environmental externality, the results in this paper do
show that these features can vastly complicate the optimal design of a permit market. One
of the commonly cited benefits of permit markets is that they require very little information
on the part of the regulator; as long as the correct number of permits is distributed, firms
will buy and sell permits so as to archive the optimal outcome. However, when lags and
uncertainty are present, to achieve a first-best result the regulator must calculate a trading
ratio for every potential pair of buyers and sellers, perhaps varying the number of permits
in the market over time. As long as lags are present, this complexity in market design will
exist even if all of the firms have identical cost structures and only one resource stock is of
concern to regulators.
An important limitation to my study is the simplicity of the theoretical model. This was
necessary to obtain analytical results that provide an intuitive understanding of how per-
mit markets could be designed to manage externalities with lags and uncertainty. In the
parameterized version of the model, important simplifying assumptions include the expo-
nential forms for the abatement cost and damage functions and the one-time nature of the
emissions decision. While these features of the model may abstract from the true complexity
of many environmental problems, they allow us to disentangle the different determinants of
optimal market design to manage lagged and stochastic externalities. Future studies that
numerically model the complexities of these management problems may benefit from the
intuition provided by these results.
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3.6 Tables
Table 3.1: Optimal abatement and key parameters in Case A
Optimal abatement Optimal abatement Comparison of
Parameter by firm 1 (a∗1) by firm 2 (a
∗
2) marginal effects
Discount factor (β) + +
da∗1
dβ
<
da∗2
dβ
Initial shock (θ0) + +
da∗1
dθ0
>
da∗2
dθ0
Variance (σ2 ) + +
da∗1
dσ2
<
da∗2
dσ2
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Table 3.2: Optimal abatement and key parameters in Case B
Optimal abatement Optimal abatement Comparison of
Parameter by firm 1 (a∗1) by firm 2 (a
∗
2) marginal effects
Discount factor (β) + +
da∗1
dβ
T da
∗
2
dβ
Initial state (x0) + +
da∗1
dx0
>
da∗2
dx0
Variance (σ2) + +
da∗1
dσ2
T da
∗
2
dσ2
67
Table 3.3: Baseline parameter values for numerical analysis
Parameter Value Parameter Value
φ1 5.8309× 10−5 β 0.9524
φ2 14.2745 ρ 0.5
γ1 4.3104× 10−5 x0 0
γ2 8.2508 σ
2 33,900
u¯ 148,800 k1 2
T 10 k2 8
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3.7 Figures
Figure 3.1: Optimal abatement levels and trading ratio for different values of the discount
rate.
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Figure 3.2: Optimal abatement levels and trading ratio for different levels of variance.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYTICAL HYDROLOGIC MODELS AND THE
DESIGN OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR
GROUNDWATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT
4.1 Introduction
Groundwater quality is a critical parameter in determining the overall well-being of individ-
uals. Approximately 46% of the population in the United States relies on groundwater for
its drinking water supply and about 42% of irrigated agriculture depends on aquifers for its
source of water [54]. At the same time, an estimated one in ten Americans have been exposed
to drinking water that fails to meet federal health standards and 40% of the nation’s com-
munity water systems have violated the Safe Drinking Water Act at least once [13]. From
1971 to 2006, 54% of reported drinking water outbreaks were caused by the use of untreated
groundwater or groundwater treatment deficiencies [9]. Given the social value of ground-
water and evidence that significant externalities affecting groundwater are being generated
by polluters, it is important to understand how regulations can maintain acceptable levels
of groundwater quality while minimizing the regulatory costs to productive activities that
pollute aquifers.
However, analyzing the economic properties of different policy instruments is not straight-
forward due the physical complexity of the groundwater contamination externality. The
discharge of pollutants into an aquifer generates contaminant concentrations in groundwater
that are spatially and temporally variable. As a result, the costs and benefits of regulating
groundwater polluters will also vary over space and time. Numerical groundwater models
can represent this complexity at a fine scale using cell-based characterizations of aquifers or
watersheds and finite-element or finite-difference methods to solve for pollution outcomes.
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However, numerical models are often computationally intensive and calibrated to specific
aquifers or watersheds. These properties of numerical models are impediments to their ap-
plication in an economic analysis. First, solving economic optimization problems requires
repeated use of the hydrologic model for different emissions patterns. The computational
burden of such as a task can be large, especially if there are many regulated polluters. Sec-
ond, from a policymaking standpoint, it is desirable for hydrologic models to be flexible
enough for use in different geographic areas and regulatory settings. Because new numerical
groundwater models are costly to develop, they are unsuitable for an analysis that seeks to
develop policy implications that can apply in a wide range of contamination problems.
The hydrology literature offers analytical groundwater models as alternatives to numerical
groundwater models. Analytical hydrologic models of groundwater quality consist of equa-
tions that relate contaminant emissions at one location in an aquifer to ambient contaminant
concentrations at another location in the aquifer. While these equations are not capable of
modeling fine-scale spatial detail and heterogeneity like numerical hydrologic models, they
require far fewer computational resources to implement and can still account for complex
spatial and dynamic processes in groundwater contaminant transport. In this chapter, I
explore how analytical hydrologic models can inform the effective design and choice of pol-
icy instruments to manage groundwater quality. In order to demonstrate the usefulness of
analytical hydrologic equations in policy formulation, I present a social planner’s problem
of optimal groundwater quality management that is coupled with analytical solutions from
the hydrologic literature and perform a theoretical analysis to characterize the properties
of an optimal emissions policy. I then apply the model in a numerical analysis of ground-
water contamination by chloride from highway deicers to demonstrate the relevance of the
theoretical results to practical management settings.
The analysis in this chapter makes three main contributions to the environmental eco-
nomics literature. First, I employ an analytical solution from the hydrology literature to
model the groundwater contamination process. This model is consistent with the manner in
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which groundwater pollution is analyzed in the field of hydrology, and when embedded in
an economic optimization framework leads to policy recommendations that are qualitatively
different from those in previous studies. Second, my model provides a framework to evaluate
the potential effectiveness of different policy instruments in the context of the geophysical
parameters associated with a particular contamination problem. As a result, the model can
provide heuristics that can be used to inform the design of contamination policies when reg-
ulators do not have access to detailed numerical groundwater models. Finally, the numerical
application in this chapter is the first quantitative economic study of regulations to manage
groundwater pollution by chloride from road salt. In addition to demonstrating the relevance
of the theoretical analysis to practical management settings, the numerical application in this
chapter is the first attempt in the literature to evaluate the tradeoff between the benefits of
road salt and the environmental damages of increased chloride concentrations in underlying
aquifers.
4.2 Economic Implications of Hydrologic Complexity
The costs and benefits of groundwater contamination depend on hydrologic phenomena that
dictate what happens between the moment pollution is generated and the moment the pol-
luted water is consumed. In most cases of groundwater contamination, the agent generating
the pollution is different from the agent who is suffering the negative effects of the pollution.
This externality is caused by a process known as advection, in which contaminants travel
from one physical location to another as they flow with moving groundwater in the subsur-
face. A priority in water quality management is thus to regulate sources of contamination
such that the social costs of pollution are internalized amongst users of an aquifer. However,
since groundwater in aquifers tends to move very slowly, there may be a substantial time lag
between the moment the pollutant is emitted and its arrival to the point of consumption.
Since the effects of a contaminant emissions choice today are not felt until some time in the
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future, the social rate of discount will be an important determinant of the optimal time path
of pollution at a source. Furthermore, since the pollutant levels at the point of consumption
do not respond instantaneously to changes in emissions, the optimal time path of emissions
must reflect this time lag.
There is also a tendency for contaminants that are released into an aquifer to spread into
large plumes, in a physical process known as dispersion. Dispersion causes the contaminant
to dilute and spread as it migrates through the aquifer, thus polluting areas that are much
larger than the contaminant source itself. Because of this process, a choice of pollutant
emissions in a single period can affect the quality of water in large portions of an aquifer
over very long periods of time. Dispersion also implies that the optimal emissions level in
any given time period is contingent on emissions choices made in other time periods.
Previous economic studies of groundwater contamination [15, 35] have analyzed how time
lags between contaminant release and ambient pollution determine optimal emissions levels.
These models adopt a stock-and-flow approach similar to the state equations that describe
capital accumulation in the macroeconomics literature. Emissions are treated as a flow that,
with some temporal delay, gets added to a stock of ambient pollution that decays over time.
While these studies account for time lags in contaminant transport, their models assume that
the groundwater quality impacts of emissions from a given time period are confined to a single
future time period. However, the presence of dispersion implies that emissions from a given
time period should affect groundwater quality in multiple future time periods. Analytical
hydrologic models can account for these multiple time lags with equations that specify the
distribution of future groundwater quality impacts as a function of geophysical parameters
such as the distance between the contaminants source and ambient receptor, groundwater
flow velocity, and aquifer dispersivity. By embedding these hydrologic equations into an
economic optimization problem, my model explains the role of geophysical parameters in
determining optimal emissions levels without making direct assumptions about time lags.
The theoretical analysis that follows also shows that the relationship between parameters,
74
such as distance to ambient receptor, and optimal emissions is not straightforward; optimal
emissions may increase or decrease due to changes in these parameters. This is a more
nuanced result than those in previous studies which conclude that optimal groundwater
contaminant emissions have a monotonic relationship with model parameters.
Yadav [80], Nkonya et al. [57], and Ibendahl et al. [30] conduct empirical studies on ground-
water pollution from fertilizer application in agriculture and use the estimated models to test
the effect of regulations such as nitrogen standards and user fees. Although these studies
address the problem of groundwater pollution from an economic perspective, they do not
consider the impact of contaminants on social welfare after they dissolve in groundwater and
start migrating through the aquifer. Since groundwater is usually consumed in locations that
are spatially distinct from sources of pollution, a complete economic analysis of groundwater
pollution must also address this aspect of contaminant transport.
The role of advective-dispersive contaminant transport in water quality management has
thus far only been analyzed in the water resources engineering literature. Gorelick et al. [23]
present a management model that determines the maximum concentration of a transient
pollutant source such that space-dependent ground-water quality standards are met. Gore-
lick and Remson [22] extend this model to incorporate multiple sources of pollution, and
examine the resulting spatial waste disposal tradeoffs. Mylopoulos et al. [53] consider the
impact of waste disposal patterns in meeting predetermined water quality standards at spe-
cific locations. Although sophisticated solute transport models are used to develop all of
these models, the results are difficult to interpret from an economic perspective. Since the
quality requirements are taken to be exogenous, there are no insights into the relationship
between optimal solutions and social welfare. Furthermore, these models are set up to de-
scribe very specific groundwater contamination problems, and as such are not conducive to
generalization and policy guidance.
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4.3 A Model of Optimal Groundwater Contaminant Emissions
4.3.1 Costs and Benefits of Groundwater Pollution
Consider a profit-maximizing firm that produces a good which is sold at an exogenously
determined price p. In each discrete time period t = 1, 2, . . . ,∞, the firm chooses a level
of output qt which is associated with a level of contaminant emissions et. Emissions can be
abated by the firm using additional resources, the cost of which is jointly determined with
the cost of producing the good through the function C(qt, et). The firm’s net benefits can
be described as a function of its emissions:
B(et) = max
qt
Π(qt, et) = max
qt
[pqt − C(qt, et)] for all t, (4.1)
where Π(·, ·) is the firm’s profit function. The function B(et) thus represents the private
benefits from emissions which are determined implicitly by the firm’s profit-maximizing
production strategy. I assume that C(qt, et) is a strictly convex function so that Π(qt, et)
is concave in (qt, et) and maxqt Π(qt, et) is concave in et. Then, B(et) is a concave benefit
function and in the absence of regulation the firm will choose the emissions level at which
marginal net benefits equal zero (that is, B′(e∗t ) = 0 for all t).
Contaminant emissions by the firm generates an externality by raising ambient contam-
inant concentrations in the aquifer. Let at describe the contaminant concentration at an
ambient receptor in time period t and define an environmental damage function D(at) that
describes the negative effects of polluted groundwater on society. Environmental damages
in this case may refer to monetary losses associated with the health consequences of pol-
luted drinking water or agricultural losses from impaired groundwater irrigation. Marginal
environmental damage is increasing in contaminant concentration, that is, D′(·) > 0 and
D′′(·) > 0; a damage function of this shape is consistent with the health impacts caused by
a broad array of contaminants [12].
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4.3.2 Pollution Dynamics
The main difference between models of optimal groundwater pollution in previous studies and
the model presented in this chapter lies in the relationship between contaminant emissions
and ambient contaminant concentration over space and time. As discussed in Section 4.2,
previous studies have employed stock-and-flow equations that do not account for the dis-
persive nature of pollutants in groundwater. In contrast, the analysis in this chapter will
follow a “dispersive transport” approach that is more consistent with current groundwater
pollution models in the hydrology literature. This section formally defines and provides a
comparison of these two approaches.
The Stock-and-Flow Approach
In the stock-and-flow approach, the accumulation of pollutants in the aquifer can be de-
scribed by the following equation of motion:
at+1 = ρet−k + (1− δ)at for t = k + 1, . . . ,∞, (4.2)
where k is the number of time periods it takes for firm emissions to affect ambient contami-
nant concentration levels, ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a response constant that represents the proportion of
emissions that reaches the environment, and δ ∈ (0, 1) is a decay constant that represents
the proportion of the pollutant that decays in the environment from one time period to
another. Recursive substitution of this equation of motion allows current ambient pollution
concentrations to be expressed solely in terms of the history of past emissions:
at = ρ
t−k∑
i=1
(1− δ)i−1et−k−i for t = k + 1, . . . ,∞. (4.3)
Figure (4.1) illustrates the time path of ambient pollutant concentration that results from a
single pulse of emissions when contaminant transport is modeled using this stock-and-flow
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equation.
Dispersive Transport Approach
In contrast to equation (4.2), analytical hydrologic equations of groundwater contamination
include a component that models the dispersion of contaminants in aquifers. Under this
regime, the accumulation of the pollutant in the aquifer can be described by the following
equation of motion:
at+1 =
t∑
i=1
eiφ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t− i+ 1) for all t. (4.4)
This equation of motion states that ambient contaminant concentration in the next time
period is a weighted sum of past levels of firm emissions, where the weights are defined by
the function φ(·) > 0. φ(·) is a transfer function that yields the proportion of the firm’s
instantaneous emissions that contribute to ambient pollution after t periods. The use of
such a transfer function allows the relationship between emissions and ambient pollution to
vary over time, and its curvature with respect to t depends on several parameters. The first
determining factor is the distance between the contaminant source and the receptor, since the
transport of contaminants will take a longer time when the distance between the source and
the receptor is larger. The distance factor enters the transfer function through the variables x,
y, and z, which describe the three-dimensional coordinates of the ambient receptor relative
to the pollutant source. Another relevant parameter is v, which represents the average
linear velocity of groundwater flowing in the aquifer, which affects the rate of transport
because contaminants dissolved in groundwater move, on average, at the same velocity as the
groundwater. Finally, the terms Dx, Dy, and Dz are coefficients of hydrodynamic dispersion,
which are allowed to vary in the x−, y−, and z− directions. These coefficients quantify the
tendency for contaminants to spread as they travel through an aquifer; higher values of Dx,
Dy, or Dz imply that contaminant plumes generated by a pollution episode will be larger,
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all else equal.
The exact formulation of φ(·) is provided by an analytical hydrologic equation that relates
contaminant emissions at one location in an aquifer to ambient contaminant concentrations
at another location in the aquifer over time. The formulation of the analytical hydrologic
equation, in turn, depends on the nature of the pollutant discharge (e.g. point source vs.
non-point source) and physical properties of the aquifer. The model in this chapter will im-
plement the analytical solution by Baetsle [4], which is the simplest solution in the hydrology
literature that still captures contaminant dispersion effects in three dimensions.1 Figure 4.2
illustrates the time path of ambient pollution that results from a single pulse of emissions
when contaminant transport is modeled as a dispersive process. While the visual differences
from the time path with the stock-and-flow approach (Figure 4.1) are subtle, the follow-
ing theoretical analysis will show that this difference in modeling can lead to qualitative
differences in the properties of the optimal regulation of groundwater polluters.
4.4 The Social Planner’s Problem
4.4.1 Solution Under the Stock-and-Flow Approach
The social planner’s problem is to maximize the firm’s net benefits from emissions minus
the environmental damages resulting from ambient pollution. Ambient contaminant concen-
tration is zero at the beginning of the planning horizon (i.e. a0 = 0) so that the first time
period in which there will be positive ambient pollution is period k + 1. Then, total social
welfare over the entire planning horizon is given by:
k∑
t=0
βtB(et) +
∞∑
t=k+1
βt [B(et)−D(at)] , (4.5)
1The Baetsle equation and its properties are described in detail in Appendix B.
79
where β is a discount factor. A social planner will choose an emissions path {e∗0, e∗1, . . . } that
maximizes (4.5) subject to the stock-and-flow pollution dynamics described in (4.2). The
Lagrangean function for this optimization problem is:
L =
k∑
t=0
βtB(et) +
∞∑
t=k+1
βt [B(et)−D(at)] +
∞∑
t=k+1
λt [ρet−k + (1− δ)at − at+1] , (4.6)
where λt is the Lagrangean multiplier for the equation of motion in time period t. The
first-order conditions for an interior solution are:
βtB′(e∗t ) = −ρλt+k, for t = 0, . . . ,∞, (4.7)
βtD′(a∗t ) = (1− δ)λt − λt−1, for t = k + 1, . . . ,∞. (4.8)
Since the objective function (4.5) is concave and the equation of motion (4.2) is linear, the
first-order conditions are sufficient for optimality. Substituting the second condition into the
first yields:
B′(e∗t )− β(1− δ)B′(e∗t+1) = βk+1ρD′(a∗t+k+1). (4.9)
Therefore, the optimal path of emissions is governed by the system of difference equations
consisting of equation (4.9) and the equation of motion (4.2), plus the initial condition a0 = 0
and the transversality condition:
lim
t→0
βtλtat+1 = 0, (4.10)
which requires that the present cost of the terminal ambient pollution stock approach zero.
According to these conditions, the optimal steady state for pollutant accumulation is
described by:
B′(e∗∞) =
ρ
1− β(1− δ)β
k+1D′(a∗∞), (4.11)
e∗∞ =
δ
ρ
a∗∞. (4.12)
Equation (4.11) specifies that in a steady state, the net benefits from an additional unit of
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emissions must equal the resulting increase in damages from ambient pollution concentration,
discounted over k + 1 periods. Equation (4.12) describes the relationship between steady-
state emissions and ambient pollution that is necessary for the solution to be consistent with
established pollution dynamics. The relationship between the steady state and the lag in
pollution dynamics is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. In the stock-and-flow approach, an increase in the transport lag time k
yields higher steady-state levels of emissions and ambient pollution concentration.
Proof. Substitution of steady-state condition (4.12) into (4.11) and minor rearrangement
yields:
βk+1D′(a∗∞)
[
B′
(
δ
ρ
a∗∞
)]−1
=
1
ρ
[1− β(1− δ)] . (4.13)
Since β ∈ (0, 1), an increase in the transport lag time k leads to a decrease in βk+1. Recall
that D′′(·) > 0 and B′′(·) < 0, and note that the right-hand side of (4.13) is comprised of
constants only. Hence, in order to preserve the equality in (4.13), a∗∞ must increase. This
implies that the steady-state level of ambient pollution is higher for larger k. Undertaking
the substitution for a∗∞ instead of e
∗
∞ shows via a similar reasoning that the steady-state
level of emissions is also higher for larger k.
The result in this proposition is driven by the social rate of discount. An increase in
the transport lag time k moves the date on which today’s emissions cause environmental
damage farther into the future. The fact that the negative consequences of today’s actions
occur farther in the future means that society will further discount the associated costs,
which makes it rational to pollute more today.
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4.4.2 Solution Under the Dispersive Transport Approach
The social planner’s problem under the dispersive transport approach is:
max
e1,e2,...
∞∑
t=1
βt [B(et)−D(at)] , (4.14)
s.t. at+1 =
t∑
i=1
eiφ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t− i+ 1) for all t. (4.15)
The Lagrangian expression for the problem is:
L =
∞∑
t=1
{
βt [B(et)−D(at)] + λt
[
t∑
i=1
φ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t− i+ 1)− at+1
]}
, (4.16)
where λt is the adjoint variable for time period t. The first-order conditions for an interior
solution are:
βsB′(e∗s) +
∞∑
t=s
λtφ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t− s+ 1) = 0, (4.17)
βsD′(a∗s) + λs−1 = 0, (4.18)
for s = 1, 2, . . . . Along with the transversality condition limt→∞ βtλtat = 0, conditions (4.17)
and (4.18) are sufficient conditions for optimality because the Lagrangian is concave in (et, at)
for t = 1, 2, . . . . Substituting condition (4.18) into condition (4.17) yields:
B′(e∗s) =
∞∑
t=s
βt−s+1D′(a∗t+1)φ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t− s+ 1),
=
∞∑
t=1
βtD′(a∗t+s)φ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t).
Therefore, an optimal steady state for firm emissions and well contamination, defined as
(e∗∞, a
∗
∞), is given by:
B′(e∗∞) = D
′(a∗∞)
∞∑
t=1
βtφ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t). (4.19)
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The term φ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t) represents the incremental impact on contaminant
concentration at the well caused by a unit of emissions at time t. The summation∑∞
t=1 β
tφ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t) is therefore the discounted sum of impacts; it can be in-
terpreted as the relative importance of the steady-state marginal damage from pollution in
determining the firm’s steady-state level of emissions. As a whole, equation (4.19) implies
that the optimal steady-state level of emissions is such that the marginal benefits to the firm
equal the discounted future marginal environmental damages caused by those emissions.
In addition, pollution dynamics have an implication for the optimal steady state level of
emissions. For a steady state, equation (4.4) is equivalent to:
a∗∞ = e
∗
∞
∞∑
t=1
φ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t). (4.20)
This condition reflects the physical requirement that for the contaminant concentration at
the well to be constant over time, a constant stream of pollutants must be emitted from the
source.
These steady-state conditions yield several key insights regarding the behavior of the
optimal solution. The following proposition provides an economic interpretation of the role
of physical aquifer parameters in the ground-water contamination problem.
Proposition 4.2. In the dispersive transport approach, an increase in the distance between
the contaminant source and the ambient receptor may increase or decrease the optimal steady-
state emissions and ambient pollution levels.
Proof. To show the effect of a change in x on the optimal steady-state solutions e∗∞ and a
∗
∞,
substitute condition (4.20) into condition (4.19) to get:
B′(e∗∞) = D
′
(
e∗∞
∞∑
t=1
φ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t)
) ∞∑
t=1
βtφ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t). (4.21)
Consider the effect of a change in x. Take the total derivative of (4.21) with respect to x to
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get:
[
B′′(·)−D′′(·)
∞∑
t=1
βtφ(·)
∞∑
t=1
φ(·)
]
de∗∞
dx
−
[
D′′(·)
∞∑
t=1
φx(·)
∞∑
t=1
βtφ(·) +D′(·)
∞∑
t=1
βtφx(·)
]
= 0, (4.22)
where φx(·) is the partial derivative of the transfer function with respect to distance co-
ordinate x and all function arguments have been suppressed for notational convenience.
Rearrangement of this expression yields:
de∗∞
dx
=
D′′(·)∑∞t=1 φx(·)∑∞t=1 βtφ(·) +D′(·)∑∞t=1 βtφx(·)
B′′(·)−D′′(·)∑∞t=1 βtφ(·)∑∞t=1 φ(·) . (4.23)
Recall that D′(·) > 0, D′′(·) > 0, and B′′(·) < 0 by assumption. Since φ(·) > 0 and
β ∈ (0, 1), it follows that the sign of de∗∞/dx depends on the sign of φx(·). If φ(·) is defined
as the Baetsle solution, it can be shown that φx(·) > 0, φx(·) < 0, or φx(·) = 0. As a result,
it is possible that de∗∞/dx > 0, de
∗
∞/dx < 0, or de
∗
∞/dx = 0. Similarly, it is possible that
da∗∞/dx > 0, da
∗
∞/dx < 0, or da
∗
∞/dx = 0 according to steady-state condition (4.20).
The intuition behind this result is illustrated in Figure 4.3, which is a birds-eye view of a
typical groundwater pollution episode with dispersion. Contaminants released at the source
have been transported by groundwater that flows in an easterly direction; the contaminants
disperse and result in a plume with steady-state concentrations indicated by the solid contour
lines. In this scenario, receptor location A is farther from the source than receptor location
A’, and contaminant concentration is lower at A than at A’. As a consequence, the regulator
would allow greater emissions when the receptor is located at A than at A’. In this situation,
increased distance between the source and the receptor is associated with higher emissions.
On the other hand, the following situation is possible: location B is farther from the source
than location B’, but concentrations are higher at B than at B’. In this case, the regulator
would allow fewer emissions for B than for B’, so that increased distance between source and
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receptor is associated with lower emissions.
Since time lags between emissions and ambient pollution are proportional to the distance
between the source and the receptor, the ambiguity of the distance effect implies that the
relationship between time lags and optimal emissions is also ambiguous. This result is more
subtle than the conclusions arrived at by previous studies, which assert that larger time lags
between emissions and ambient pollution should always lead to higher optimal steady-state
emissions.
4.5 Numerical Application: Protecting Groundwater from
Pollution by Highway Deicers
The use of highway deicing agents generates undeniable social benefits in the form of reduced
automobile accidents and associated reductions in passenger injuries and deaths [40]. Making
roads more passable during the winter season also yields economic benefits through reduced
workplace absences and travel times [60]. On the other hand, the use of road salt as a
highway deicer can lead to significant costs to society. Road salt is known to have an adverse
effect on roadside trees, shrubs, grasses, and wetlands as well as on the quality of surface
water in nearby rivers, lakes, streams, and ponds [73]. Increased concentrations of chloride
in roadside ecosystems can also affect aquatic life [31] and can increase the mobility of
harmful chemicals, such as heavy metals, in soil [16]. Road salt application can also lead to
infrastructure costs from corrosion to bridges and vehicles [79].
Yet another social cost of road salt use is contamination of drinking water by chloride.
Road salt can enter drinking water supplies by percolating through soil into groundwater
or entering as runoff into reservoirs, though infiltration is more common for groundwater-
based supplies [73]. The regulation of chloride contamination falls under the purview of the
National Secondary Drinking Water Regulations, as they do not constitute a primary threat
to human health. However, chloride has cosmetic effects on drinking water, primarily in
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the form of salty taste and unpleasant odor. The United States Environmental Protection
Agency (USEPA) defines a secondary maximum contaminant level of 250 milligrams per
liter (mg/L) for chloride in public water systems [76]. A comprehensive economic analysis
of policies to regulate road salt would require quantifying all of the economic and social
benefits of road salt as well as all of the environmental, infrastructure, and human health
costs. However, such a holistic approach is not possible due the lack of reliable estimates and
data on these costs and benefits. As a result, the numerical application in this chapter will be
limited to the analysis of damages from contamination of groundwater drinking supplies and
benefits from the avoidance of deaths, injuries, and property damage from vehicle collisions.
Road salt is a convenient case study because winter maintenance procedures on public
roads are coordinated by government agencies. As such, this application is less likely to
suffer from the imperfect monitoring and incomplete information issues that are typical
of pollution control problems. Furthermore, we can expect that government agencies will
seek to maximize aggregate welfare so that the optimization problem in this particular case
closely reflects the social planners problem developed in Section 4.3. Furthermore, as a
contaminant, chloride possesses some useful properties. It is a conservative pollutant in
surface and groundwater that doesnt react and thus is transported at the same velocity
as water. Therefore, the subsurface transport of chloride is relatively simple and can be
reasonably described by the analytical models used in my theoretical model.
4.5.1 Generalization of the Theoretical Model to Line Sources
Before performing the numerical application, the model in Section 4.3 must be generalized
to accommodate line sources of pollution and the problem must be modified to one of con-
strained optimization in order to match USEPA’s maximum contaminant level policy for
chloride. Consider a straight stretch of highway that runs from north to south through a
jurisdiction and treat it as a line such that the location of any point on the highway can be
described by the scalar y ∈ [y, y], where y and y represent the ends of the stretch of highway.
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There is an aquifer underlying the highway in which the direction of groundwater flow is
perpendicular to the highway toward the east. A well of depth z that supplies drinking
water to the jurisdiction is located at a perpendicular distance x to the east of the highway.
Without loss of generality, the value of y = 0 is assigned to the point on the highway directly
west of the well so that points on the highway north of the well take on values of y > 0 and
points south take on values y < 0. Figure 4.4 illustrates the basic setup of this numerical
application.
Let the density function g(y, t) describe the amount of road salt applied along the highway
over time. The total mass of salt applied on the stretch of highway in period t is then given
by: ∫ y
y
g(y, t) dy. (4.24)
The benefits of road salting in location y at each instant of time can be written as a function
of the density:
B(g(y, t)), B′ > 0, B′′ < 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞]. (4.25)
Therefore, in the absence of environmental constraints, the dynamic and spatial social plan-
ner’s problem for road salt application is to:
max
g(y,t)
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[∫ y
y
B(g(y, t)) dy
]
dt, (4.26)
where r is the social rate of discount.
Due to precipitation and subsequent infiltration into the ground, a fixed portion α of the
road salt applied dissolves into flowing groundwater and is transported toward the well. The
transport process is described by the same analytical hydrologic model for point sources
presented in Section 4.3.2, modified to accommodate a continuous release of contaminant
over time across a continuous line object. Specifically, the principle of superposition is
applied both over space and over time to get an expression for the chloride concentration at
87
the well at time t for a given road salt application policy g(y, t), for y ∈ [y, y] and t ∈ [0,∞):
c(t) = α
∫ t
0
∫ y
y
g(y, s)φ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t− s) dy ds. (4.27)
This solution can serve as the equation of motion to describe the dynamic and spatial impacts
of road salt application in the social planner’s problem.
Suppose that the chloride concentration may not exceed an upper bound c at any point
in time. Then, the constrained social planner’s problem is to:
max
g(y,t)
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[∫ y
y
B(g(y, t)) dy
]
dt, (4.28)
subject to:
c(t) = α
∫ t
0
∫ y
y
g(y, s)φ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t− s) dy ds for t ∈ [0,∞), (4.29)
c(t) ≤ c for t ∈ [0,∞). (4.30)
The Lagrangian expression for this optimization problem is:
L(c, g, λ, η) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[∫ y
y
B(g(y, t)) dy
]
dt
+
∫ ∞
0
λ(t)
[
α
∫ t
0
∫ y
y
g(y, s)φ(·) dy ds− c(t)
]
dt+
∫ ∞
0
η(t) [c− c(t)] dt, (4.31)
where λ(t) is the costate variable, η(t) is the multiplier on the contamination constraint,
and the arguments to the transfer function φ(·) have been suppressed for the sake of brevity.
Distributing the terms in brackets and changing the order of integration for the resulting
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triple integral yields:
L(c, g, λ, η) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[∫ y
y
B(g(y, t)) dy
]
dt
+
∫ ∞
0
{
α
∫ y
y
g(y, t)
[∫ ∞
t
λ(s)φ(·) ds
]
dy − λ(t)c(t) + η(t) [c− c(t)]
}
dt. (4.32)
The conditions for L to be stationary are:
∂L
∂g
= 0 = e−rtB′(g(y, t)) +
∫ ∞
t
λ(s)φ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s− t) ds, (4.33)
∂L
∂c
= 0 = −λ(t)− η(t), (4.34)
η(t) ≥ 0, η(t) [c− c(t)] = 0, (4.35)
for y ∈ [y, y] and t ∈ [0,∞), together with the equation of motion (4.27) and a transversality
condition, limt→∞ λ(t)c(t) = 0. Note that by (4.34) and the non-negativity of η(t), it must
be that λ(t) ≤ 0, which is consistent with its interpretation as the marginal social cost
of road salt contamination. Furthermore, adopting the common assumptions that B(g) >
0 and B′(g) → ∞ as g → 0, equation (4.33) implies that λ(t) is strictly negative since
φ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s− t) is strictly positive for all s ∈ (t,∞). This, in turn, implies that
η(t) > 0 so that the contamination constraint always binds by complementary slackness.
If the optimal steady state is defined by the set of variables (css, λss, ηss) and the function
gss(y), equation (4.27) modified to describe the steady state is:
css = α
∫ y
y
gss(y)
[∫ ∞
0
φ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t) dt
]
dy. (4.36)
In addition, the necessary conditions (4.33) and (4.34) together imply that:
B′(g(y, t))−
∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)µ(s)φ(x, y, z, v,Dx, Dy, Dz, s− t) ds = 0, (4.37)
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where µ(s) is the marginal current-value benefit to society of violating the contamination
constraint at time s, i.e. e−rsµ(s) = λ(s). Changing the lower limit of integration allows
equation (4.37) to be rewritten as:
B′(g(y, t))−
∫ ∞
0
e−rsµ(s+ t)φ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) ds = 0. (4.38)
The necessary conditions therefore imply the following condition for the steady state:
B′(gss(y))− µss
∫ ∞
0
e−rsφ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) ds = 0, (4.39)
where µss is the steady-state marginal current-value benefit of violating the constraint. As-
suming that µss > 0 so that the contamination constraint binds in the steady state, conditions
(4.36) and (4.39) describe the optimal steady state. This system of equations leads to two
theoretical results regarding the relationship between optimal steady state pollution and the
geophysical parameters of the problem.
Proposition 4.3. In a constrained optimal steady state, road salt application is higher at
points on the highway farther away from the point y = 0, i.e. the point directly west of the
well.
Proof. Proving this result is equivalent to showing that dgss/dy > 0 for y ∈ (0, y] and
dgss/dy < 0 for y ∈ [y, 0). Begin by noting that steady-state condition (4.39) implies that:
gss(y) = (B
′)−1
(
µss
∫ ∞
0
e−rsφ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) ds
)
. (4.40)
Invoking the inverse function theorem, we get:
dgss
dy
=
µss
∫∞
0
e−rsφy(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) ds
B′′[(B′)−1]
(
µss
∫∞
0
e−rsφ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) ds
) , (4.41)
where φy(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) is the derivative of the transfer function φ(·) with respect
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to y. Since B′ > 0 by assumption, (B′)−1 > 0. Furthermore, since B′′ < 0 by assumption, it
follows that the denominator in (4.41) is always negative. In turn, the sign of the numerator
is determined by the sign of
∫∞
0
e−rsφy(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) ds. From the definition of
φ(·) in (B.1), we know that, φy(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) S 0 when y T 0, for all s > 0 (see
Appendix A). This implies that
∫∞
0
e−rsφy(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) ds S 0 when y T 0. The
numerator in (4.41) is therefore negative for y > 0 and positive for y < 0, which in turn
implies that dgss/dy > 0 for y ∈ (0, y] and dgss/dy < 0 for y ∈ [y, 0).
Proposition 4.4. At a given point yˆ 6= 0 along the highway segment, constrained optimal
road salt application in the steady state may be higher or lower the closer the well is to the
highway.
Proof. From equation (4.40) and the inverse function theorem, it can be shown that:
dgss
dx
=
µss
∫∞
0
e−rsφx(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) ds
B′′[(B′)−1]
(
µss
∫∞
0
e−rsφ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) ds
) . (4.42)
From the definition of φ(·) in (B.1), for x < vs, φx(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) > 0 and for x > vs,
φx(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) < 0. Therefore, the sign of
∫∞
0
e−rsφx(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) ds
is ambiguous, so that the sign of dgss/dx is also ambiguous.
4.5.2 Benefit and Damage Quantification
In order to conduct the numerical analysis, the highway must be represented as a series
of discrete point sources, indexed by y = y, . . . , y. Due to the lack of numerical estimates
in existing studies, it is not feasible to construct a single function that quantifies all the
benefits of road salt use. Furthermore, it is likely that risk-averting behavior will change
how individuals drive in response to added traction from highway deicing. Given that there
is no widely recognized benefit function for road salt, this analysis will resort to the variable-
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parameter function employed by Kolstad [37]:
B(gy) = a
(gy
b
)n
, (4.43)
where gy is the steady-state annual quantity of salt applied on point y on the highway. The
shape of this benefit function can be varied by changing the parameter n. Benefits are linear
in road salt application when n = 1 and concave in road salt application for n ∈ (0, 1). The
parameter a serves to scale the function and can be interpreted as the “plateau” level of
benefits at which additional salt application yields no further benefits. In the context of this
numerical application, these benefits are achieved with a “bare pavement” policy in which all
ice and snow is removed from the pavement. Finally, the parameter b represents the critical
salt quantity required to obtain bare pavement.
To further simplify this numerical analysis, the benefit function will only account for
the value of avoided vehicle collisions. A study by the Strategic Highway Research Pro-
gram concluded that winters in Monroe County, New York, see 2.88 accidents per million
vehicle-kilometers on ice- and snow-covered pavements and 1.44 accidents per million vehicle-
kilometers on wet pavements [44]. This implies that applying enough salt on an ice- or
snow-covered highway so as to abide by the bare pavement policy yields 1.44 fewer acci-
dents per million vehicle-kilometers, or 9.2698 × 10−6 fewer accidents per mile of four-lane
highway. Based on California Department of Transportation data, the severity of freeway
accidents is 3.2 percent fatal, 44.6 percent injury, and 52.2 percent property-damage-only
accidents [44]. Furthermore, the Federal Highway Administration estimates the costs for
accidents as $2,600,000 for fatal,2 $19,000 for injury, and $2,000 for property damage only.
It follows that applying enough salt on an ice- or snow-covered highway to abide by the bare
pavement policy generates an expected annual benefit of $0.86 per vehicle for every mile of
four-lane highway.3 Using the Illinois Department of Transportation’s lower bound of 10,000
2This figure is substantially lower than USEPA’s current recommendation of $7.4 million for the value of
a statistical life [77].
3This figure is obtained by calculating the expected cost of an accident and multiplying it by the reduction
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vehicles for the bare pavement policy, this amounts to $8,594.80 of annual benefits per mile
of four-lane highway [47]. This will be the value assigned to parameter a, though it is likely
that this represents a lower bound for the benefits generated by highway deicing.
The critical salt application level b is defined by the quantity of salt with which bare
pavement is achieved. The Illinois Department of Transportation’s snow and ice management
practice require interstates, expressways, and routes with average daily traffic exceeding
10,000 to receive a bare pavement level of service [47]. The average annual salt loading on
state highways in Illinois is 6.6 tons per lane-mile [73]. Assuming that this average salt
loading achieves bare pavement, b is set equal to 23,949,677,136, which is the equivalent
value in milligrams for a mile stretch of four-lane highway.
The estimated annual benefit function for salt application at location y is thus given by:
B(gy) = 8594.8
(
gy
23, 949, 677, 136
)n
. (4.44)
Figure 4.5 illustrates this benefit function for various values of n ∈ [0, 1]. Using this benefit
function, the aggregate benefits for a four-lane highway divided into discrete locations y =
y, . . . , y for a period of one year can be written as:
y∑
y=y
B(gy) =
y∑
y=y
8594.8
(
gy
23, 949, 677, 136
)n
. (4.45)
where β is a discount factor.
The social costs of road salt application will be implicitly defined by the secondary max-
imum contaminant level for chloride recommended by the EPA as a constraint at drinking
water wells. As a result, the upper bound c in the constrained social planner’s problem is
set to 250 mg/L. In a study of groundwater contamination by road salt in East Central Mas-
in accidents per mile of four-lane highway:
[($2, 600, 000× 0.032) + ($19, 000× 0.446) + ($2, 000× 0.522)]× (9.2698× 10−6) = $0.86.
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sachusetts, Huling and Hollocher [29] find that at least 35 percent of salt applied in winter
will infiltrate and become dissolved in groundwater. The parameter α is therefore assigned
a value of 0.35. Finally, the numerical analysis assumes that groundwater flow velocity is 5
feet per day, or 0.3456 miles per year, and that the dispersion coefficient is 10 square feet
per day, or 1.3093× 10−4 square miles per year. These are in the range of values for typical
shallow sand and gravel aquifers.
4.5.3 Results
The following results are based on a hypothetical road salt contamination scenario with a
20-mile stretch of four-lane highway. A well that supplies drinking water to the jurisdiction
is located directly east at a distance x from the middle of the 20-mile section, as shown in
Figure 4.4. Following the notation in Section 4.5.1, this setup implies that y = 10, y = −10,
and y = 0 at the middle of the highway section.
I solve for the steady-state solution to the optimization problem defined by equations (4.28)
through (4.30) using MATLAB numerical analysis software. The benefit function parameter-
ization and contamination scenario are as described in Section 4.5.2. This procedure yields
an optimal quantity of road salt application along the hypothetical highway that maximizes
social benefits while meeting groundwater quality requirements. I provide results for three
scenarios with different distances between the highway and the drinking water well: x = 20,
x = 30, and x = 40. Figure 4.6 presents these results, where the horizontal axis denotes
miles on the highway and the vertical axis indicates the optimal quantity of road salt applied
in milligrams per mile per year.
The optimal application rates in Figure 4.6 are consistent with Proposition 4.3, which
theorized that applied road salt should optimally increase on points along the highway farther
away from y = 0. The optimal distribution of road salt along the highway segment is
noticeably different depending on the distance of the drinking water well from the highway,
x. An interesting result is that the ranking of optimal applied salt with respect to distance
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to the well changes along the highway; in the middle of the highway segment, optimal salt
application is higher if the well is farther away from the highway, whereas near the ends of
the highway segment, optimal salt application is higher if the well is closer to the highway.
This numerical result is consistent with Proposition 4.4, which stated that the relationship
between optimal emissions and distance to the drinking water well can be ambiguous. The
intuition behind this result is that infiltrating road salt at points on the ends of the highway
is less likely to get transported to the drinking water well when the well is closer to the
highway. In the extreme case in which the well is right next to the middle of the highway
segment, road salt applied at the ends of the highway will “bypass” the well entirely because
polluted groundwater is flowing perpendicularly from those points.
Figure 4.6 also illustrates how the variability of optimal salt application across space can
be small or large depending on the distance between the highway segment and drinking
water well. When the well is 20 miles from the highway, there is a sudden and significant
increase in optimal salt application at about seven miles from the middle of the highway
segment. In contrast, when the well is 40 miles from the highway, the differences in optimal
salt application along the highway are smaller and change more gradually across distance.
4.6 Policy Implications
The results in this chapter call for care in designing groundwater pollution policies that
are based on physical parameters of the contamination problem. Modeling contaminant
transport in aquifers as a dispersive process is particularly important, since it introduces
ambiguity in the relationship between these parameters and the optimal emissions path.
In contrast, previous economic studies have found certain “rules of thumb” that do not
necessarily hold when the problem is modeled in a spatially explicit manner. The ambiguous
relationships between optimal contaminant emissions and geophysical parameters suggests
that there is no “one size fits all” solution to different groundwater pollution problems.
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However, the model developed in this chapter does provide a framework to evaluate the
potential effectiveness of different policy instruments using geophysical parameters associated
with particular contamination problems. The numerical application of the model to the
problem of groundwater contamination by highway deicers serves as an example. The spatial
patterns of optimal salt application along a highway have implications for the choice of policy
instrument to regulate the activity. For example, if the well is 20 miles from the highway,
the optimal distribution of road salt may be approximated by a zoning rule such as a “no
salt area” within 7 miles of the middle of the highway segment. Such a policy would be
administratively simple and easy to enforce while being close to achieving the constrained
optimal level of benefits and desired environmental target. In contrast, if the well is 40 miles
from the highway, groundwater contamination must be regulated more homogeneously across
space. It is likely that, in the context of road salt application, the appropriate regulation in
this case would be a uniform quantity restriction.
Other types of policy instruments to control pollution that are commonly discussed in the
economics literature include emission fees and tradable discharge permits. These market-
based policy instruments are not directly relevant to our numerical application due to the
centralized nature of highway deicing provision. However, the model presented in this paper
can be applied to other groundwater contamination problems in which these solutions are
valid alternatives, such as industrial pollution. If the spatial pattern of optimal emissions is
very heterogenous, the potential gains from spatial specificity in regulation are large, which
may be difficult to include in a system of emissions fees or tradable permits; different polluters
will need to face different prices for emissions. In these cases, zoning may be an effective
policy if polluters with different levels of optimal emissions can be categorized spatially. On
the other hand, if the optimal emissions pattern is close to being spatially uniform, a system
of fees or tradable permits may be more cost effective since the gains from spatial specificity
will be small and transaction costs in the form of information acquisition and monitoring
will be low.
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4.7 Conclusion
The analytical approach presented in this chapter can help determine which policy instru-
ments are likely to be effective in controlling groundwater pollution, especially if costly
numerical groundwater models are not available for the aquifer in question. Unlike previ-
ous economic studies of groundwater contamination, this approach defines optimal emissions
policies as a function of geophysical parameters employed by hydrologists, such as distance
between source and sink, groundwater velocity, and aquifer dispersivity. The theoretical
section of this chapter also demonstrates that the relationship between geophysical parame-
ters and optimal emissions is not monotonic. These theoretical results are confirmed in the
numerical analysis of policies to regulate road salt use to protect groundwater supplies from
chloride contamination.
The results presented in this study are based on the assumption of perfect information.
However, it is undeniable that the regulation of groundwater contamination occurs in an un-
certain environment. The regulator and polluters may have asymmetric information about
abatement costs, or the regulator may not know the exact nature of the societal damages
caused by pollution. The first-best solution to the emissions decision can only be determined
if the firm’s benefit function and the environmental damage functions are known with cer-
tainty. If this is not the case, second-best solutions with suboptimal social welfare outcomes
must be considered. The economic implications of such solutions have been examined for
lumped-parameter models by studies on non-point source pollution, and often involve costly
monitoring schemes that generate incentives for the polluters to reveal their true abatement
costs (see, for example, [27] and [48]).
The problems generated by imperfect monitoring are exacerbated when multiple firms are
polluting the aquifer. Since the physical process of dispersion leads to expanding plumes of
contamination over time, the pollution generated by two or more firms can overlap in the
aquifer, making it difficult for regulators to identify each polluter’s contribution to contami-
nant concentration in ground water. Although this problem is examined by the literature on
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non-point source pollution, the lumped-parameter approach that these studies adopt does
not account for the possibility that hydrologic information may help regulators determine
what individual polluters are doing. Such methods are already used to determine the de-
gree of ex-post liability in groundwater pollution episodes for which multiple polluters are
at fault. It would be interesting to quantify the value of improved regulation that can result
from a consideration of hydrologic principles.
Uncertainty may also arise in the form of stochasticity in the physical process of ground-
water pollution. For example, groundwater velocity may not be constant over time, and
instead may follow a Brownian motion. In addition, static parameters such as dispersivity
may not be known for a particular location, and thus must be inferred from measurements
in surrounding areas. Although the role of physical uncertainty in the form of stochastic
recharge and baseflow has been examined in water quantity management, relatively little
work has been done regarding water quality. For the model presented in this paper, it may
be possible to analytically derive the direction of bias in the optimal emissions policy that
results from aquifer parameter uncertainty. Future work will address this issue, was well as
the implications of other sources of uncertainty.
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4.8 Figures
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Figure 4.1: Time path of ambient contaminant concentration due to a single pulse of
emissions when pollution dynamics are modeled as a non-dispersive process.
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Figure 4.2: Time path of ambient contaminant concentration due to a single pulse of
emissions when pollution dynamics are modeled as a dispersive process.
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Figure 4.3: A birds-eye view of a typical ground-water pollution episode.
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Figure 4.4: A bird’s eye view of the road salt contamination scenario.
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Figure 4.5: The benefit function.
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Figure 4.6: Optimal road salt application, for various distances x to drinking water supply.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Economists argue that policy instruments to regulate environmental externalities must cor-
rectly account for the damages caused by firms and individuals. However, due to the com-
plexity of natural and physical processes, the environmental externalities of many economic
activities are spatial, dynamic, and stochastic. Not accounting for the spatial and temporal
distribution of damages or uncertainty regarding the consequences of damages may lead to
unnecessary regulatory costs and/or unsatisfactory environmental outcomes. In this disserta-
tion, I have examined the implications of some of these complexities of natural properties on
the optimal design and feasibility of market-based solutions to environmental externalities.
In chapter two, I used a population data set of irrigation wells in Nebraska’s Republi-
can River Basin to analyze whether adopting spatially differentiated groundwater markets
leads to significant savings in abatement cost while protecting nearby streams. Although the
marginal damage of groundwater use on stream flows depends crucially on the location of
pumping relative to streams, I find that regulators can generate most of the potential cost
savings and maintain current levels of stream flow without spatial differentiation. In chapter
three, I examined the key features of an efficient tradable permits system to regulate envi-
ronmental externalities that are lagged and stochastic. I find that optimal tradable permit
systems will require trading ratios that may be greater than or less than one, and that the
magnitudes of these trading ratios depend on (a) the discount rate, (b) conditional expec-
tations of future states of the affected resource, (c) persistence of the state of the affected
resource, and (d) initial conditions. In chapter four, I analyzed how analytical hydrologic
models can inform the effective design and choice of policy instruments to manage groundwa-
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ter quality. I developed an economic optimization model that explains the role of geophysical
parameters in determining optimal groundwater contaminant levels and apply the model to
solve a management problem of aquifer contamination from highway deicers. I compared
my theoretical results to those from previous economic studies of groundwater pollution
and describe how my model can provide a framework to evaluate the potential effectiveness
of different policy instruments to manage different classes of groundwater contamination
problems.
Several themes and conclusions arise from my dissertation more generally. First, my re-
sults yield a mixed review of the success of traditional designs of market-based schemes in
internalizing cost effectively the damages of complex environmental externalities. In the first
chapter, I find that a non-spatially differentiated groundwater market to protect streams can
achieve abatement cost savings and environmental benefits similar to those of a more com-
plicated cost-effective, spatially differentiated market. However, I also find that the cost
effectiveness of a spatially uniform policy diminishes rapidly for higher environmental target
on stream flows. Furthermore, the analysis in the second chapter indicates that the simulta-
neous presence of time lags and uncertainty in the evolution of an externality can complicate
significantly the design of a first-best tradable permit market. Thus, market-based solu-
tions are neither uniformly ineffective nor a panacea for all environmental problems; their
potential for success must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
My dissertation also sheds some light on how such a case-by-case analysis can be completed
effectively. A second running theme throughout these chapters is that computationally
intensive numerical models of hydrologic systems may not be necessary to assess the potential
effectiveness of different policy instruments. The first and third chapters employ analytical
depictions of groundwater flow processes in the place of numerical models. This method
provides a first approximation to both the economic and environmental outcomes of different
regulations, and can do so at low computational cost in settings where detailed numerical
groundwater models are not available for policy guidance. In addition, because analytical
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hydrologic models explain the relationship between physical parameters and environmental
outcomes, embedding these models into economic optimization problems can help us better
understand the interaction between economic and environmental systems. Such information
can be helpful when a policy instrument is being considered for scenarios with physical
parameters outside the range of previous experience.
The theoretical analyses in my dissertation show that results from previous studies on
environmental regulation may not hold if spatial, dynamic, and stochastic properties of nat-
ural systems are accounted for explicitly in economic optimization models. Results from the
parameterized model in chapter three show that the simultaneous presence of time lags and
uncertainty in environmental externalities have implications on the cost-effective design of
permit markets that are qualitatively different from those that arise from analyzing the role
of time lags or uncertainty independently. Results from the model of dispersive groundwater
contamination in chapter four contradict the theorems presented in previous studies which
assert that larger time lags between emissions and ambient pollution should always lead to
higher optimal steady-state emissions. Hence, the process of designing effective environmen-
tal regulations can be quite subtle, which is a further motivation to build economic models
that employ realistic analytical or numerical models of the natural systems that they seek
to study.
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APPENDIX A
MATHEMATICAL DERIVATIONS
A.1 Optimal Abatement Levels Under Case A
Given the form of the cost function in (3.10), the form of the environmental damage function
in (3.11), and the stochastic process described in Section 3.3.2, the social planner’s objective
is to:
min
a1,a2
exp(φ1a1 + φ2) + exp(φ1a2 + φ2)
+ E
[
βk1 exp(γ1 (u¯− a1 + θk1) + γ2) + βk2 exp(γ1 (u¯− a2 + θk2) + γ2)
∣∣ θ0] . (A.1)
The first-order conditions for an interior solution to this minimization problem are:
φ1 exp(φ1a
∗
j + φ2)− γ1βkjE
[
exp(γ1
(
u¯− a∗j + θkj
)
+ γ2)
∣∣ θ0] = 0, (A.2)
for j = 1, 2. Next, we can make use of the fact that if a random variable y is normally
distributed with mean E[y] and variance σ2y, then E[exp(y)] = exp(E[y] + σ2y/2). The first-
order conditions can then be rewritten as:
φ1 exp(φ1a
∗
j + φ2)
− γ1βkj exp
(
E
[
γ1
(
u¯− a∗j + θkj
)
+ γ2
∣∣ θ0]+ 1
2
var
[
γ1
(
u¯− a∗j + θkj
)
+ γ2
∣∣ θ0]) = 0. (A.3)
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Since E[θs|θ0] = µsθ0 and var[θs|θ0] = σ2
∑s−1
i=o µ
2i by the definition of θt,
φ1 exp(φ1a
∗
j + φ2)− γ1βkj exp
(
γ1(u¯− a∗j + µkjθ0) + γ2 +
1
2
γ21σ
2

s−1∑
i=o
µ2i
)
= 0. (A.4)
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides and rearranging yields a closed-form solution to
the optimal abatement level:
a∗j =
1
φ1 + γ1
γ2 − φ2 + ln(γ1βkj
φ1
)
+ γ1
(
u¯+ ρkjθ0
)
+
1
2
γ21σ
2

kj−1∑
i=0
ρ2i
 , (A.5)
for j = 1, 2.
A.2 First-Order Conditions for Case B
Given the form of the cost function in (3.10) and the form of the environmental damage
function in (3.11), the social planner’s objective is to:
min
a1,a2
exp(φ1a1 + φ2) + exp(φ1a2 + φ2) +
T∑
t=1
βt−1E[exp(γ1xt + γ2)], (A.6)
subject to the state equations listed in Section 3.3.2. These equations can be rewritten using
recursive substitution as follows:
xt = ρ
tx0 +
t∑
i=1
ρt−iθi for t = 1, . . . , k1 − 1, (A.7)
xt = ρ
tx0 + ρ
t−k1(u¯− a1) +
t∑
i=1
ρt−iθi for t = k1, . . . , k2 − 1, (A.8)
xt = ρ
tx0 + ρ
t−k1(u¯− a1) + ρt−k2(u¯− a2) +
t∑
i=1
ρt−iθi for t = k2, . . . , T. (A.9)
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We substitute these equations into the objective function and calculate the first-order con-
ditions for an interior solution:
φ1 exp(φ1a
∗
1 + φ2)−
γ1
ρk1
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρt exp(Z1)− γ1
ρk1
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρt exp(Z2) = 0, (A.10)
φ1 exp(φ1a
∗
2 + φ2)−
γ1
ρk2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρt exp(Z2) = 0, (A.11)
where the terms Z1 and Z2 are defined separately for notational convenience:
Z1 = γ1
[
ρtx0 + ρ
t−k1(u¯− a∗1)
]
+
γ21σ
2(1− ρ2t)
2(1− ρ2) + γ2, (A.12)
Z2 = γ1
[
ρtx0 + ρ
t−k1(u¯− a∗1) + ρt−k2(u¯− a∗2)
]
+
γ21σ
2(1− ρ2t)
2(1− ρ2) + γ2. (A.13)
A.3 Comparative Statics for Case B
A.3.1 Comparative Statics With Respect to β
Start from the first-order conditions derived in Appendix A.2 and take the total derivative
with respect to β:
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
1 + φ2)
da∗1
dβ
− γ1
ρk1
k2−1∑
t=k1
[
βt−1ρt exp(Z1)
(
−γ1ρt−k1 da
∗
1
dβ
)
+ (t− 1)βt−2ρt exp(Z1)
]
− γ1
ρk1
T∑
t=k2
[
βt−1ρt exp(Z2)
(
−γ1ρt−k1 da
∗
1
dβ
− γ1ρt−k2 da
∗
2
dβ
)
+ (t− 1)βt−2ρt exp(Z2)
]
= 0,
(A.14)
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φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
2 + φ2)
da∗2
dβ
− γ1
ρk2
T∑
t=k2
[
βt−1ρt exp(Z2)
(
−γ1ρt−k1 da
∗
1
dβ
− γ1ρt−k2 da
∗
2
dβ
)
+ (t− 1)βt−2ρt exp(Z2)
]
= 0,
(A.15)
where Z1 and Z2 are as defined in Appendix A.2. Rearrange and factor out the differentials
to get:
(
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
1 + φ2) +
γ21
ρ2k1
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z1) +
γ21
ρ2k1
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
)
da∗1
dβ
+
(
γ21
ρk1+k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
)
da∗2
dβ
− γ1
ρk1
k2−1∑
t=k1
(t− 1)βt−2ρt exp(Z1)− γ1
ρk1
T∑
t=k2
(t− 1)βt−2ρt exp(Z2) = 0, (A.16)
(
γ21
ρk1+k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
)
da∗1
dβ
+
(
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
2 + φ2) +
γ21
ρ2k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
)
da∗2
dβ
− γ1
ρk2
T∑
t=k2
(t− 1)βt−2ρt exp(Z2) = 0. (A.17)
This system of equations can be written in matrix form:
 L1,1 L1,2
L2,1 L2,2
 ·
 da∗1dβ
da∗1
dβ
 =
 M1
M2
 ,
where:
L1,1 = φ21 exp(φ1a∗1 + φ2) +
γ21
ρ2k1
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z1) +
γ21
ρ2k1
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2), (A.18)
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L1,2 = L2,1 =
γ21
ρk1+k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2), (A.19)
L2,2 = φ21 exp(φ1a∗2 + φ2) +
γ21
ρ2k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2), (A.20)
M1 =
γ1
ρk1
k2−1∑
t=k1
(t− 1)βt−2ρt exp(Z1) + γ1
ρk1
T∑
t=k2
(t− 1)βt−2ρt exp(Z2), (A.21)
M2 =
γ1
ρk2
T∑
t=k2
(t− 1)βt−2ρt exp(Z2). (A.22)
The determinant of the Hessian matrix for this system is positive by inspection, so by
Cramer’s Rule:
sign
(
da∗1
dβ
)
= sign
det
 M1 L1,2
M2 L2,2

 .
Deriving and rearranging the determinant of the matrix above yields the sign of the com-
parative static:
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
2 + φ2)M1 +
[
γ21
ρ2k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
][
γ1
ρk1
k2−1∑
t=k1
(t− 1)βt−2ρt exp(Z1)
]
≥ 0.
(A.23)
It follows that da∗1/dβ ≥ 0. Also, by Cramer’s Rule:
sign
(
da∗2
dβ
)
= sign
det
 L1,1 M1
L2,1 M2

 .
After rearrangement, the determinant of the matrix above can be expressed as:
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
1 + φ2)M2 +
[
γ21
ρ2k1
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z1)
]
M2
− L2,1
[
γ1
ρk1
k2−1∑
t=k1
(t− 1)βt−2ρt exp(Z1)
]
. (A.24)
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Use the summation rule that
∑T
t=t0
at
∑S
s=s0
bs =
∑T
t=t0
∑S
s=s0
atbs to further rearrange the
expression for the determinant:
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
1 + φ2)M2
+
γ31
ρ2k1+k2
k2−1∑
s=k1
T∑
t=k2
βs+t−3 exp(Z1(s)) exp(Z2(t))
[
ρ2s+t(t− 1)− ρs+2t(s− 1)] . (A.25)
This expression is greater than or equal to zero because t > s for all t, s. It follows that
da∗2/dβ ≥ 0.
A.3.2 Comparative Statics With Respect to x0
Start from the first-order conditions derived in Appendix A.2 and take the total derivative
with respect to x0:
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
1 + φ2)
da∗1
dx0
− γ1
ρk1
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρt exp(Z1)
(
−γ1ρt−k1 da
∗
1
dx0
+ γ1ρ
t
)
− γ1
ρk1
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρt exp(Z2)
(
−γ1ρt−k1 da
∗
1
dx0
− γ1ρt−k2 da
∗
2
dx0
+ γ1ρ
t
)
= 0, (A.26)
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
2 + φ2)
da∗2
dx0
− γ1
ρk2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρt exp(Z2)
(
−γ1ρt−k1 da
∗
1
dx0
− γ1ρt−k2 da
∗
2
dx0
+ γ1ρ
t
)
= 0.
(A.27)
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where Z1 and Z2 are as defined in Appendix A.2. Rearrange and factor out the differentials
to get:
(
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
1 + φ2) +
γ21
ρ2k1
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z1) +
γ21
ρ2k1
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
)
da∗1
dx0
+
(
γ21
ρk1+k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
)
da∗2
dx0
− γ
2
1
ρk1
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z1)− γ
2
1
ρk1
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2) = 0, (A.28)
(
γ21
ρk1+k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
)
da∗1
dx0
+
(
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
2 + φ2) +
γ21
ρ2k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
)
da∗2
dx0
− γ
2
1
ρk2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2) = 0. (A.29)
This system of equations can be written in matrix form:
 L1,1 L1,2
L2,1 L2,2
 ·
 da∗1dx0
da∗1
dx0
 =
 M1
M2
 ,
where:
L1,1 = φ21 exp(φ1a∗1 + φ2) +
γ21
ρ2k1
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z1) +
γ21
ρ2k1
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2), (A.30)
L1,2 = L2,1 =
γ21
ρk1+k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2), (A.31)
L2,2 = φ21 exp(φ1a∗2 + φ2) +
γ21
ρ2k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2), (A.32)
M1 =
γ21
ρk1
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z1) +
γ21
ρk1
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2), (A.33)
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M2 =
γ21
ρk2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2). (A.34)
The determinant of the Hessian matrix for this system is positive by inspection, so by
Cramer’s Rule:
sign
(
da∗1
dx0
)
= sign
det
 M1 L1,2
M2 L2,2

 .
Deriving and rearranging the determinant of the matrix above yields the sign of the com-
parative static:
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
2 + φ2)M1 +
[
γ21
ρk1
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z1)
][
γ21
ρ2k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
]
≥ 0. (A.35)
It follows that da∗1/dx0 ≥ 0. Also, by Cramer’s Rule:
sign
(
da∗2
dx0
)
= sign
det
 L1,1 M1
L2,1 M2

 .
Deriving the determinant of the matrix above yields the sign of the comparative static:
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
1 + φ2)
[
γ21
ρk2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
]
≥ 0. (A.36)
It follows that da∗2/dx0 ≥ 0. Because the determinant of the Hessian is positive, the sign of
(da∗1/dx0)−(da∗2/dx0) is equivalent to the sign of the difference in the determinants calculated
above:
sign
(
da∗1
dx0
− da
∗
2
dx0
)
= sign
{
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
2 + φ2)M1 +
[
γ21
ρk1
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z1)
]
·
[
γ21
ρ2k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
]
− φ21 exp(φ1a∗1 + φ2)
[
γ21
ρk2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
]}
. (A.37)
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Substitute in the first-order conditions (see Appendix A.2) to get:
sign
(
da∗1
dx0
− da
∗
2
dx0
)
= sign
{
φ1γ
3
1
ρk1+k2
[
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z1)
][
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρt exp(Z2)
]
− φ1γ
3
1
ρk1+k2
[
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρt exp(Z1)
][
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
]
+
γ41
ρk1+2k2
[
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z1)
)(
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
]}
. (A.38)
Use the summation rule that
∑T
t=t0
at
∑S
s=s0
bs =
∑T
t=t0
∑S
s=s0
atbs to further rearrange the
expression for the difference in determinants:
sign
(
da∗1
dx0
− da
∗
2
dx0
)
= sign
{
γ31
ρk1+k2
[
k2−1∑
s=k1
T∑
t=k2
βs+t−2ρs+t exp(Z1(s)) exp(Z2(t))
(
φ1ρ
s − φ1ρt + γ1
ρk2
ρs+t
)]}
.
(A.39)
This expression is greater than or equal to zero because t > s for all t, s. It follows that
da∗1/dx0 ≥ da∗2/dx0.
A.3.3 Comparative Statics With Respect to σ2
Start from the first-order conditions derived in Appendix A.2 and take the total derivative
with respect to σ2:
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
1 + φ2)
da∗1
dσ2
− γ1
ρk1
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρt exp(Z1)
[
−γ1ρt−k1 da
∗
1
dσ2
+
γ21(1− ρ2t)
2(1− ρ2)
]
− γ1
ρk1
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρt exp(Z2)
[
−γ1ρt−k1 da
∗
1
dσ2
− γ1ρt−k2 da
∗
2
dσ2
+
γ21(1− ρ2t)
2(1− ρ2)
]
= 0, (A.40)
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φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
2 + φ2)
da∗2
dσ2
− γ1
ρk2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρt exp(Z2)
[
−γ1ρt−k1 da
∗
1
dσ2
− γ1ρt−k2 da
∗
2
dσ2
+
γ21(1− ρ2t)
2(1− ρ2)
]
= 0, (A.41)
where Z1 and Z2 are as defined in Appendix A.2. Rearrange and factor out the differentials
to get:
[
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
1 + φ2) +
γ21
ρ2k1
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z1) +
γ21
ρ2k1
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
]
da∗1
dσ2
+
[
γ21
ρk1+k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
]
da∗2
dσ2
− γ
3
1
2ρk1(1− ρ2)
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρt(1− ρ2t) exp(Z1)
− γ
3
1
2ρk1(1− ρ2)
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρt(1− ρ2t) exp(Z2) = 0, (A.42)
[
γ21
ρk1+k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
]
da∗1
dσ2
+
[
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
2 + φ2) +
γ21
ρ2k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
]
da∗2
dσ2
− γ
3
1
2ρk2(1− ρ2)
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρt(1− ρ2t) exp(Z2) = 0. (A.43)
This system of equations can be written in matrix form:
 L1,1 L1,2
L2,1 L2,2
 ·
 da∗1dσ2
da∗1
dσ2
 =
 M1
M2
 ,
where:
L1,1 = φ21 exp(φ1a∗1 + φ2) +
γ21
ρ2k1
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z1) +
γ21
ρ2k1
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2), (A.44)
L1,2 = L2,1 =
γ21
ρk1+k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2), (A.45)
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L2,2 = φ21 exp(φ1a∗2 + φ2) +
γ21
ρ2k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2), (A.46)
M1 =
γ31
2ρk1(1− ρ2)
[
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρt(1− ρ2t) exp(Z1) +
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρt(1− ρ2t) exp(Z2)
]
, (A.47)
M2 =
γ31
2ρk2(1− ρ2)
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρt(1− ρ2t) exp(Z2) (A.48)
The determinant of the Hessian matrix for this system is positive by inspection, so by
Cramer’s Rule:
sign
(
da∗1
dσ2
)
= sign
det
 M1 L1,2
M2 L2,2

 .
Deriving and rearranging the determinant of the matrix above yields the sign of the com-
parative static:
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
2 + φ2)
[
γ31
2ρk1(1− ρ2)
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρt(1− ρ2t) exp(Z1)
+
γ31
2ρk1(1− ρ2)
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρt(1− ρ2t) exp(Z2)
]
+
γ21
ρ2k2
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρ2t exp(Z2)
[
γ31
2ρk1(1− ρ2)
k2−1∑
t=k1
βt−1ρt(1− ρ2t) exp(Z1)
]
≥ 0. (A.49)
It follows that da∗1/dσ
2 ≥ 0. Also, by Cramer’s Rule:
sign
(
da∗2
dσ2
)
= sign
det
 L1,1 M1
L2,1 M2

 .
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Use the summation rule that
∑T
t=t0
at
∑S
s=s0
bs =
∑T
t=t0
∑S
s=s0
atbs to derive the sign of the
determinant of the matrix above:
sign
(
da∗2
dσ2
)
= sign
{
φ21 exp(φ1a
∗
1 + φ2)
[
γ31
2ρk2(1− ρ2)
T∑
t=k2
βt−1ρt(1− ρ2t) exp(Z2)
]
+
γ51
2ρ2k1+k2(1− ρ2)
[
k2−1∑
s=k1
T∑
t=k2
βt+s−2ρs+t exp(Z1(s)) exp(Z2(t))(ρs(1− ρ2t)− ρt(1− ρ2s))
]}
.
(A.50)
This expression is greater than or equal to zero because t > s for all t, s. It follows that
da∗2/dσ
2 ≥ 0.
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APPENDIX B
THE BAETSLE (1969) SOLUTION AND ITS
PROPERTIES
Given the location of a source of emissions in an aquifer, the analytical solution of Baetsle [4]
can model the movement of the discharged contaminants to any other point in the aquifer.
The original form of this solution is:
c0 =
αv0
8(pit)3/2(DxDyDz)1/2
exp
[
−(x− vt)
2
4Dxt
− y
2
4Dyt
− z
2
4Dzt
]
(B.1)
where v0 is the contaminant mass released instantaneously at the emissions source, c0 is
the contaminant concentration at an ambient receptor with coordinates (x, y, z) relative to
the emissions source at time t, and Dx, Dy, and Dz are the coefficients of hydrodynamic
dispersion in the x-, y-, and z-directions.
In the economic model developed in this Section 4.3.2, the definition of the transfer function
φ(·) employs the Baetsle solution:
c0 ≡ αv0φ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t). (B.2)
As shown in Section 4.3.2, this transfer function can be used to model continuous sources of
emissions by invoking the principle of superposition.
The partial derivative of φ(·) with respect to y is:
φy(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t) = φ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t)
(
− y
2Dys
)
. (B.3)
It follows that φy(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t) S 0 when y T 0, for all s > 0.
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The partial derivative of φ(·) with respect to x is:
φx(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t) = φ(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, t)
(
−x− vs
2Dxs
)
. (B.4)
It follows that for x < vs, φx(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) > 0 and for x > vs,
φx(x, y, z,Dx, Dy, Dz, v, s) < 0.
121
APPENDIX C
COMPUTER CODE
C.1 Computer Code for Chapter 2
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : depletion paths.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
% Date : August 31, 2010
% Ref : Calculate stream depletion paths from seasonal pumping by all
% wells in the Republican River Basin with well-specific
% transmissivity values.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
tic % Start timer
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SET PARAMETER VALUES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
season = 160; % Number of days in growing season
nseasons = 50; % Number of seasons to simulate
stor = 0.175; % Storativity coefficent
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% LOAD WELL DISTANCES AND TRANSMISSIVITIES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Loading data...’)
load DISTSTREAM.mat
load TRANS.mat
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CONVERT TRANSMISSIVITY VALUES TO M^2/DAY %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Converting data from U.S. to metric...’)
TRANS = TRANS./10.7639104;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE DEPLETION PATHS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Calculating depletion paths...’)
TIME = 1:1:nseasons*365; % Generate vector of days in simulation
DEP = zeros(size(DISTSTREAM,1),nseasons*365); % Generate empty depletion
% paths matrix
for i = 1:size(DISTSTREAM,1)
for j = 0:nseasons-1
DEP(i,(j*365)+1:nseasons*365) = DEP(i,(j*365)+1:nseasons*365) ...
+ erfc(sqrt(((DISTSTREAM(i,1)^2)*stor)./(4*TRANS(i,1)* ...
(TIME(1,(j*365)+1:nseasons*365)-(j*365)))));
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% Calculate pumping portion of depletion path
DEP(i,(j*365)+season+1:nseasons*365) = DEP(i,(j*365)+season+1 ...
:nseasons*365) - erfc(sqrt(((DISTSTREAM(i,1)^2)*stor)./ ...
(4*TRANS(i,1)*(TIME(1,(j*365)+season+1:nseasons*365) ...
-((j*365)+season)))));
% Calculate recovery portion of depletion path
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE CUMULATIVE DEPLETION PATHS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Calculating cumulative depletion paths...’)
CUMDEP = cumsum(DEP,2); % Calculate cumulative depletion path
CUMDEPFINAL = CUMDEP(:,nseasons*365); % Store final cumulative depletion
CUMDEPUNIT = CUMDEPFINAL./(nseasons*season); % Store final cumulative
% depletion per unit of
% pumping
disp(’SIMULATION COMPLETE’)
toc % Stop timer
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : current policy.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
% Date : September 1, 2010
% Ref: : Calculate abatement cost and stream depletion outcomes under
% current policy
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
tic % Start timer
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% LOAD DATA %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
load CERTACRES.mat % Load certified acreage
load CUMDEPUNIT.mat % Load per-unit cumulative stream depletion volumes
load NRD.mat % Load NRD codes
load P.mat % Load marginal abatement costs
load Q.mat % Load abatement volumes
load UNCON.mat % Load unconstained pumping rates
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SET SIMULATION PARAMETERS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
nwells = length(CERTACRES); % Number of wells
ntrap = 500; % Number of trapezoids in trapezoidal integration procedure
PUMPUB(1,1) = 13; % Upper bound on pumping in Upper Republican NRD, in
% inches per year
PUMPUB(2,1) = 12; % Upper bound on pumping in Middle Republican NRD, in
% inches per year
PUMPUB(3,1) = 9; % Upper bound on pumping in Lower Republican NRD, in
% inches per year
PUMPUB(4,1) = 11; % Upper bound on pumping in Gosper County (Tri-Basin
% NRD), in inches per year
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PUMPUB(5,1) = 9; % Upper bound on pumping in Kearney County (Tri-Basin
% NRD), in inches per year
PUMPUB(6,1) = 10; % Upper bound on pumping in Phelps County (Tri-Basin
% NRD), in inches per year
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PRELIMINARY DATA PROCESSING %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%% Convert per-acre marginal cost to per-well marginal cost %%%
PWELL = zeros(nwells,50);
for i = 1:nwells
PWELL(i,:) = (ones(1,50)*CERTACRES(i,1)).*P(i,:);
end
%%% Generate vector of per-acre abatement %%%
ABATE = zeros(nwells,1); % Generate matrix of per-acre abatement
% corresponding to upper bounds
for i = 1:nwells
if NRD(i,1) == 1
ABATE(i,1) = UNCON(i,1) - PUMPUB(1,1);
elseif NRD(i,1) == 2
ABATE(i,1) = UNCON(i,1) - PUMPUB(2,1);
elseif NRD(i,1) == 3
ABATE(i,1) = UNCON(i,1) - PUMPUB(3,1);
elseif NRD(i,1) == 4
ABATE(i,1) = UNCON(i,1) - PUMPUB(4,1);
elseif NRD(i,1) == 5
ABATE(i,1) = UNCON(i,1) - PUMPUB(5,1);
elseif NRD(i,1) == 6
ABATE(i,1) = UNCON(i,1) - PUMPUB(6,1);
else
end % If statements to calculate per-acre abatement given current upper
% bounds on pumping
if ABATE(i,1) < 0
ABATE(i,1) = 0;
else
end % If statement to assign zero abatement when upper bound >
% unconstrained pumping
if ABATE(i,1) > UNCON(i,1)
ABATE(i,1) = UNCON(i,1);
else
end % If statement to prevent negative pumping
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE TOTAL ABATEMENT COSTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Calculating total abatement costs...’)
%%% Calculate total abatement costs to each well %%%
TAC = zeros(nwells,1);
EVAL = zeros(1,ntrap+1);
VAL = zeros(1,ntrap+1);
for i = 1:nwells
EVAL = 0:(ABATE(i,1)/ntrap):ABATE(i,1); % Generate vector of abatement
% volumes in integration
VAL = pchip(Q(i,:),PWELL(i,:),EVAL); % Interpolate to find marginal
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% cost values corresponding to
% abatement volumes in
% integration
TAC(i,1) = trapz(EVAL,VAL); % Calculate total abatement cost using
% trapezoidal numerical integration
% procedure
end
aggtac = sum(TAC); % Calculate aggregate total abatement costs
aggtacacre = aggtac./sum(CERTACRES); % Calculate aggregate total abatement
% costs per acre
%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE PUMPING AND STREAM DEPLETION OUTCOMES %%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Calculating pumping and stream depletion outcomes...’)
PUMPING = zeros(nwells,1);
CUMDEP = zeros(nwells,1);
UNCONDEP = zeros(nwells,1);
for i = 1:nwells
PUMPING(i,1) = (UNCON(i,1) - ABATE(i,1))*CERTACRES(i,1);
CUMDEP(i,1) = (UNCON(i,1) - ABATE(i,1))*CERTACRES(i,1)*CUMDEPUNIT(i,1);
UNCONDEP(i,1) = UNCON(i,1)*CERTACRES(i,1)*CUMDEPUNIT(i,1);
end % Loop to calculate stream depletion due to pumping by each well
aggpump = sum(PUMPING); % Calculate aggregate pumping
aggcumdep = sum(CUMDEP); % Calculate aggregate stream depletion from
% pumping under current policy
agguncondep = sum(UNCONDEP); % Calculate aggregate stream depletion from
% unconstrained pumping
aggcumdepred = (agguncondep - aggcumdep)/agguncondep;
% Calculate corresponding percent reductions in
% aggregate stream depeltion
toc % Stop timer
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : certified allocations.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
% Date : September 2, 2010
% Ref: : Calculate abatement cost and stream depletion outcomes when
% wells pump their certified allocation
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
tic % Start timer
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% LOAD DATA %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
load CERTACRES.mat % Load certified acreage
load CUMDEPUNIT.mat % Load per-unit cumulative stream depletion volumes
load NRD.mat % Load NRD codes
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SET SIMULATION PARAMETERS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
nwells = length(CERTACRES); % Number of wells
ntrap = 500; % Number of trapezoids in trapezoidal integration procedure
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PUMPUB(1,1) = 13; % Upper bound on pumping in Upper Republican NRD, in
% inches per year
PUMPUB(2,1) = 12; % Upper bound on pumping in Middle Republican NRD, in
% inches per year
PUMPUB(3,1) = 9; % Upper bound on pumping in Lower Republican NRD, in
% inches per year
PUMPUB(4,1) = 11; % Upper bound on pumping in Gosper County (Tri-Basin
% NRD), in inches per year
PUMPUB(5,1) = 9; % Upper bound on pumping in Kearney County (Tri-Basin
% NRD), in inches per year
PUMPUB(6,1) = 10; % Upper bound on pumping in Phelps County (Tri-Basin
% NRD), in inches per year
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PRELIMINARY DATA PROCESSING %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
PUMPACRE = zeros(nwells,1); % Generate matrix of per-acre pumping
for i = 1:nwells
if NRD(i,1) == 1
PUMPACRE(i,1) = PUMPUB(1,1);
elseif NRD(i,1) == 2
PUMPACRE(i,1) = PUMPUB(2,1);
elseif NRD(i,1) == 3
PUMPACRE(i,1) = PUMPUB(3,1);
elseif NRD(i,1) == 4
PUMPACRE(i,1) = PUMPUB(4,1);
elseif NRD(i,1) == 5
PUMPACRE(i,1) = PUMPUB(5,1);
elseif NRD(i,1) == 6
PUMPACRE(i,1) = PUMPUB(6,1);
else
end % If statements to calculate per-acre pumping and abatement
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE PUMPING AND STREAM DEPLETION OUTCOMES %%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Calculating pumping and stream depletion outcomes...’)
PUMPING = zeros(nwells,1);
CUMDEP = zeros(nwells,1);
for i = 1:nwells
PUMPING(i,1) = PUMPACRE(i,1)*CERTACRES(i,1);
CUMDEP(i,1) = PUMPACRE(i,1)*CERTACRES(i,1)*CUMDEPUNIT(i,1);
end % Loop to calculate stream depletion due to pumping by each well
aggpump = sum(PUMPING); % Calculate aggregate pumping
aggcumdep = sum(CUMDEP); % Calculate aggregate stream depletion from
% pumping under current policy
toc % Stop timer
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : upper bound basin.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
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% Date : September 2, 2010
% Ref: : Calculate abatement cost and stream depletion outcomes under
% uniform upper bounds on pumping across the whole basin
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
matlabpool open local 4 % Open MATLAB pool to run parallel loops
tic % Start timer
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% LOAD DATA %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
load CERTACRES.mat % Load certified acreage
load CUMDEPUNIT.mat % Load per-unit cumulative stream depletion volumes
load P.mat % Load marginal abatement costs
load Q.mat % Load abatement volumes
load UNCON.mat % Load unconstained pumping rates
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SET SIMULATION PARAMETERS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
ngrid = 500; % Number of abatement cost calculations
ntrap = 500; % Number of trapezoids in integration procedure to calculate
% total cost from marginal cost
minpump = 0; % Minimum pumping volume to evaluate
maxpump = max(UNCON); % Maximum pumping volume to evaluate
nwells = length(CERTACRES); % Number of wells
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE TOTAL ABATEMENT COSTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Calculating total abatement costs...’)
%%% Convert per-acre marginal cost to per-well marginal cost %%%
PWELL = zeros(nwells,50);
for i = 1:nwells
PWELL(i,:) = (ones(1,50)*CERTACRES(i,1)).*P(i,:);
end
%%% Generate matrix of per-acre abatement levels at which to evaluate %%%
PUMPGRID = maxpump:((-1)*((maxpump-minpump)/(ngrid-1))):minpump;
% Generate grid of upper bounds on per-acre pumping
%PUMPGRID = fliplr((logspace(0,(log10(maxpump+1)/log10(10)),ngrid))-1);
% Generate grid of upper bounds on per-acre pumping, in log scale
ABATE = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of per-acre abatement
% levels associated with upper bounds on
% per-acre pumping
for i = 1:nwells
parfor j = 1:ngrid
ABATE(i,j) = UNCON(i,1) - PUMPGRID(1,j);
if ABATE(i,j) < 0
ABATE(i,j) = 0;
else
end % If statement to assign zero abatement when upper bound >
% unconstrained pumping
if ABATE(i,j) > UNCON(i,1)
ABATE(i,j) = UNCON(i,1);
else
end % If statement to prevent negative pumping
end
end % Loop to calculate each well’s per-acre abatement given upper bounds
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% on per-acre pumping
%%% Calculate total abatement costs to each well using trapezoidal %%%
%%% numerical integration %%%
TAC = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of total abatement costs
% associated with abatement levels
for i = 1:nwells
QSLICE = Q(i,:); % Slice the Q matrix to parallel loop
PWELLSLICE = PWELL(i,:); % Slice the PWELL matrix to parallel loop
parfor j = 1:ngrid
EVAL = 0:(ABATE(i,j)/ntrap):ABATE(i,j); % Calculate trapezoid bases
% in integration
VAL = pchip(QSLICE,PWELLSLICE,EVAL);
% Interpolate to find trapezoid heights associated with
% trapezoid bases
TAC(i,j) = trapz(EVAL,VAL); % Integration procedure
end
end
AGGTAC = sum(TAC,1); % Calculate aggregate total abatement costs
AGGTACACRE = AGGTAC./sum(CERTACRES); % Calculate aggregate total abatement
% costs per acre
%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE PUMPING AND STREAM DEPLETION OUTCOMES %%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Calculating pumping and stream depletion outcomes...’)
PUMPING = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of pumping outcomes
CUMDEP = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of cumulative
% depletion outcomes
parfor i = 1:nwells
PUMPING(i,:) = (UNCON(i,1) - ABATE(i,:))*CERTACRES(i,1);
CUMDEP(i,:) = (UNCON(i,1) - ABATE(i,:))*CERTACRES(i,1)*CUMDEPUNIT(i,1);
end % Loop to calculate cumulative depletion caused by each well at upper
% bounds
AGGPUMP = sum(PUMPING,1); % Calculate aggregate pumping
AGGCUMDEP = sum(CUMDEP,1); % Calculate aggregate stream depletion
AGGCUMDEPRED = (AGGCUMDEP(1,1) - AGGCUMDEP)/AGGCUMDEP(1,1);
% Calculate corresponding percent reductions in aggregate
% stream depeltion
toc % Stop timer
matlabpool close % Close MATLAB pool
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : upper bound county.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
% Date : September 2, 2010
% Ref: : Calculate abatement cost and stream depletion outcomes under
% uniform upper bounds on pumping in each county
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
matlabpool open local 4 % Open MATLAB pool to run parallel loops
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tic % Start timer
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% LOAD DATA %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
load CERTACRES.mat % Load certified acreage
load COUNTY.mat % Load county IDs
load CUMDEPUNIT.mat % Load per-unit cumulative stream depletion volumes
load P.mat % Load marginal abatement costs
load Q.mat % Load abatement volumes
load UNCON.mat % Load unconstained pumping rates
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SET SIMULATION PARAMETERS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
ngrid = 2000; % Number of abatement cost values to evaluate
ntrap = 2000; % Number of trapezoids in trapezoidal integration procedure
minpump = 0; % Minimum per-acre pumping volume to evaluate
maxpump = max(UNCON); % Maximum per-acre pumping volume to evaluate
nwells = length(CERTACRES); % Number of wells
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% OPTIMIZATION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Applying optimality conditions...’)
%%% Convert per-acre marginal cost to per-well marginal cost %%%
P(:,50) = 10000; % Increase marginal cost at shutdown to compensate the
% weighting
PWELL = zeros(nwells,50);
for i = 1:nwells
PWELL(i,:) = (ones(1,50)*CERTACRES(i,1)).*P(i,:);
end
%%% Generate grid of upper bounds on per-acre pumping %%%
PUMPGRID = maxpump:((-1)*((maxpump-minpump)/(ngrid-1))):minpump;
%%% Generate matrix of total abatement levels corresponding to grid of %%%
%%% upper bounds %%%
ABATE = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of per-acre abatement
% levels associated with pumping grids
for i = 1:nwells
for j = 1:ngrid
ABATE(i,j) = UNCON(i,1) - PUMPGRID(1,j);
if ABATE(i,j) < 0
ABATE(i,j) = 0;
else
end % If statement to assign zero abatement when upper bound >
% unconstrained pumping
if ABATE(i,j) > UNCON(i,1)
ABATE(i,j) = UNCON(i,1);
else
end % If statement to prevent negative pumping
end
end % Loop to calculate per-acre abatement levels associated with pumping
% grids
%%% Calculate county-level ratios of sums of marginal costs and %%%
%%% depletion coefficients %%%
MACSUM = zeros(16,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of county-level sum of
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% marginal abatement costs
CUMDEPUNITSUM = zeros(16,1); % Generate empty vector of county-level sum of
% cumulative depletion impacts
COUNTYIDX = [15 29 31 32 33 37 42 43 44 50 56 65 68 69 73 91]’;
% Generate vector of county numbers
for i = 1:nwells
for j = 1:16
if COUNTY(i,1) == COUNTYIDX(j,1)
MACSUM(j,:) = MACSUM(j,:) + pchip(Q(i,:),PWELL(i,:), ...
ABATE(i,:));
CUMDEPUNITSUM(j,1) = CUMDEPUNITSUM(j,1) + CUMDEPUNIT(i,1);
else
end
end
end % Loop to calculate county-level sums of marginal costs and
% depletion coefficients
for i = 1:16
MACSUM(i,:) = MACSUM(i,:)./CUMDEPUNITSUM(i,1)
end % Loop to calculate ratio of county-level sums of marginal costs and
% depletion coefficients
%%% Calculate abatement levels with equal marginal costs across %%%
%%% counties %%%
maxmac = max(max(MACSUM)); % Find largest marginal cost-depletion
% coefficient ratio
EQMACSUM = 0:(maxmac/(ngrid-1)):maxmac; % Generate grid of equimarginal
% cost/depletion ratios to evaluate
EQMACUB = zeros(16,ngrid); % Generate matrix of county-level upper bounds
% on pumping corresponding to equimarginal
% cost/depletion ratios
K = zeros(16,1); % Set counting matrix of unconstrained counties to
% accommodate pchip requirement of unique data points
for i = 1:16
for j = 1:ngrid
if MACSUM(i,j) == 0 % If the sum of weighted marginal costs in
% county is zero...
K(i,1) = K(i,1) + 1; % ...update counter to remove zero point
% from pchip procedure.
else
end
end
end
for i = 1:16
for j = 1:ngrid
EQMACUB(i,j) = pchip(MACSUM(i,K(i):ngrid),PUMPGRID(K(i):ngrid) ...
,EQMACSUM(1,j));
if EQMACSUM(1,j) > max(MACSUM(i,:))
EQMACUB(i,j) = 0;
else
end % Statement to shut down pupming in county when evaluated
% marginal cost is greater than the highest marginal cost
end % Loop to find upper bounds on county that lead to equimarginal
% cost/depletion ratios
end
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE TOTAL ABATEMENT COSTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Calcuating total abatement costs...’)
%%% Find abatement levels corresponding to county-level upper bounds %%%
%%% on pumping %%%
EQMACABATE = zeros(nwells,ngrid);
for i = 1:nwells
for j = 1:16
if COUNTY(i,1) == COUNTYIDX(j,1)
EQMACABATE(i,:) = UNCON(i,1) - EQMACUB(j,:);
else
end
end
end % Loop to calculate abatement levels
for i = 1:nwells
parfor j = 1:ngrid
if EQMACABATE(i,j) < 0
EQMACABATE(i,j) = 0;
else
end
end
end % Loop to set abatement to zero when pumping rate is greater than
% unconstrained rate
%%% Calculate total abatement costs to each well using trapezoidal %%%
%%% numerical integration %%%
TAC = zeros(nwells,ngrid);
EVAL = zeros(1,ntrap+1);
VAL = zeros(1,ntrap+1);
for i = 1:nwells
QSLICE = Q(i,:);
PWELLSLICE = PWELL(i,:);
parfor j = 1:ngrid
EVAL = 0:(EQMACABATE(i,j)/ntrap):EQMACABATE(i,j);
% Calculate trapezoid bases in integration
VAL = pchip(QSLICE,PWELLSLICE,EVAL);
% Interpolate to find trapezoid heights associated with
% trapezoid bases
TAC(i,j) = trapz(EVAL,VAL); % Integration procedure
end
end
AGGTAC = sum(TAC,1); % Calculate aggregate total abatement costs
AGGTACACRE = AGGTAC./sum(CERTACRES); % Calculate aggregate total abatement
% costs per acre
%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE PUMPING AND STREAM DEPLETION OUTCOMES %%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Calculating pumping and stream depletion outcomes...’)
PUMPING = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of pumping outcomes
CUMDEP = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of cumulative
% depletion outcomes
parfor i = 1:nwells
PUMPING(i,:) = (UNCON(i,1) - EQMACABATE(i,:))*CERTACRES(i,1);
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CUMDEP(i,:) = (UNCON(i,1) - EQMACABATE(i,:))*CERTACRES(i,1) ...
*CUMDEPUNIT(i,1);
end % Loop to calculate pumping and cumulative depletion by each well at
% equimarginal cost depletion ratios
AGGPUMP = sum(PUMPING,1); % Calculate aggregate pumping
AGGCUMDEP = sum(CUMDEP,1); % Calculate aggregate stream depletion
AGGCUMDEPRED = (AGGCUMDEP(1,1) - AGGCUMDEP)/AGGCUMDEP(1,1);
% Calculate corresponding percent reductions in aggregate
% stream depeltion
toc % Stop timer
matlabpool close % Close MATLAB pool
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : upper bound nrd.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
% Date : September 2, 2010
% Ref: : Calculate abatement cost and stream depletion outcomes under
% uniform upper bounds on pumping in each NRD
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
matlabpool open local 4 % Open MATLAB pool to run parallel loops
tic % Start timer
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% LOAD DATA %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
load CERTACRES.mat % Load certified acreage
load COUNTY.mat % Load county IDs
load CUMDEPUNIT.mat % Load per-unit cumulative stream depletion volumes
load NRD.mat % Load NRD codes
load P.mat % Load marginal abatement costs
load Q.mat % Load abatement volumes
load UNCON.mat % Load unconstained pumping rates
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SET SIMULATION PARAMETERS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
ngrid = 500; % Number of abatement cost values to evaluate
ntrap = 500; % Number of trapezoids in trapezoidal integration procedure
minpump = 0; % Minimum per-acre pumping volume to evaluate
maxpump = max(UNCON); % Maximum per-acre pumping volume to evaluate
nwells = length(CERTACRES); % Number of wells
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% OPTIMIZATION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Applying optimality conditions...’)
%%% Convert per-acre marginal cost to per-well marginal cost %%%
P(:,50) = 10000; % Increase marginal cost at shutdown to compensate the
% weighting
PWELL = zeros(nwells,50);
for i = 1:nwells
PWELL(i,:) = (ones(1,50)*CERTACRES(i,1)).*P(i,:);
end
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%%% Generate grid of upper bounds on per-acre pumping %%%
PUMPGRID = maxpump:((-1)*((maxpump-minpump)/(ngrid-1))):minpump;
%%% Generate matrix of total abatement levels corresponding to grid of %%%
%%% upper bounds %%%
ABATE = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of per-acre abatement
% levels associated with pumping grids
for i = 1:nwells
for j = 1:ngrid
ABATE(i,j) = UNCON(i,1) - PUMPGRID(1,j);
if ABATE(i,j) < 0
ABATE(i,j) = 0;
else
end % If statement to assign zero abatement when upper bound >
% unconstrained pumping
if ABATE(i,j) > UNCON(i,1)
ABATE(i,j) = UNCON(i,1);
else
end % If statement to prevent negative pumping
end
end % Loop to calculate per-acre abatement levels associated with pumping
% grids
%%% Calculate NRD-level ratios of sums of marginal costs and depletion %%%
%%% coefficients %%%
MACSUM = zeros(6,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of NRD-level sum of
% marginal abatement costs
CUMDEPUNITSUM = zeros(6,1); % Generate empty vector of NRD-level sum of
% cumulative depletion impacts
for i = 1:nwells
for j = 1:6
if NRD(i,1) == j
MACSUM(j,:) = MACSUM(j,:) + pchip(Q(i,:),PWELL(i,:), ...
ABATE(i,:));
CUMDEPUNITSUM(j,1) = CUMDEPUNITSUM(j,1) + CUMDEPUNIT(i,1);
else
end
end
end % Loop to calculate NRD-level sums of marginal costs and depletion
% coefficients
for i = 1:6
MACSUM(i,:) = MACSUM(i,:)./CUMDEPUNITSUM(i,1);
end % Loop to calculate ratio of NRD-level sums of marginal costs and
% depletion coefficients
%%% Calculate abatement levels with equal marginal costs across NRDs %%%
maxmac = max(max(MACSUM)); % Find largest marginal cost-depletion
% coefficient ratio
EQMACSUM = 0:(maxmac/(ngrid-1)):maxmac; % Generate grid of equimarginal
% cost/depletion ratios to evaluate
%EQMACSUM = (logspace(0,(log10(maxmac+1)/log10(10)),ngrid))-1;
% Generate grid of equimarginal cost values to evaluate, in log
% scale
EQMACUB = zeros(6,ngrid); % Generate matrix of NRD-level upper bounds on
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% pumping corresponding to equimarginal
% cost/depletion ratios
K = zeros(6,1); % Set counting matrix of unconstrained NRDs to accommodate
% pchip requirement of unique data points
for i = 1:6
for j = 1:ngrid
if MACSUM(i,j) == 0 % If the sum of weighted marginal costs in NRD
% is zero...
K(i,1) = K(i,1) + 1; % ...update counter to remove zero point
% from pchip procedure.
else
end
end
end
for i = 1:6
for j = 1:ngrid
EQMACUB(i,j) = pchip(MACSUM(i,K(i):ngrid),PUMPGRID(K(i):ngrid), ...
EQMACSUM(1,j));
if EQMACSUM(1,j) > max(MACSUM(i,:))
EQMACUB(i,j) = 0;
else
end % If statement to shut down pupming in NRD when evaluated
% marginal cost is greater than the highest marginal cost
end % Loop to find upper bounds on NRD that lead to equimarginal
% cost/depletion ratios
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE TOTAL ABATEMENT COSTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Calcuating total abatement costs...’)
%%% Find abatement levels corresponding to NRD-level upper bounds on %%%
%%% pumping %%%
EQMACABATE = zeros(nwells,ngrid);
for i = 1:nwells
for j = 1:6
if NRD(i,1) == j
EQMACABATE(i,:) = UNCON(i,1) - EQMACUB(j,:);
else
end
end
end % Loop to calculate abatement levels
for i = 1:nwells
parfor j = 1:ngrid
if EQMACABATE(i,j) < 0
EQMACABATE(i,j) = 0;
else
end
end
end % Loop to set abatement to zero when pumping rate is greater than
% unconstrained rate
%%% Calculate total abatement costs to each well using trapezoidal %%%
%%% numerical integration %%%
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TAC = zeros(nwells,ngrid);
EVAL = zeros(1,ntrap+1);
VAL = zeros(1,ntrap+1);
for i = 1:nwells
QSLICE = Q(i,:); % Slice the Q matrix for parallel loops
PWELLSLICE = PWELL(i,:); % Slice the PWELL matrix for parallel loops
parfor j = 1:ngrid
EVAL = 0:(EQMACABATE(i,j)/ntrap):EQMACABATE(i,j);
% Calculate trapezoid bases in integration
VAL = pchip(QSLICE,PWELLSLICE,EVAL);
% Interpolate to find trapezoid heights associated with
% trapezoid bases
TAC(i,j) = trapz(EVAL,VAL); % Integration procedure
end
end
AGGTAC = sum(TAC,1); % Calculate aggregate total abatement costs
AGGTACACRE = AGGTAC./sum(CERTACRES); % Calculate aggregate total abatement
% costs per acre
%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE PUMPING AND STREAM DEPLETION OUTCOMES %%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Calculating pumping and stream depletion outcomes...’)
PUMPING = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of pumping outcomes
CUMDEP = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of cumulative
% depletion outcomes
parfor i = 1:nwells
PUMPING(i,:) = (UNCON(i,1) - EQMACABATE(i,:))*CERTACRES(i,1);
CUMDEP(i,:) = (UNCON(i,1) - EQMACABATE(i,:))*CERTACRES(i,1)* ...
CUMDEPUNIT(i,1);
end % Loop to calculate pumping and cumulative depletion by each well at
% equimarginal cost depletion ratios
AGGPUMP = sum(PUMPING,1); % Calculate aggregate pumping
AGGCUMDEP = sum(CUMDEP,1); % Calculate aggregate stream depletion
AGGCUMDEPRED = (AGGCUMDEP(1,1) - AGGCUMDEP)/AGGCUMDEP(1,1);
% Calculate corresponding percent reductions in aggregate stream
% depeltion
toc % Stop timer
matlabpool close % Close MATLAB pool
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : onetoone trading basin.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
% Date : September 1, 2010
% Ref: : Calculate abatement costs under basin-side trading
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
matlabpool open local 4 % Open MATLAB pool to run parallel loops
tic % Start timer
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% LOAD DATA %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
load CERTACRES.mat % Load certified acreage
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load CUMDEPUNIT.mat % Load per-unit cumulative stream depletion volumes
load P.mat % Load marginal abatement costs
load Q.mat % Load abatement volumes
load UNCON.mat % Load unconstained pumping rates
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SET SIMULATION PARAMETERS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
ngrid = 500; % Number of abatement cost calculations
ntrap = 500; % Number of trapezoids in trapezoidal integration procedure
nwells = length(CERTACRES); % Number of wells
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% OPTIMIZATION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%% Calculate abatement levels with equal marginal costs %%%
disp(’Finding abatement levels with equal marginal costs...’)
maxmac = max(P(:,49)); % Set maximum marginal abatement cost level to
% evaluate
MACGRID = (logspace(0,(log10(maxmac+1)/log10(10)),ngrid))-1;
% Generate grid of equimarginal cost values to evaluate, in log
% scale
ABATE = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty vector of per-acre abatement
% levels
parfor i = 1:nwells
ABATE(i,:) = pchip(P(i,:),Q(i,:),MACGRID);
end % Calculate per-acre abatement to each well corresponding to
% equimarginal cost values to evaluate
for i = 1:ngrid
parfor j = 1:nwells
if ABATE(j,i) < 0
ABATE(j,i) = 0; % If statement to assign zero abatement when
% upper bound > unconstrained pumping
elseif ABATE(j,i) > UNCON(j,1)
ABATE(j,i) = UNCON(j,1); % If statement to prevent negative
% pumping
else
end
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE TOTAL ABATEMENT COSTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Calculating total abatement costs...’)
%%% Convert per-acre marginal cost to per-well marginal cost %%%
PWELL = zeros(nwells,50);
for i = 1:nwells
PWELL(i,:) = (ones(1,50)*CERTACRES(i,1)).*P(i,:);
end
%%% Calculate total abatement costs to each well using trapezoidal %%%
%%% numerical integration %%%
TAC = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of total abatement costs
% associated with abatement levels
for i = 1:nwells
QSLICE = Q(i,:); % Slice the Q matrix to parallel loop
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PWELLSLICE = PWELL(i,:); % Slice the PWELL matrix to parallel loop
parfor j = 1:ngrid
EVAL = 0:(ABATE(i,j)/ntrap):ABATE(i,j); % Calculate trapezoid bases
% in integration
VAL = pchip(QSLICE,PWELLSLICE,EVAL);
% Interpolate to find trapezoid heights associated with
% trapezoid bases
TAC(i,j) = trapz(EVAL,VAL); % Integration procedure
end
end
AGGTAC = sum(TAC,1); % Calculate aggregate total abatement costs
AGGTACACRE = AGGTAC./sum(CERTACRES); % Calculate aggregate total abatement
% costs per acre
%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE PUMPING AND STREAM DEPLETION OUTCOMES %%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Calculating pumping and stream depletion outcomes...’)
PUMPING = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of pumping outcomes
CUMDEP = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of cumulative
% depletion outcomes
parfor i = 1:nwells
PUMPING(i,:) = (UNCON(i,1) - ABATE(i,:))*CERTACRES(i,1);
CUMDEP(i,:) = (UNCON(i,1) - ABATE(i,:))*CERTACRES(i,1)*CUMDEPUNIT(i,1);
end % Loop to calculate cumulative depletion caused by each well at
% equimarginal costs
AGGPUMP = sum(PUMPING,1); % Calculate aggregate pumping
AGGCUMDEP = sum(CUMDEP,1); % Calculate aggregate stream depletion
AGGCUMDEPRED = (AGGCUMDEP(1,1) - AGGCUMDEP)/AGGCUMDEP(1,1);
% Calculate corresponding percent reductions in aggregate
% stream depeltion
toc % Stop timer
matlabpool close % Close MATLAB pool
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : onetoone trading county.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
% Date : September 4, 2010
% Ref: : Calculate abatement costs for county-level trading
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
matlabpool open local 4 % Open MATLAB pool to run parallel loops
tic % Start timer
for countyselect = [15,29,31,32,33,37,42,43,44,50,56,65,68,69,73,91]
disp([’Trading in County ’,num2str(countyselect),’...’]);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% LOAD DATA %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
load CERTACRES.mat % Load certified acreage
load COUNTY.mat % Load county IDs
load CUMDEPUNIT.mat % Load per-unit cumulative stream depletion volumes
load NRD.mat % Load NRD codes
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load P.mat % Load marginal abatement costs
load Q.mat % Load abatement volumes
load UNCON.mat % Load unconstained pumping rates
load WELLID.mat % Load well IDs
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SET SIMULATION PARAMETERS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
ngrid = 500; % Number of abatement cost calculations
ntrap = 500; % Number of trapezoids for trapezoidal integration
% procedure
nwells = length(CERTACRES); % Number of wells
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PRELIMINARY DATA PROCESSING %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
countywells = sum(COUNTY==countyselect); % Count number of wells in
% selected county
%%% Generate empty matrices %%%
CERTACRESCOUNTY = zeros(countywells,1);
CUMDEPUNITCOUNTY = zeros(countywells,1);
PCOUNTY = zeros(countywells,50);
QCOUNTY = zeros(countywells,50);
UNCONCOUNTY = zeros(countywells,1);
WELLIDCOUNTY = zeros(countywells,1);
%%% Extract data for current county %%%
j = 1;
for i = 1:nwells
if COUNTY(i,1) == countyselect
CERTACRESCOUNTY(j,1) = CERTACRES(i,1);
CUMDEPUNITCOUNTY(j,1) = CUMDEPUNIT(i,1);
PCOUNTY(j,:) = P(i,:);
QCOUNTY(j,:) = Q(i,:);
UNCONCOUNTY(j,1) = UNCON(i,1);
WELLIDCOUNTY(j,1) = WELLID(i,1);
j = j + 1;
else
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% OPTIMIZATION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%% Calculate abatement levels with equal marginal costs %%%
maxmac = max(PCOUNTY(:,49)); % Set maximum marginal abatement cost
% level to evaluate
MACGRID = (logspace(0,(log10(maxmac+1)/log10(10)),ngrid))-1;
% Generate grid of equimarginal cost values to evaluate, in
% log scale
ABATE = zeros(countywells,ngrid); % Generate empty vector of per-acre
% abatement levels
parfor i = 1:countywells
ABATE(i,:) = pchip(PCOUNTY(i,:),QCOUNTY(i,:),MACGRID);
end % Calculate per-acre abatement for each well corresponding to
% equimarginal cost values to evaluate
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for i = 1:ngrid
parfor j = 1:countywells
if ABATE(j,i) < 0
ABATE(j,i) = 0; % If statement to assign zero abatement
% when upper bound > unconstrained pumping
elseif ABATE(j,i) > UNCONCOUNTY(j,1)
ABATE(j,i) = UNCONCOUNTY(j,1); % If statement to prevent
% negative pumping
else
end
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE TOTAL ABATEMENT COSTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%% Convert per-acre marginal cost to per-well marginal cost %%%
PWELL = zeros(countywells,50);
for i = 1:countywells
PWELL(i,:) = (ones(1,50)*CERTACRESCOUNTY(i,1)).*PCOUNTY(i,:);
end
%%% Calculate total abatement costs for each well using trapezoidal %%%
%%% numerical integration %%%
TAC = zeros(countywells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of total
% abatement costs associated with
% abatement levels
for i = 1:countywells
QCOUNTYSLICE = QCOUNTY(i,:); % Slice the QCOUNTY matrix for
% parallel loops
PWELLSLICE = PWELL(i,:); % Slice the PWELL matrix for parallel
% loops
parfor j = 1:ngrid
EVAL = 0:(ABATE(i,j)/ntrap):ABATE(i,j);
% Calculate trapezoid bases for integration
VAL = pchip(QCOUNTYSLICE,PWELLSLICE,EVAL);
% Interpolate to find trapezoid heights associated with
% trapezoid bases
TAC(i,j) = trapz(EVAL,VAL); % Integration procedure
end
end
AGGTAC = sum(TAC,1); % Calculate aggregate total abatement costs
AGGTACACRE = AGGTAC./sum(CERTACRESCOUNTY); % Calculate aggregate total
% abatement costs per acre
%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE PUMPING AND STREAM DEPLETION OUTCOMES %%%%%%%%%%%
PUMPING = zeros(countywells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of pumping
% outcomes
CUMDEP = zeros(countywells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of
% cumulative depletion outcomes
parfor i = 1:countywells
PUMPING(i,:) = (UNCONCOUNTY(i,1) - ABATE(i,:))* ...
CERTACRESCOUNTY(i,1);
CUMDEP(i,:) = (UNCONCOUNTY(i,1) - ABATE(i,:))* ...
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CERTACRESCOUNTY(i,1)*CUMDEPUNITCOUNTY(i,1);
end % Loop to calculate cumulative depletion caused by each well at
% equimarginal costs
AGGPUMP = sum(PUMPING,1); % Calculate aggregate pumping
AGGCUMDEP = sum(CUMDEP,1); % Calculate aggregate stream depletion
AGGCUMDEPRED = (AGGCUMDEP(1,1) - AGGCUMDEP)/AGGCUMDEP(1,1);
% Calculate corresponding percent reductions in aggregate
% stream depeltion
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SAVE RESULTS FOR COUNTY AND CLEAR %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
save([’ONETOONE TRADING COUNTY ’ num2str(countyselect) ’ SOL’])
clear
end
toc % Stop timer
matlabpool close % Close MATLAB pool
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : onetoone trading nrd.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
% Date : September 4, 2010
% Ref: : Calculate abatement costs for NRD-level trading
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
matlabpool open local 4 % Open MATLAB pool to run parallel loops
tic % Start timer
for nrdselect = 1:6
disp([’Trading in NRD ’,num2str(nrdselect),’...’]);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% LOAD DATA %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
load CERTACRES.mat % Load certified acreage
load COUNTY.mat % Load county IDs
load CUMDEPUNIT.mat % Load per-unit cumulative stream depletion volumes
load NRD.mat % Load NRD codes
load P.mat % Load marginal abatement costs
load Q.mat % Load abatement volumes
load UNCON.mat % Load unconstained pumping rates
load WELLID.mat % Load well IDs
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SET SIMULATION PARAMETERS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
ngrid = 500; % Number of abatement cost calculations
ntrap = 500; % Number of trapezoids for trapezoidal integration
% procedure
nwells = length(CERTACRES); % Number of wells
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PRELIMINARY DATA PROCESSING %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
nrdwells = sum(NRD==nrdselect); % Count number of wells in selected NRD
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%%% Generate empty matrices %%%
CERTACRESNRD = zeros(nrdwells,1);
CUMDEPUNITNRD = zeros(nrdwells,1);
PNRD = zeros(nrdwells,50);
QNRD = zeros(nrdwells,50);
UNCONNRD = zeros(nrdwells,1);
WELLIDNRD = zeros(nrdwells,1);
%%% Extract data for current NRD %%%
j = 1;
for i = 1:nwells
if NRD(i,1) == nrdselect
CERTACRESNRD(j,1) = CERTACRES(i,1);
CUMDEPUNITNRD(j,1) = CUMDEPUNIT(i,1);
PNRD(j,:) = P(i,:);
QNRD(j,:) = Q(i,:);
UNCONNRD(j,1) = UNCON(i,1);
WELLIDNRD(j,1) = WELLID(i,1);
j = j + 1;
else
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% OPTIMIZATION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%% Calculate abatement levels with equal marginal costs %%%
maxmac = max(PNRD(:,49)); % Set maximum marginal abatement cost level
% to evaluate
MACGRID = (logspace(0,(log10(maxmac+1)/log10(10)),ngrid))-1;
% Generate grid of equimarginal cost values to evaluate, in
% log scale
ABATE = zeros(nrdwells,ngrid); % Generate empty vector of per-acre
% abatement levels
parfor i = 1:nrdwells
ABATE(i,:) = pchip(PNRD(i,:),QNRD(i,:),MACGRID);
end % Calculate per-acre abatement for each well corresponding to
% equimarginal cost values to evaluate
for i = 1:ngrid
parfor j = 1:nrdwells
if ABATE(j,i) < 0
ABATE(j,i) = 0; % If statement to assign zero abatement
% when upper bound > unconstrained pumping
elseif ABATE(j,i) > UNCONNRD(j,1)
ABATE(j,i) = UNCONNRD(j,1); % If statement to prevent
% negative pumping
else
end
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE TOTAL ABATEMENT COSTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%% Convert per-acre marginal cost to per-well marginal cost %%%
PWELL = zeros(nrdwells,50);
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for i = 1:nrdwells
PWELL(i,:) = (ones(1,50)*CERTACRESNRD(i,1)).*PNRD(i,:);
end
%%% Calculate total abatement costs for each well using trapezoidal %%%
%%% numerical integration %%%
TAC = zeros(nrdwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of total abatement
% costs associated with abatement levels
for i = 1:nrdwells
QNRDSLICE = QNRD(i,:); % Slice the QNRD matrix for parallel loops
PWELLSLICE = PWELL(i,:); % Slice the PWELL matrix for parallel
% loops
parfor j = 1:ngrid
EVAL = 0:(ABATE(i,j)/ntrap):ABATE(i,j);
% Calculate trapezoid bases for integration
VAL = pchip(QNRDSLICE,PWELLSLICE,EVAL);
% Interpolate to find trapezoid heights associated with
% trapezoid bases
TAC(i,j) = trapz(EVAL,VAL); % Integration procedure
end
end
AGGTAC = sum(TAC,1); % Calculate aggregate total abatement costs
AGGTACACRE = AGGTAC./sum(CERTACRESNRD); % Calculate aggregate total
% abatement costs per acre
%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE PUMPING AND STREAM DEPLETION OUTCOMES %%%%%%%%%%%
PUMPING = zeros(nrdwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of pumping
% outcomes
CUMDEP = zeros(nrdwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of cumulative
% depletion outcomes
parfor i = 1:nrdwells
PUMPING(i,:) = (UNCONNRD(i,1) - ABATE(i,:))*CERTACRESNRD(i,1);
CUMDEP(i,:) = (UNCONNRD(i,1) - ABATE(i,:))*CERTACRESNRD(i,1)* ...
CUMDEPUNITNRD(i,1);
end % Loop to calculate cumulative depletion caused by each well at
% equimarginal costs
AGGPUMP = sum(PUMPING,1); % Calculate aggregate pumping
AGGCUMDEP = sum(CUMDEP,1); % Calculate aggregate stream depletion
AGGCUMDEPRED = (AGGCUMDEP(1,1) - AGGCUMDEP)/AGGCUMDEP(1,1);
% Calculate corresponding percent reductions in aggregate
% stream depeltion
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SAVE RESULTS FOR NRD AND CLEAR %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
save([’ONETOONE TRADING NRD ’ num2str(nrdselect) ’ SOL’])
clear
end
toc % Stop timer
matlabpool close % Close MATLAB pool
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : ratio trading basin.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
% Date : August 31, 2010
% Ref: : Calculate abatement costs for basin-wide trading with ratios
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
matlabpool open local 4 % Open MATLAB pool to run parallel loops
tic % Start timer
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% LOAD DATA %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
load CERTACRES.mat % Load certified acreage
load CUMDEPUNIT.mat % Load per-unit cumulative stream depletion volumes
load P.mat % Load marginal abatement costs
load Q.mat % Load abatement volumes
load UNCON.mat % Load unconstained pumping rates
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SET SIMULATION PARAMETERS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
ngrid = 500; % Number of abatement cost calculations
ntrap = 500; % Number of trapezoids in trapezoidal integration procedure
nwells = length(CERTACRES); % Number of wells
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% OPTIMIZATION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%% Calculate abatement levels with equal weighted marginal costs %%%
disp(’Finding abatement levels with equal weighted marginal costs...’)
maxmac = max(P(:,49)./CUMDEPUNIT); % Maximum marginal abatement cost level
% to evaluate at
MACGRID = (logspace(0,(log10(maxmac+1)/log10(10)),ngrid))-1;
% Generate grid of equimarginal cost values to evaluate, in log
% scale
ABATE = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty vector of per-acre abatement
% levels
P(:,50) = 1*(20^100); % Increase marginal cost at shutdown to compensate
% the weighting
parfor i = 1:nwells
ABATE(i,:) = pchip(P(i,:)./CUMDEPUNIT(i,1),Q(i,:),MACGRID);
end % Calculate per-acre abatement to each well corresponding to
% equimarginal cost values to evaluate
for i = 1:ngrid
parfor j = 1:nwells
if ABATE(j,i) < 0
ABATE(j,i) = 0; % If statement to assign zero abatement when
% upper bound > unconstrained pumping
elseif ABATE(j,i) > UNCON(j,1)
ABATE(j,i) = UNCON(j,1); % If statement to prevent negative
% pumping
else
end
end
end
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE TOTAL ABATEMENT COSTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Calculating total abatement costs...’)
%%% Convert per-acre marginal cost to per-well marginal cost %%%
PWELL = zeros(nwells,50);
for i = 1:nwells
PWELL(i,:) = (ones(1,50)*CERTACRES(i,1)).*P(i,:);
end
%%% Calculate total abatement costs to each well using trapezoidal %%%
%%% numerical integration %%%
TAC = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of total abatement costs
% associated with abatement levels
for i = 1:nwells
QSLICE = Q(i,:); % Slice the Q matrix to parallel loop
PWELLSLICE = PWELL(i,:); % Slice the PWELL matrix to parallel loop
parfor j = 1:ngrid
EVAL = 0:(ABATE(i,j)/ntrap):ABATE(i,j); % Calculate trapezoid bases
% in integration
VAL = pchip(QSLICE,PWELLSLICE,EVAL);
% Interpolate to find trapezoid heights associated with
% trapezoid bases
TAC(i,j) = trapz(EVAL,VAL); % Integration procedure
end
end
AGGTAC = sum(TAC,1); % Calculate aggregate total abatement costs
AGGTACACRE = AGGTAC./sum(CERTACRES); % Calculate aggregate total abatement
% costs per acre
%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE PUMPING AND STREAM DEPLETION OUTCOMES %%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(’Calculating pumping and stream depletion outcomes...’)
PUMPING = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of pumping outcomes
CUMDEP = zeros(nwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of cumulative
% depletion outcomes
parfor i = 1:nwells
PUMPING(i,:) = (UNCON(i,1) - ABATE(i,:))*CERTACRES(i,1);
CUMDEP(i,:) = (UNCON(i,1) - ABATE(i,:))*CERTACRES(i,1)*CUMDEPUNIT(i,1);
end % Loop to calculate cumulative depletion caused by each well at
% equimarginal costs
AGGPUMP = sum(PUMPING,1); % Calculate aggregate pumping
AGGCUMDEP = sum(CUMDEP,1); % Calculate aggregate stream depletion
AGGCUMDEPRED = (AGGCUMDEP(1,1) - AGGCUMDEP)/AGGCUMDEP(1,1);
% Calculate corresponding percent reductions in aggregate stream
% depeltion
toc % Stop timer
matlabpool close % Close MATLAB pool
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : ratio trading county.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
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% Date : September 4, 2010
% Ref: : Calculate abatement costs under county-level trading with
% ratios
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
matlabpool open local 4 % Open MATLAB pool to run parallel loops
tic % Start timer
for countyselect = [15,29,31,32,33,37,42,43,44,50,56,65,68,69,73,91]
disp([’Trading in County ’,num2str(countyselect),’...’]);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% LOAD DATA %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
load CERTACRES.mat % Load certified acreage
load COUNTY.mat % Load county IDs
load CUMDEPUNIT.mat % Load per-unit cumulative stream depletion volumes
load NRD.mat % Load NRD codes
load P.mat % Load marginal abatement costs
load Q.mat % Load abatement volumes
load UNCON.mat % Load unconstained pumping rates
load WELLID.mat % Load well IDs
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SET SIMULATION PARAMETERS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
ngrid = 500; % Number of abatement cost calculations
ntrap = 500; % Number of trapezoids in trapezoidal integration
% procedure
nwells = length(CERTACRES); % Number of wells
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PRELIMINARY DATA PROCESSING %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
countywells = sum(COUNTY==countyselect); % Count number of wells in
% selected county
%%% Generate empty matrices %%%
CERTACRESCOUNTY = zeros(countywells,1);
CUMDEPUNITCOUNTY = zeros(countywells,1);
PCOUNTY = zeros(countywells,50);
QCOUNTY = zeros(countywells,50);
UNCONCOUNTY = zeros(countywells,1);
WELLIDCOUNTY = zeros(countywells,1);
%%% Extract data in current county %%%
j = 1;
for i = 1:nwells
if COUNTY(i,1) == countyselect
CERTACRESCOUNTY(j,1) = CERTACRES(i,1);
CUMDEPUNITCOUNTY(j,1) = CUMDEPUNIT(i,1);
PCOUNTY(j,:) = P(i,:);
QCOUNTY(j,:) = Q(i,:);
UNCONCOUNTY(j,1) = UNCON(i,1);
WELLIDCOUNTY(j,1) = WELLID(i,1);
j = j + 1;
else
end
end
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% OPTIMIZATION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%% Calculate abatement levels with equal marginal costs %%%
maxmac = max(PCOUNTY(:,49)./CUMDEPUNITCOUNTY);
% Set maximum marginal abatement cost level to evaluate
MACGRID = (logspace(0,(log10(maxmac+1)/log10(10)),ngrid))-1;
% Generate grid of equimarginal cost values to evaluate, in
% log scale
ABATE = zeros(countywells,ngrid); % Generate empty vector of per-acre
% abatement levels
PCOUNTY(:,50) = 1*(20^100); % Increase marginal cost at shutdown to
% compensate the weighting
parfor i = 1:countywells
ABATE(i,:) = pchip(PCOUNTY(i,:)./CUMDEPUNITCOUNTY(i,1), ...
QCOUNTY(i,:),MACGRID);
end % Calculate per-acre abatement to each well corresponding to
% equimarginal cost values to evaluate
for i = 1:ngrid
parfor j = 1:countywells
if ABATE(j,i) < 0
ABATE(j,i) = 0; % If statement to assign zero abatement
% when upper bound > unconstrained pumping
elseif ABATE(j,i) > UNCONCOUNTY(j,1)
ABATE(j,i) = UNCONCOUNTY(j,1); % If statement to prevent
% negative pumping
else
end
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE TOTAL ABATEMENT COSTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%% Convert per-acre marginal cost to per-well marginal cost %%%
PWELL = zeros(countywells,50);
for i = 1:countywells
PWELL(i,:) = (ones(1,50)*CERTACRESCOUNTY(i,1)).*PCOUNTY(i,:);
end
%%% Calculate total abatement costs to each well using trapezoidal %%%
%%% numerical integration %%%
TAC = zeros(countywells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of total
% abatement costs associated with
% abatement levels
for i = 1:countywells
QCOUNTYSLICE = QCOUNTY(i,:); % Slice the QCOUNTY matrix to
% parallel loop
PWELLSLICE = PWELL(i,:); % Slice the PWELL matrix to parallel
% loop
parfor j = 1:ngrid
EVAL = 0:(ABATE(i,j)/ntrap):ABATE(i,j);
% Calculate trapezoid bases in integration
VAL = pchip(QCOUNTYSLICE,PWELLSLICE,EVAL);
% Interpolate to find trapezoid heights associated with
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% trapezoid bases
TAC(i,j) = trapz(EVAL,VAL); % Integration procedure
end
end
AGGTAC = sum(TAC,1); % Calculate aggregate total abatement costs
AGGTACACRE = AGGTAC./sum(CERTACRESCOUNTY); % Calculate aggregate total
% abatement costs per acre
%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE PUMPING AND STREAM DEPLETION OUTCOMES %%%%%%%%%%%
PUMPING = zeros(countywells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of pumping
% outcomes
CUMDEP = zeros(countywells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of
% cumulative depletion outcomes
parfor i = 1:countywells
PUMPING(i,:) = (UNCONCOUNTY(i,1) - ABATE(i,:))* ...
CERTACRESCOUNTY(i,1);
CUMDEP(i,:) = (UNCONCOUNTY(i,1) - ABATE(i,:))* ...
CERTACRESCOUNTY(i,1)*CUMDEPUNITCOUNTY(i,1);
end % Loop to calculate cumulative depletion caused by each well at
% equimarginal costs
AGGPUMP = sum(PUMPING,1); % Calculate aggregate pumping
AGGCUMDEP = sum(CUMDEP,1); % Calculate aggregate stream depletion
AGGCUMDEPRED = (AGGCUMDEP(1,1) - AGGCUMDEP)/AGGCUMDEP(1,1);
% Calculate corresponding percent reductions in aggregate
% stream depeltion
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SAVE RESULTS FOR COUNTY AND CLEAR %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
save([’RATIO TRADING COUNTY ’ num2str(countyselect) ’ SOL’])
clear
end
toc % Stop timer
matlabpool close % Close MATLAB pool
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : ratio trading nrd.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
% Date : September 4, 2010
% Ref: : Calculate abatement costs under NRD-level trading with ratios
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
matlabpool open local 4 % Open MATLAB pool to run parallel loops
tic % Start timer
for nrdselect = 1:6
disp([’Trading in NRD ’,num2str(nrdselect),’...’]);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% LOAD DATA %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
load CERTACRES.mat % Load certified acreage
load COUNTY.mat % Load county IDs
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load CUMDEPUNIT.mat % Load per-unit cumulative stream depletion volumes
load NRD.mat % Load NRD codes
load P.mat % Load marginal abatement costs
load Q.mat % Load abatement volumes
load UNCON.mat % Load unconstained pumping rates
load WELLID.mat % Load well IDs
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SET SIMULATION PARAMETERS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
ngrid = 500; % Number of abatement cost calculations
ntrap = 500; % Number of trapezoids in trapezoidal integration
% procedure
nwells = length(CERTACRES); % Number of wells
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PRELIMINARY DATA PROCESSING %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
nrdwells = sum(NRD==nrdselect); % Count number of wells in selected NRD
%%% Generate empty matrices %%%
CERTACRESNRD = zeros(nrdwells,1);
CUMDEPUNITNRD = zeros(nrdwells,1);
PNRD = zeros(nrdwells,50);
QNRD = zeros(nrdwells,50);
UNCONNRD = zeros(nrdwells,1);
WELLIDNRD = zeros(nrdwells,1);
%%% Extract data in current NRD %%%
j = 1;
for i = 1:nwells
if NRD(i,1) == nrdselect
CERTACRESNRD(j,1) = CERTACRES(i,1);
CUMDEPUNITNRD(j,1) = CUMDEPUNIT(i,1);
PNRD(j,:) = P(i,:);
QNRD(j,:) = Q(i,:);
UNCONNRD(j,1) = UNCON(i,1);
WELLIDNRD(j,1) = WELLID(i,1);
j = j + 1;
else
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% OPTIMIZATION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%% Calculate abatement levels with equal marginal costs %%%
maxmac = max(PNRD(:,49)./CUMDEPUNITNRD);
% Set maximum marginal abatement cost level to evaluate
MACGRID = (logspace(0,(log10(maxmac+1)/log10(10)),ngrid))-1;
% Generate grid of equimarginal cost values to evaluate, in
% log scale
ABATE = zeros(nrdwells,ngrid); % Generate empty vector of per-acre
% abatement levels
PNRD(:,50) = 1*(20^100); % Increase marginal cost at shutdown to
% compensate the weighting
parfor i = 1:nrdwells
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ABATE(i,:) = pchip(PNRD(i,:)./CUMDEPUNITNRD(i,1),QNRD(i,:), ...
MACGRID);
end % Calculate per-acre abatement to each well corresponding to
% equimarginal cost values to evaluate
for i = 1:ngrid
parfor j = 1:nrdwells
if ABATE(j,i) < 0
ABATE(j,i) = 0; % If statement to assign zero abatement
% when upper bound > unconstrained pumping
elseif ABATE(j,i) > UNCONNRD(j,1)
ABATE(j,i) = UNCONNRD(j,1); % If statement to prevent
% negative pumping
else
end
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE TOTAL ABATEMENT COSTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%% Convert per-acre marginal cost to per-well marginal cost %%%
PWELL = zeros(nrdwells,50);
for i = 1:nrdwells
PWELL(i,:) = (ones(1,50)*CERTACRESNRD(i,1)).*PNRD(i,:);
end
%%% Calculate total abatement costs to each well using trapezoidal %%%
%%% numerical integration %%%
TAC = zeros(nrdwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of total abatement
% costs associated with abatement levels
for i = 1:nrdwells
QNRDSLICE = QNRD(i,:); % Slice the QNRD matrix to parallel loop
PWELLSLICE = PWELL(i,:); % Slice the PWELL matrix to parallel
% loop
parfor j = 1:ngrid
EVAL = 0:(ABATE(i,j)/ntrap):ABATE(i,j);
% Calculate trapezoid bases in integration
VAL = pchip(QNRDSLICE,PWELLSLICE,EVAL);
% Interpolate to find trapezoid heights associated with
% trapezoid bases
TAC(i,j) = trapz(EVAL,VAL); % Integration procedure
end
end
AGGTAC = sum(TAC,1); % Calculate aggregate total abatement costs
AGGTACACRE = AGGTAC./sum(CERTACRESNRD); % Calculate aggregate total
% abatement costs per acre
%%%%%%%%%%% CALCULATE PUMPING AND STREAM DEPLETION OUTCOMES %%%%%%%%%%%
PUMPING = zeros(nrdwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of pumping
% outcomes
CUMDEP = zeros(nrdwells,ngrid); % Generate empty matrix of cumulative
% depletion outcomes
parfor i = 1:nrdwells
PUMPING(i,:) = (UNCONNRD(i,1) - ABATE(i,:))*CERTACRESNRD(i,1);
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CUMDEP(i,:) = (UNCONNRD(i,1) - ABATE(i,:))*CERTACRESNRD(i,1)* ...
CUMDEPUNITNRD(i,1);
end % Loop to calculate cumulative depletion caused by each well at
% equimarginal costs
AGGPUMP = sum(PUMPING,1); % Calculate aggregate pumping
AGGCUMDEP = sum(CUMDEP,1); % Calculate aggregate stream depletion
AGGCUMDEPRED = (AGGCUMDEP(1,1) - AGGCUMDEP)/AGGCUMDEP(1,1);
% Calculate corresponding percent reductions in aggregate
% stream depeltion
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SAVE RESULTS FOR NRD AND CLEAR %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
save([’RATIO TRADING NRD ’ num2str(nrdselect) ’ SOL’])
clear
end
toc % Stop timer
matlabpool close % Close MATLAB pool
C.2 Computer Code for Chapter 3
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : simulation1d.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
% Date : June 24, 2010
% Ref : Calculate constrained optimal abatement by two pumping zones
% given a range of values of one parameter
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
global T phi1 phi2 gamma1 gamma2 beta rho x0 ubar sigma2 k1 k2
% Define global variables
%%% Define range of parameter to simulate %%%
evals = 100; % Number of evaluations within parameter range
betamin = 1/(1+0); % Minimum parameter value in range
betamax = 1/(1+0.1); % Maximum parameter value in range
BETA = betamin:((betamax-betamin)/(evals-1)):betamax;
% Generate vector of paramter values to evaluate
%sigma2min = 0; % Minimum parameter value in range
%sigma2max = 135598*0.7; % Maximum parameter value in range
%SIGMA2 = sigma2min:((sigma2max-sigma2min)/(evals-1)):sigma2max;
% Generate vector of paramter values to evaluate
%%% Set parameter values %%%
T = 10; % Simulation time horizon, in years
phi1 = 4.3104*(10^(-5)); % Abatement cost fcn linear coefficient
phi2 = 7.9846; % Abatement cost fcn constant
gamma1 = 4.3104*(10^(-5)); % Damage fcn linear coefficient
gamma2 = 8.2508; % Damage fcn constant
beta = 1/(1+0.05); % Discount factor
rho = 0.5; % Autoregressive parameter
150
x0 = 0; % Initial depletion
ubar = 297600/2; % Unconstrained aggregate pumping
k1 = 2; % First pumping zone lag, in years
k2 = 8; % Second pumping zone lag, in years
sigma2 = 135598*0.25; % Variance in depletion
%%% Solve system of first-order conditions %%%
a0 = [297600/2; 297600/2]; % Make a starting guess at the solution
options = optimset(’Display’,’notify’,’MaxFunEvals’,100000,’MaxIter’, ...
100000); % Fsolve options
A = zeros(evals,2); % Generate empty matrix to store optimal abatement
% quantities
for i = 1:evals
beta = BETA(i); % Set parameter value
%sigma2 = SIGMA2(i);
[A(i,:),fval] = fsolve(@objfun,a0,options); % Call solver
end
%%% Calculate trading ratios %%%
RATIO = zeros(evals,1); % Generate empty matrix to store trading ratios
for i = 1:evals
SUMS = zeros(T,2); % Generate empty matrix to store terms in summation
beta = BETA(i); % Set parameter value
%sigma2 = SIGMA2(i); % Set parameter value
for t = k1:(k2-1)
SUMS(t,1) = (beta^(t-1))*(rho^t)*exp((-1)*gamma1*(rho^(t-k1))* ...
A(i,1) + gamma1*(rho^t)*(x0+(rho^((-1)*k1))*ubar) + ...
(((gamma1^2)*(sigma2^2)*(1-(rho^(2*t))))/(2*(1-(rho^2)))) ...
+ gamma2);
end % Loop to calculate terms in first summation
for t = k2:T
SUMS(t,2) = (beta^(t-1))*(rho^t)*exp((-1)*gamma1*(rho^(t-k1))* ...
A(i,1) +(-1)*gamma1*(rho^(t-k2))*A(i,2) + gamma1*(rho^t)* ...
(x0+(rho^((-1)*k1))*ubar+(rho^((-1)*k2))*ubar) + (((gamma1^2)* ...
(sigma2^2)*(1-(rho^(2*t))))/(2*(1-(rho^2))))+ gamma2);
end % Loop to calculate terms in second summation
RATIO(i,1) = ((gamma1/(rho^k2))*sum(SUMS(:,2)))/((gamma1/(rho^k1))* ...
sum(SUMS(:,1)) + (gamma1/(rho^k1))*sum(SUMS(:,2)));
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : objfun.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
% Date : June 24, 2010
% Ref : Objective fcn to minimize abatement and damage costs
% from pumping in two zones
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function F = objfun(a)
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global T phi1 phi2 gamma1 gamma2 beta rho x0 ubar sigma2 k1 k2
% Define global variables
%%% Define terms inside summation signs %%%
SUMS = zeros(T,2);
for t = k1:(k2-1)
SUMS(t,1) = (beta^(t-1))*(rho^t)*exp((-1)*gamma1*(rho^(t-k1))*a(1) ...
+ gamma1*(rho^t)*(x0+(rho^((-1)*k1))*ubar) + (((gamma1^2)* ...
(sigma2^2)*(1-(rho^(2*t))))/(2*(1-(rho^2)))) + gamma2);
end
for t = k2:T
SUMS(t,2) = (beta^(t-1))*(rho^t)*exp((-1)*gamma1*(rho^(t-k1))*a(1) ...
+(-1)*gamma1*(rho^(t-k2))*a(2) + gamma1*(rho^t)*(x0+( ...
rho^((-1)*k1))*ubar+(rho^((-1)*k2))*ubar) + (((gamma1^2)* ...
(sigma2^2)*(1-(rho^(2*t))))/(2*(1-(rho^2))))+ gamma2);
end
%%% Define system of equations %%%
% F = [((1-(beta^T))/(1-beta))*phi1*exp(phi1*a(1)+phi2) - (gamma1/ ...
% (rho^k1))*sum(SUMS(:,1)) - (gamma1/(rho^k1))*sum(SUMS(:,2));
% ((1-(beta^T))/(1-beta))*phi1*exp(phi1*a(2)+phi2) - (gamma1/ ...
% (rho^k2))*sum(SUMS(:,2))];
F = [phi1*exp(phi1*a(1)+phi2) - (gamma1/(rho^k1))*sum(SUMS(:,1)) - ...
(gamma1/(rho^k1))*sum(SUMS(:,2));
phi1*exp(phi1*a(2)+phi2) - (gamma1/(rho^k2))*sum(SUMS(:,2))];
C.3 Computer Code for Chapter 4
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : optim4.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
% Date : June 22, 2011
% Ref : Calculate optimal road salt application along highway
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%% SET PARAMETER VALUES %%%%%
dx = 0.05; % Dispersivity in x-direction, in mi^2/yr
dy = 0.05; % Dispersivity in y-direction, in mi^2/yr
dz = 0.05; % Dispersivity in z-direction, in mi^2/yr
v = 1; % Velocity of ground water, in mi/yr
x = 40; % Perpendicular distance of well from highway, in mi
end of highway, in mi
end of highway, in mi
z = 0.01; % Well depth, in mi
alpha = 0.35; % Percentage of salt applied that dissolves in ground water
points = 40; % Number of point sources in addition to y = 0
tmax = 2000; % Upper limit of integration in steady-state weighted
% transfer fcn
constr = 1.0420*(10^6); % Contamination concentration at the well, in
% mg/mi^3
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%%%%% CALCULATE STEADY-STATE WEIGHTED TRANSFER FUNCTION %%%%%
TRANSFER = zeros((points+1),1); % Generate empty vector of weighted
% transfer fcn values
ROAD = ((-1)*(ymin)):((ymin+ymax)/points):ymax; % Generate y values to
% road
for i = 1:(points+1)
for t = 1:tmax
TRANSFER(i,1) = TRANSFER(i,1) + ((1/(8*((pi*t)^(3/2))* ...
((dx*dy*dz)^(1/2))))*(exp(((-1)*((x-(v*t))^2)/(4*dx*t))- ...
(((ROAD(i))^2)/(4*dy*t))-((z^2)/(4*dz*t)))));
end
end % Calculate steady-state transfer fcn values to each road segment
for i = 1:(points+1)
COEFS(1,i) = alpha*TRANSFER(i,1);
end % Calculate portion of emissions that dissolves in ground water
%%%%% CONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION PROCEDURE %%%%%
start = 1000; % Define starting value in optimization
E0 = zeros((points+1),1); % Generate empty vector of starting values
E0(:,1) = start; % Fill in vector of starting values
options=optimset(’Display’,’iter’,’MaxFunEvals’,100000,’MaxIter’, ...
100000,’TolFun’,1e-15,’TolCon’,1e-15);
Aeq = []; % No equality constraints
beq = []; % No equality constraints
lb = []; % No lower bound
ub = []; % No upper bound
nonlcon = []; % No nonlinear constraints
[E,fval] = fmincon(@myfun4,E0,COEFS,constr,Aeq,beq,lb,ub,nonlcon,options)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Program : myfun4.m
% Programmer: Yusuke Kuwayama
% Date : June 22, 2011
% Ref : Function in procedure to calculate optimal road salt
% application along highway
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function f = myfun4(E)
%%%%% FIXED PARAMTERS %%%%%
apermile = 8594.8; % Benefit fcn paramter ’a’ per mile
bpermile = 23949677136; % Benefit functin paramter ’b’ per mile
n = 0.25; % Benefit function curvature paramter n
beta = 0.95; % Discount factor
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%%%%% VARIABLE PARAMETER VALUES %%%%%
points = 41; % Number of point sources
roadlength = 20; % Length of highway segment, in mi
%%%%% CALCULATE SIMULATION-SPECIFIC PARAMETER VALUES %%%%%
a = apermile*(roadlength/points);
b = bpermile*(roadlength/points);
%%%%% DEFINE FUNCTION %%%%%
%TEMP = (E./b).^n;
f = (-1)*a*(1/(1-beta))*(sum((E./b).^n));
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